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The Libyan economy has witnessed remarkable changes especially since the 1970s 
when the government introduced the so-called nationalisation and Libyanisation 
programmes and adopting socialist system. Consequently, the state undertook control 
of all economic and financial aspects. The Libyan banking system has been 
characterised as a governmental control system for credit allocation. This situation led 
to lax prudential regulation and supervision in banking sector as well as resulting in 
various problems such as lack of performance, low efficiency, high levels of non- 
performing loans, and lack of internal control systems. Therefore, Libyan government 
has return to privatisation in early 1990s including, the initial reform policy to 
enhance performance of banking sector. The main questions of this study are: 1) is 
the current performance of the Libyan banking sector acceptable. 2) Have the Libyan 
banking reforms affected internal control system, banking efficiency, and 
performance. The objective of this study is to assess and evaluate performance 
through measuring efficiency in the Libyan commercial banking sector by using Data 
Envelopment Analysis (DEA). In this study, however, we attempt to incorporate such 
qualitative aspects into our measurement of efficiency scores in order to appraise the 
potentials of the internal control systems by using questionnaire analysis. Recent 
literature on financial and banking reform is reviewed. In the light of this, an 
overview of the initial reforms in Libya is presented emphasising on the impact of 
government control over banking sector. Using DEA technique, the efficiency of 
Libyan commercial banking is analysed, as cross-section and DEA-window analysis 
during the period between 1980 and 2000, indicating little impact of the banking 
reforms, with scale inefficiency. In addition, score efficiency in conjunction with 
financial ratios suggest that banks with high efficiency scores also exhibit high scores 
in capital adequacy, asset utilisation, and liquidity position, and lower ratios in 
profitability, and asset quality. Finally, in terms of audit function efficiency, the 
results show that banks with high technical efficiency tend to have higher efficiency 
in auditing function. 
1 
Abstract 
List of contents 11 
List of tables vi 
List of figures viii 





INTRODUCTION, AIMS, OBJCTIVES, AND PLAN OF THESIS 
1.1 INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................. 
1 
1.2 RESEARCH PROBLEM ................................................................................................................... 
3 
1.3 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES ............................................................................................................... 
4 
1.4 RESEARCH QUESTIONS ................................................................................................................ 
5 
1.5 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY ........................................................................................................ 
5 
1.6 SOURCES OF DATA ........................................................................................................................ 
6 
1.7 SCOPE OF THE STUDY ................................................................................................................... 
6 
1.8 CONTRIBUTION OF THE STUDY .................................................................................................... 
7 
1.9 PLAN OF THE THESIS .................................................................................................................... 
8 
CHAPTER TWO 
THE BANKING SECTOR IN THE LIBYAN ECONOMY 
2.1 INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................................... 
11 
2.2 THE LIBYAN ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT .................................................................................. 
12 
2.2.1 Libya under the Italian Occupation ......................................................................................... 
12 
2.2.1.1 The Libyan Economy under the Italian Colony ............................................................. 14 
2.2.1.2 The Libyan Economy under British Administration ..................................................... 
15 
2.2.2 Independence and oil Discovery ............................................................................................... 
17 
2.2.2.1 Independence ..................................................................................................................... 
17 
2.2.2.2 Oil Discovery and its Impact on the Libyan Economy .................................................. 
18 
2.2.2.3 The Impact of Oil Revenues on the Libyan Economy ................................................... 
19 
2.2.2.4 The Five -Year Social and Economic Development Plan 1963-69 ................................ 
20 
2.2.2.5 Population Growth ............................................................................................................ 
22 
2.2.3 TheNewStrategy on the LibyanEconomy and the Role of Government .................................. 
23 
2.2.3.1 Nationalisation and Development Plans in the 1970s ..................................................... 
24 
2.2.3.2 Economic Performance in the 1970s ................................................................................ 
26 
2 2 Economi 33 Oil P d th Cri i f th i 1980 28 . . s ............................................................ r ces an e c s so e 2.2.3.4 The Economic Trends in the 1980s .................................................................................. 
31 
23 2 5 Towards Privatisation 33 . . ....................................................................................................... 2.2.4 Foreign Trade ........................................................................................................................... 36 2 3 TI{E FINANCIAL SECTOR AND MON 39 . ETARY POLICY ................................................................... 
ii 
2.3.1 TheGeneralCharacteristics of theFinancial Sector ................................................................. 
39 
2.3.1.1 Financial Market ............................................................................................................... 
39 
2.3.1.2 The Financial Institutions ................................................................................................ 
40 
2.. 3.2BANKING SECTOR EVOLUTION, DEVELOPMENTS AND TYPES ................................................. 
41 
2.3.2.1 The Central Bank of Libya ................................................................................................ 
41 
2.3.2.2 The Evolution andDevelopment of the Commercial Banking Sector in Libya ................ 
42 
2.3.2.2.1 Before 1951 ................................................................................................................. 
42 
2.. 3.2.2.2 The Banking System During Independence and Libaynisation ............................ 43 
2.3.2.2.3 The Nationalisation Period ........................................................................................ 
46 
2.3.3 Specialised Banks ...................................................................................................................... 
48 
2.3.4 The Financial and Investment Corporation ............................................................................ 
51 
2.4 THE ROLE OF THE BANKING SECTOR IN THE DEVELOPMENT PLANS ............... 53 
2.5 RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE BANKING SECTOR IN LIBYA ........................... 55 
2.5.1 The New Banking Law ............................................................................................................ 
55 
2.5.2 The Bank of Commerce and Development (BCD) ................................................................ 
56 
2.5.3 Foreign Exchange and Financial Services Company (FEFSC) ............................................ 
57 
2.5.4 Domestic Banks (Al-Massarif AL-Ahliya) ............................................................................. 
57 
2.6 SUMMARY ................................................................................................................................... 
58 
CHAPTER THREE 
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE BANKING INDUSTRY: AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 
3.1 INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................................... 
62 
3.2 TIIE BANKING INDUSTRY IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY ............................................................. . 66 
3.2.1 The Functions of the Banking Institutions .............................................................................. 
68 
3.2.2 Theories of Financial Intermediaries ....................................................................................... 70 
3.2.3 Recent Changes in Market and Intermediaries ....................................................................... 
74 
3.3 FINANCIAL AND BANKING CRISES: REASONS AND EFFECTS ...................................................... . 
77 
3.4 THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS IN THE BANKING REFORMS: A REVIEW OF 
REFORM POLICIES ................................................................................................................................. . 
83 
3.4.1 Banking Reform Theory ......................................................................................................... . 
85 
3.4.2 Banking Regulation and Supervision: Objectives, Rules, and Prospective ........................... . 88 
3.4.2.1 Banking Supervision ........................................................................................................ . 
88 
3.4.2.2 Banking Regulation ......................................................................................................... . 
89 
3.4.2.3 Capital Adequacy .............................................................................................................. 90 
3.4.2.4 Loan Classification ............................................................................................................ 
91 
3.4.2.5 Internal Control Systems: Definition and Components ................................................. 93 
3.4.2.6 Government Intervention in the Banking System ........................................................ 100 
3.5 LESSONS FROM OTHER EXPERIENCES ..................................................................................... 
100 
3.5.1 The Malaysia Experience ....................................................................................................... 101 
3.5.1.1 The Financial System in Malaysia ................................................................................. 102 
3.5.1.2 Recent Developments in the Malaysian Banking Sector .............................................. 103 
3.5.1.3 The Reform Policy in Malaysia ...................................................................................... 104 3.5.1.4 Lessons from Malaysian Experience ............................................................................. 109 3.5.2 The Saudi Arabia Experience ................................................................................................. 110 
3.5.2.1 The Structure of the Banking System in KSA .............................................................. 111 3.5.2.2 Banking Growth, Consolidation and Restructuring .................................................... 112 
3.6 SUMMARY ................................................................................................................................. 116 
CHAPTER FOUR 




4.2 THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LIBYAN COMMERCIAL BANKING SECTOR ................................. 
120 
111 
4.2.1 Assets and Liability Structure of the Commercial Banking System ...................................... 126 
4.2.1.1 Structure of Assets .......................................................................................................... 
126 
4.2.1.2 Structure of Liabilities .................................................................................................... 
134 
4.2.2 Growth of Network Branches ................................................................................................. 
139 
4.2.3 Comparative Analysis ............................................................................................................. 
142 
4.3 THE MONETARY POLICY FUNCTION AND ITS INSTRUMENTS .............................. 144 
4.4 THE INITIAL REFORM POLICY IN BANKING SECTOR .................................................................. 
149 
4.4.1 The Need for Banking Reforms in Libya ............................................................................... 
149 
4.4.2 Assessing the Libyan Banking Reforms Experience ............................................................. 
158 
4.5 GOVERNMENT CONTROL VERSUS LIBERALISATION ........................................................... 
159 
4.5.1 Credit Policy and Government Intervention .......................................................................... 
160 
4.5.1.1 Development of Lending Activity and Loans Classification..... ........ 00.0.0 ...... 0.0000.0 ....... 
161 
4.5.1.2 The Main Features of Loan Policy of Commercial Banks in Libya ........................... 166 
, 4.5.1.3 Non-performing loans: Reasons, Results and Impacts on Banks Credit ................... 
168w 
4.5.13.1 Loan Problems and their Reasons .......................................................................... 168 
4.5.1.3.2 Size of Non-performing Loans in Libyan Commercial Banks ............................. 170 
4.5.1.3.3 The Negative Impacts of Non-performing Loans, ............. -. 0.0 ...... 0- ........ 0_0 ....... 
170. 
4.5.2 Internal Control System in Libyan Commercial Banks ......................................................... 
173 
4.6 SUMMARY................................................................................................................................. 178 
CHAPTER FIVE 
METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES AND BANKING EFFICIENCY 
5.1 INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................... 180 5.2 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY .................................................................................................... 180 
5.2.1 Questionnaire Design ............................................................................................................. 181 
5.2.2 Banking Efficiency as a Basis for Establishing DEA Technique ......................................... 
182 
5.2.2.1 The Concept of Banking Efficiency ............................................................................... 184 
5.2.2.2 Data Envelopment Analysis Methodology .................................................................... 187 
5.2.23 The Main Approaches to DEA ....................................................................................... 194 
5.2.2.4 Models of DEA ................................................................................................................ 195 
5.2.2.5 Window Analysis ............................................................................................................. 
199 
5.2.2.6 Some Applications of DEA in the Banking Industry ................................................... 201 
5.2.2.7 Advantages and Disadvantages of Using DEA Technique .......................................... 204 
5.2.2.8 Selection of Inputs and Outputs ..................................................................................... 
205 
5.2.3 Financial Ratios ...................................................................................................................... 207 
5.3 SUMMARY ............................................................................................................................ 
212 
CHAPTER SIX 
EVALUATION OF THE PERFORMANCE OF LIBYAN COMMERCIAL BANKING : AN 
APPLICATION OF DEA 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
......................................................................................................................... 213 
6.2 SELECTION OF INPUTS AND OUTPUTS ...................................................................................... 214 
6.3 STRATEGY OF ANALYSIS .......................................................................................................... 216 
6.3.1 Measuring Efficiency Score ............................................................................................ 217 6.3.2 Window Analysis ............................................................................................................. 224 6.3.3 The Impact of Non performing Loans on Efficiency ..................................................... 230 6.3.4 Sources of Inefficiency Scores of Libyan Commercial Banking .................................... 233 6.4 MICROECONOMIC PERFORMANCE ............................ 236 .............................................................. 6.4.1 DEA in Conjunction with Financial Ratios- Model one ................................................ 236 6.4.2 Empirical Results from DEA in Conjunction with Financial Ratios ............................. 238 6.5 QUESTIONNAIRE ANALYSIS ..................... . 244 ................................................................................ 6.5.1 Introduction 
...................................................................................................................... 244 6.5.2 Objectives of the Questionnaire Study ............................................................................. 
245 
iv 
6.5.3 Results ............................................................................................................................. 247 6.5.3.1 Descriptive Analysis .................................................................................................... 247 
6.53.1.1 General Information ................................................................................................ 
247 
6.5.3.1.2 Audit Function ......................................................................................................... 250 6.5.3.1.3 Senior Management and Audit Functions ............................................................. 252 
6.53.1.4 Scope and Limitations of Audit Functions ............................................................. 
255 
6.5.3.2 Evaluation of Internal Control Components ............................................................ 260 6.5.3.3 Measuring Efficiency of Internal Audit Functions .................................................. 263 6.5.33.1 Empirical Results ................................................................................................. 266 6.6 SUMMARY ................................................................................................................................. 267 
CHAPTER SEVEN 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDIATION 





3.7 LIMITATIONS AND DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH ........................................................ 
288 
APPENDIX 
APPENDIX ONE THE EVOLUTION OF THE MONETARY POLICY ..................................... 290 
APPENDIX TWO DEA MODELS .................................................................................................... 303 
APPENDIX THREE WINDOW ANALYSIS OF LIBYAN COMMERCIAL BANKS ................ 309 
APPENDIX FOUR QUESTINNAIRE DESIGEN ............................................................................ 316 
APPENDIX FIVE QUESTIONNAIRE ANALYSIS ........................................................................ 325 
BIBIOLOGRAPHY ............................................................................................................................ 334 
V 
LIST OF TABLES 
Page 
Table 2.1 Table 2.1. Summary of Expenditure of the Italian Government on Public 15 
Works and Utilities (In thousand liras) 
Table 2.2 Libyan Imports and Exports, 1945-1950 (in 000 £) 16 
Table 2.3 Government Budgets from 1942/43 to 1950/51(Libyan £ in 000) 17 
Table 2.4 Foreign Assistance Allocation to Libya 18 
Table 2.5 The Contribution of Oil Revenues to Total Libyan Revenues 20 
Table 2.6 Total Imports and Food Imports in Libya, 1963-69 (in $ mn) 20 
Table 2.7 Development Expenditure, 1963-69 (in LD mn) 21 
Table 2.8 Population 1980-2003 (in million) 22 
Table 2.9 Allocation among Sectors in the 1973-1975 Plans 25 
Table2.10 Economic Indicators in the 1970s (in $ billion) 27 
Table 2.11 Oil Revenues, 1980-90 ($billion) 29 
Table 2.12 Allocation of Development Plan by Sectors (in per cent) 30 
Table 2.13 Trends in GDP, 1980-1989 32 
Table 2.14 GDP for Libyan Economy in 1990s ($ billion) 33 
Table 2.15 Contribution of Oil Sector from 1990-99(as percentage) 34 
Table 2.16 Foreign Trade ($ billion) 37 
Table 2.17 Percentage Distribution of Libyan Trade, 1989-2000 38 
Table 3.1 Key Macroeconomic Indicators 1997-2002 in Malaysia 102 
Table 3.2 Assets of the Banking System in Malaysia in 1997 and 2003 103 
Table 3.3 Performance of the Malaysian Banking System, 1990-2002 104 
Table 3.4 Assets and Loans of the Malaysian Banking System ($ billion) 104 
Table 3.5 Non-Performing Loans of Commercial banks as Percentage 107 
Table 3.6 Bank Branches Operating in the Saudi Arabia 3rd Qrt 2001 111 
Table 3.7 The Saudi Banking System in 1980-2002 114 
Table 4.1 Commercial Banks' Assets, Total Deposits and GDP (LD million) 123 
Table 4.2 Assets and Liabilities Structure of the Commercial Banks in Libya (1970- 2001) 127 
in percentage 
Table 4.3 Commercial Bank's Growth in Libya: Deposits Structure 138 
Table 4.4 Commercial Banks and their Branches 140 
Table 4.5A Number of Commercial Bank Branches and their Financial Positions 141 
Table 4.5B Distribution of Commercial Banks Branches based Municipalities 1995 142 
Table 4.6 Economic Indicators 143 
Table 4.7 Money Supply and its Components 1970-2001 146 
Table 4.8 Money Supply and GDP in Libya 1970-2001 147 
Table 4.9 Total credit and Total deposits as percentage to GDP 1970 to 148 
Table 4.10 Aggregate of Assets and Liabilities of Domestic Banks 1997-2001 156 
Table 4.11 Banking Loan in Economic Activities During 1970 -1979 (LD mn) 163 
Table 4.12 Banking Credit in Economic Sectors During 1984 -2000 (LD mn) 164 
Table 4.13 Growth of Banking Loan (LD in million) 165 
Table4.13A Credit for Private Sector as Percentage of Total Credit 167 
Table 4.14 The Growth of Allowances Loans: in LD million 171 
Table 5.1 Summary of Selected of Previous Studies of commercial Bank Efficiency 189 
Table 6.1 Overall Performance of Libyan Commercial Banking Sector 219 
Table 6.2 Overall Performance in Libyan Commercial Banking 1980-2000 221 
Table 6.3 Targets for Unit Bank 2 Efficiency 45.95% Radial in 1988 223 
Table 6.4 Peers for Unit Bank 2 Efficiency 45.95% Radial in 1988 223 
Table 6.5 Average Efficiency Scores for Libyan Commercial Banks in Each Window 228 
Table 6.6 Window Analysis Mean, Variance, Difference Statistics 228 
Table 6.7 Summary of Efficiency Scores for Entire Period 229 
Table 6.8 Efficiency Scores of Libyan Commercial Banking under Scenario 1 231 
Table 6.9 Impact of Non-performing Loans on Technical Efficiency 231 
V1 
Table 6.10 Returns to Scale of Frontier Banks 233 
Table 6.11 Overall Efficiency Scores of Libyan Commercial Banks under Scenario 1 238 
Table 6.12 Mean Financial Ratio and Differences between DEA Groups 240 
Table 6.13 Questionnaire Distribution and Return 246 
Table 6.14 Auditor Qualifications 260 
Table 6.15 Strength of Audit Functions 261 
Table 6.16 Attention From Senior Management 262 
Table 6.17 Audit Function and Achievement its Duties 263 
Table 6.18 Efficiency Scores of Libyan Commercial Banks 266 
vi' 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Page 
Figure 1.1 Diagram of the Thesis 10 
Figure 2.1 Structure of the Libyan Banking System 41 
Figure 3.1 Research Concept 65 
Figure 3.2 Services Provided by Financial Intermediation 76 
Figure 4.1 The Total Assets and the Total Deposits as a Percentage of the GDP 125 
Figure 4.2 Development of Total Assets in Libyan commercial banks 129 
Figure 4.3 Deposits Growth in Libyan Commercial Bank (1970-2001) 136 
Figure 4.4 Growth of Provision of Non-performing Loans in Libyan Commercial Banks 172 
Figure 5.1 Farrell Efficiency 190 
Figure 5.2 Constant and Variable Returns to Scale Frontiers 197 
Figure 6.1 Average Technical, Pure and Scale Efficiency of Libyan Commercial Banking 219 
(1980-2000) Under scenario 1 
Figure 6.2 Average Technical, Pure and Scale Efficiency of Libyan Commercial Banking 220 
(1980-2000) Under Scenario 2 
Figure 6.3 Average Levels of Efficiency Scores of Libyan Commercial Banks by windows 225 
Figure 6.4 Sources of Inefficiency in Libyan commercial banks 235 
Figure 6.5 Job Title of Audit Function in Libyan Commercial Banks 248 
Figure 6.6 Higher Qualifications of Auditors in Libyan Commercial Banks 249 
Figure 6.7 Experience in Auditing Field 249 
Figure 6.8 Reports Feedback 251 
Figure 6.9 Audit Employee Competence 251 
Figure 6.10 Senior Management and Determination of General Policy of Audit Function 254 
Figure 6.11 Senior Management and Importance of Audit Function 254 
Figure 6.12 Viewpoint of Senior Management about Role of Audit Function 255 
Figure 6.13 Form of Audit Programmes 256 
Figure 6.14 Sufficiency of Audit Programmes 257 
Figure 6.15 Achievement of Internal Audit in Libyan Commercial Banking 257 
Figure 6.16 Reasons for Corruption and Embezzlement Cases 259 
Figure 6.17 Scatter of Efficiency in Libyan Commercial Banking 266 
vii' 
LIST OF ABBREVIATION 
ADB Asian Development Bank 
BCC Banker, Charters, and Cooper' model 
BCD Bank of Commerce and Development 
BIS Bank of International Settlement 
CAMEL Capital adequacy, Asset utilities, Management efficiency, Earnings, 
and Liquidity position 
CBL Central Bank of Libya 
CCR Charters, Cooper, and Rhodes' model 
CRS Constant Return to Scale 
DEA Data Envelopment Analysis 
DMUs Decision Making Unites 
DRS Decrease Return to Scale 
EC European countries 
FEFSC Foreign Exchange and financial Services Company 
GDP Gross Domestic Product 
IMF International monetary Fund 
IREB Industrial and the Real Estate Bank 
IRS Increase Return to Scale 
KSA Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
LAFB Libyan Arab Foreign Bank 
LAFIC Libyan Arab Foreign Investment Company 
LD Libyan Dinar 
NPL Non-Performing Loans 
PTE Pure Technical Efficiency 
ROA Return to Assets 
ROE Return to Equity 
SAMA Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency 
SE Scale Efficiency 
TD Total Deposits 
TE Technical Efficiency 
TL Total Loans 
US United State 
VRS Variable Return to Scale 
WB World Bank 
ix 
DEDICATION 
To the soul of my mother, Asia Al-Zorgani 
Who taught me how to deal in this life. Even though she died one and half year ago, 




I thank Allah for all the many blessings bestowed to me, particularly during my 
educational period in the United Kingdom. 
I owe the deepest gratitude to Dr. Taghavi, my major supervisor, for his help, 
patience, and encouragement during these years. He took an active interest in my 
research and he has been a constant source of inspiration, his contribution to my 
personal development extends far beyond this thesis. I am particularly grateful to my 
second supervisor Mr. Ian Lincoln. I am greatly indebted to Mr. Andrew Hunt, and 
Dr. John Pemberton for their illustration in the statistical side of this thesis, without 
them this would not have been possible. 
Words cannot express my gratitude to my parents, Mr. Mohammed Alwaddan, and 
Mrs. Asah Al-organs, who spent their lives paving the way to educate me in a right 
way, and to whom I dedicate this thesis. I want to thank them for their endless 
support and infinite sacrifices that made it possible for me to reach this stage of my 
life, without them the road to success would have been much more difficult. Also I 
would like to thank my brothers and sisters for their an conditional love and support, 
and particularly during graduate school. 
I would like to thank my friends in Real Estate Bank, particularly, Mohamed Abu- 
Krres, Alamari Algahwi, All Barrod, and Mahmud Nasser, for their supports during 
collecting data and conducting my questionnaire. 
Finally, I would like to especially thank my family, my wife Salma, and my children 
Mohammed, Mahmud, Malek, Moaad, and my daughter Maha, any success I have 
achieved is to do with their presence in my life. 
xi 
DECLARATION 
I certify that this work has not been accepted in substance for any degree and is not 
concurrently submitted for any degree other than that of Doctor of Philosophy of the 
university of Northumbria. I also declare that this work is the result of my own 
investigation except where otherwise stated. 
Signature of Student: ....... 
xii 
CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION, AIMS, OBJECTIVES, AND 
PLAN OF THESIS 
1.1 Introduction 
The financial sector throughout the world has recently witnessed significant 
developments, including the consolidation of institutions, the globalisation of operations, 
the development of new technologies, and the universalisation of banks. As a 
consequence, the expansion of banks has been accompanied by a banking crisis leading 
to the shaking of public confidence in the sector as well as deterioration in the quality of 
its services. Moreover, the 1980s witnessed a major banking crisis in many developing 
countries, followed spreading in the 1990s to many industrial countries. The total cost 
of this crisis has been estimated at around $250 billion (Honohan, 1997). 
However, in the aftermath of the financial crises in both developed and developing 
countries, the efficiency of the banking industry has recently been receiving even more 
attention (Berger and Humphrey, 1997) rendering the examination of this banking 
efficiency an important issue for both the public and the policy makers alike. 
Meanwhile, international cooperative efforts between the IMF, the World Bank, and the 
Basle Committee have focused on the possibility of alleviating a potential banking crisis 
by adopting a set of reform policies, including strengthening the framework of banking 
1 
regulations, supervision, and capital adequacy as well as the internal control systems in 
order to ensure a sound and efficient banking sector. 
However, banks as financial intermediaries stand between the suppliers of money and 
the users of money. Banks receive funds from depositors (suppliers), and in return they 
have to assure these depositors that their money is efficiently used and carefully 
monitored. In other words, commercial banking is expected to be managed efficiently, 
prudently, safely, and profitably (Reed et al., 1984). Therefore, any discussion of 
banking as an institution or as an industry should deal with many aspects, including the 
structure of the banking system, risk management, the quality of services, profitability, 
and conduct as well as the regulation and supervision of banking activities. These 
aspects will jointly determine the banking efficiency. Yet, the general structures of the 
institutions that provide financial services are rapidly changing. Thus these institutions 
should become more efficient by improving profitability, intermediating larger amounts 
of funds, more competitive prices, better quality services, and greater safety and 
soundness (Berger et al., 1993). 
In the early 1970s, the practices of the Libyan banking system were subjected to 
fundamental changes. The first dramatic transformation came about in 1970 when the 
government proceeded with the nationalization of the banking system, with the 
introduction of a new Banking law (No. 63/1971), which allowed the government to 
own and control the banking system (Ghanem, 1987). 
2 
However, over the past three decades or so, the banking system in Libya has been in 
severe turmoil, primarily regarding continuous interventions in the financial sector and 
the damaging consequences of these interventions for the banks and the economy as a 
whole. On the other hand, the Libyan government has recently been willing to open up 
the country to foreign investment in many sectors, in order to adapt to the challenges 
imposed by globalisation. However, that would imply the reform of the financial sector 
in general and the liberalisation of the banking sector in particular. 
1.2 Research Problem 
The banking sector in Libya, as in most developing countries, has witnessed significant 
government control particularly following nationalisation and the Libyanisation 
programmes of the early 1970 (more details are given later). Moreover, the banks have 
been subject to fundamental changes and regulations, which allowed the government to 
own and control the banking sector. However, this situation has led to enormous levels 
of government intervention, affecting the efficiency of Libyan commercial banking, and 
resulting in poor performance, high levels of non-performing loans and a lack of internal 
control systems [(El-Jehaimi et al, (1992); Attia and El-ghumati, (1993); Beal-kaer 
(1993); CBL, (1992); Al-Arbah (1997); Chamia et al, (1997)]. 
Hence, banking efficiency has become an area of great concern to the banks and 
regulators as well as researchers, as the industry tries to readjust itself to cope with the 
rapid changes that are taking place in the global banking environment. The performance 
of any institution, nonetheless, is often evaluated in terms of its efficiency regarding the 
use of resources, and yet the concept of efficiency is primarily an engineering concept, 
3 
mainly concerned with the measurement of the value of (a single) output for a given 
level of inputs. However, considered in a wider context, efficiency management is 
concerned with the full utilisation of the available inputs to achieve an optimum mix of 
outputs within the boundaries of feasibility in operations (Saha and Ravisanker, 2000). 
Efficiency in banking organisations is defined as success in transforming resources to 
outputs. This research, therefore, will focus on: 1) assessing and evaluating performance 
through measuring the efficiency of the Libyan commercial banking sector by using 
Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA); and 2) appraising the potential of internal control 
systems as an important component of banking management and a foundation for safe, 
sound, and efficient operations in the banking industry. 
1.3 Research Objectives 
To address the research problem, this study aims to critically analyse the factors that 
produce the overall stability of the banking sector. Hence, the research objectives can be 
summarised as follows: 
1. To provide a descriptive analysis of the Libyan commercial banking sector with 
special emphasis on the main problems and reforms introduced during 1970- 
2001. 
2. To evaluate the performance of the Libyan commercial banking sector by 
measuring its banking efficiency. 
3. To appraise the potential of internal control systems and the role they can play in 
sustaining the Libyan commercial banking system in meeting its objectives. 
4. To give recommendations on banking reforms in Libya. 
4 
1.4 Research Questions 
This study will undertake a detailed examination of the performance of Libyan 
commercial banks during the period 1970-2001, focussing on the operation of the 
Libyan commercial banking sector. However, the research recognises that internal 
control systems represent a foundation for safe and sound of banking operations 
enabling higher efficiency and higher performance. Here, several key questions 
following need to be answered: 
1) Given the performance of the banking sector in the past 30 years, is the current 
performance of the Libyan banking sector acceptable? 
2) Regarding the initial reforms policy, have the reforms introduced into the 
Libyan banking system affected internal control systems, and banking 
efficiency and performance? 
1.5 Research Methodology 
The methodology used in this study is: 
1) A questionnaire study designed to evaluate the effectiveness of internal 
control systems in Libyan commercial banks. A detailed analysis of the 
questionnaire design and its aims are provided in chapter 5. 
2) Using DEA methodology in conjunction with financial ratios to measure 
banking efficiency in Libyan commercial banks during 1980 to 2000. Further 
detailed analysis of DEA and the methodological approach used are offered in 
chapter 5. 
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1.6 Sources of Data 
Despite the usual data collection problems associated with developing economies, the 
quality of data concerning the Libyan banking sector is sound. The publications of the 
Central Bank of Libya constitute the main sources of data for this study. These 
publications include CBL Annual Reports, Economic Bulletins, Special Reports and 
Studies, the official Gazette, decrees and acts etc. Other sources also include the annual 
reports of commercial banks, international financial statistics, International Monetary 
Fund papers, regional country reports, and World Bank publications. 
1.7 Scope of the Study 
This study will cover the period 1970-2001, primarily because: 
1. The real national banking sector in the country began in 1970 
following nationalisation and the Libyanisation of the banking sector, 
witnessing the emergence of the Central Bank of Libya as the sole 
monetary authority of the country. 
2. Banks were required by the government to allocate funds to pre- 
selected sectors of the economy with no regard to the banking system 
of credit-worthiness; hence adversely affecting banking development. 
3. The adoption of socialism in 1978 and the phasing out of the private 
sector has been a catastrophic blow to the commercial banking sector. 
4. In late 1989, the Libyan government started moving towards 
privatisation, commencing its liberalisation policy by promoting 
foreign investment. 
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1.8 Contribution of the Study 
This study will focus on the reform policies, performance and internal control systems in 
Libyan commercial banking. It will also investigate the performance of Libyan 
commercial banking over the period 1970-2001. Therefore, this study is expected to be 
of real value to various parties such as the commercial banking sector, the Central Bank 
of Libya (CBL) as the monetary authority and economic analysts and researchers. 
1) To the Libyan Banking Sector 
The study will be of great help in banking management by analysing and evaluating 
banking performance, efficiency and the effectiveness of internal control systems. 
2) To the Libyan Government 
The Libyan government has established the banking sector to be used as a tool to 
achieve its objectives regarding its socio-economic plans. Therefore, the government is 
using the commercial banking to provide credit facilities for its projects. Hence the 
government, and especially the CBL, is likely to benefit from this study by under 
standing the negative impacts of direct intervention. 
3) To Researchers 
A search of the literature to date reveals that no comprehensive research has been 
conducted in the area of efficiency, reforms, and the internal control systems of Libyan 
commercial banking operations. This study will be definitive, encompassing the 
operational characteristics of the major financial institutions operating within the Libyan 
economy, and therefore will be of benefit to researchers in this area. 
7 
To this end, the following points emphasise the significance of this study: 
1) It evaluates the performance of Libyan commercial banking 
for the first time. 
2) It critically investigates the impact of government intervention in the 
commercial banking sector. 
3) It attempts to measure the efficiency and the performance of the 
commercial banking system in Libya. 
4) By testing and evaluating the internal control systems, this study 
produces further evidence regarding the quality of the services 
provided by the commercial banking system in Libya. 
5) It provides a framework for further studies. 
1.9 Plan of the Thesis 
This thesis is divided into seven chapters as shown in figure 1.1. Chapter two gives an 
overview of the Libyan economy, with special reference to the financial sector and its 
historical development. 
Chapter three provides a review of the literature with regard to the banking reforms. 
However, the first part of this chapter is mainly concerned with financial intermediation 
theory and the evolution of banking institutions, whilst the second part deals with the 
world financial and banking crisis and the impact of this crisis on the banking system. 
However, the final part of this chapter tries to investigate international cooperation 
regarding the banking crisis in issuing new regulations and standard principles for 
banking activities, with special emphasis on banking reform policies the world over. 
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Chapter four attempts to address the evolution of the banking sector in Libya regarding 
its development, growth, and pre-reform policies. This chapter is primarily concerned 
with the development of the Libyan commercial banks, as suggested by financial and 
economic indicators. Moreover, it will try to examine the structure of assets and 
liabilities regarding Libyan commercial banking during the period 1970-2001. 
Chapter five defines the concept of banking efficiency, and outlines the methodology of 
the study, while chapter six tests Libyan banking efficiency using the DEA 
methodology. The empirical findings are described in this chapter. The final chapter will 
incorporate the summary, the conclusions of this study and the recommendations for 
bank management, Central Bank of Libya, government, and future studies concerning 
Libyan commercial banks' performance and its efficiency. 
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THE BANKING SECTOR IN THE LIBYAN 
ECONOMY 
2.1 Introduction 
The modem Libyan economy depends on oil revenues, thus rendering Libya an oil 
rentier state. Prior to the discovery of oil in 1958 and the beginning of production in 
1961, Libya had been one of the poorest countries in the world (Vandewalle, 1998). 
As Ghanem (1982) argued, the Libyan economic situation before and during the Italian 
occupation had depended on agriculture, animal breeding and handcrafts. The discovery 
and the exportation of crude oil have changed the Libyan economy from one of the 
poorest countries in the world to the highest income in the region (Wright, 1982). 
Furthermore, the Libyan government became responsible for finding the best way to 
spend the oil revenues regarding the various economic sectors, introducing a number of 
development plans in the 1970s and 1980s. 
Following the end of World War II and the defeat of the Italians by the Allies in 1942, 
the monetary and banking systems broke down (ibid, 1982). However, before 
independence, the new government took control of the banking sector and monetary 
system established by the Bank of Libya and the commercial banks in April 1956, and 
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issued banking law No. 4 /1963, which was amended by decree No. 63/1971 (Bichara 
and El-Wifati, 1987). 
This chapter attempts to describe the economic development process and its influence on 
both the banking and monetary systems in Libya from the early 1950s until now. This 
chapter is divided into three sections. The first part investigates the Libyan economic 
environment from the Italian occupation to independence and the oil discovery, and up 
to the September Revolution. 
Part two provides the background of the financial sector in Libya by offering a summary 
of the financial markets and institutions. It discusses the general characteristics of the 
banking sector, the national bank of Libya and the banking laws, nationalization and the 
recent developments in banking system. 
The third part discusses the role of the banking sector in the development plans. The 
chapter will end with a summary of the findings. 
2.2 The Libyan Economic Environment 
2.2.1 Libya under the Italian occupation 
Libya has suffered from different foreign rules for most of its known history: the Greeks, 
the Romans, the Phoenicians, the Ottomans and the Italians (Wright, 1982). Before the 
twentieth century, Libya had been under rule of the Ottomans from 1551. The Karmanli 
family took over the country and established a semi-independent state from 1771 to 
1835, when direct Ottoman rule was restored. By the middle of the nineteenth century, 
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the Ottoman Empire was in serious decline and had become known as the sick man of 
Europe (Craig, 1986; and Ghanem, 1982). 
According to Ghanem (1982), before Italian colonial rule agriculture had been the 
backbone of the Libyan economy, where barley and wheat had constituted the main 
products which depended on the fluctuations of rainfall. However, the palm date had 
been the main food source, especially in southern Libya. Meanwhile, handicrafts such as 
hide dying used to produce shoes, sandals and sword belts as well as ship building had 
been the main occupations of the people in Libya. He adds: 
"Thus the income of Libya during the reign of Youssef Pasha Karamanli 
became from the imposing royalties on other countries who wanted their 
fleets to sail in safely in the Mediterranean ". 
During that time, the most important activity had been the Caravan traders between 
Africa and Europe through Libya. However, Libya suffered from the sparseness of 
resources, and the country had been described as waterless and trade-less, by the Italians 
(ibid, 1982). As a result of its strategic position, Libya has been subjected to a wave of 
foreign military invasions and colonisation for more than 3000 years (Nyrop, 1973), 
hence making Tripoli one of the leading merchant towns in Africa (Wright, 1982). 
The Italians considered Libya as an integral part of Italy - the `fourth shore'. To achieve 
their objectives, the Italians began with "a peaceful permeation" particularly in 
commercial activities. For instance, in Tripoli the Banco Di Roma started its operation 
of lending money to agriculture, light industry, mineral projects and shipping. A further 
eighteen branches of the bank were opened, and this activity was extended to Benghazi 
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and began to take over trans-Saharan trade, doubling the trade between Libya and Italy 
between 1906 and 1910. As Wright (1982) points out: 
"Italian diplomacy spent 30 years, on and off, preparing 
international Opinion for the eventual occupation of 
Turkey's remaining north African possessions" 
As a result, the Italian banks played an important role in the subsequent occupation, for 
example collecting colonial information and purchasing land (Ghanem, 1982). The 
French occupation of Algeria and Tunisia, on the other hand had encouraged Italy to 
rethink her imperialist programme. Consequently, Italian aggression started in October 
1911, and the Libyan resistance was not broken until the execution of the leader of the 
resistance, Omar E1-Mukhtar, in 1932 (Wright, 1982). 
2.2.1.1 The Libyan Economy under Italian Colonialism 
As the Italian dream was to create a fourth shore and therefore strategically control the 
central Mediterranean basin, Libya was seen as a part of the mother country Italy; her 
role being to provide her mother with corn, olive oil and other products (ibid, 1982). 
As Segre (1982) points out, the main goal of Italian colonial rule was to create the 
aforementioned fourth Mediterranean shore, making Libya part of Italy. However, the 
main benefit to Italy would be integrating the Libyan colony into the Italian economy. 
By 1938, the Libyan exports were mainly 109 million Lire worth of wheat, skins, 
esparto and vegetable oils, compared to 882 million Lire worth of imports. 
The Italian occupation caused little change in the economic condition of Libya. 
According to published statistics, the Italian invested nearly 2 billion lire in Libya during 
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the occupation. Although agriculture had always been the backbone of the development 
programme, nonetheless the Italian colonists developed other ancillary sectors to support 
agriculture, as shown in table 2.1. Table 2.1 indicates that the Italian occupations 
expenditure was divided into two periods. The first period started from 1913 until 1936, 
where the Italian occupation focused on infrastructure projects such as roads, ports, and 
public buildings. These projects were intended to bring the country into the 20th century, 
and to attract Italians to settle in Libya. Moreover, roads and ports were of great 
importance to the Italian army in suppressing the national resistance. 
After Italy achieved full control over Libya in 1932, the second stage commenced with 
agricultural development and land reclamation. It can be seen that 68 per cent of Italian 
expenditure from 1936 to 1942 was spent on this (Ghanern, 1982). 
Table 2.1. Summary of Expenditure of the Italian Government on Public Works and Utilities 
(In thousand liras) 
1913-36 1913-36 1936-42 1913-42 
Road construction 130,858 78,390 87,785 297,033 
Port construction 53,000 123,383 66,320 242,703 
Agriculture land reclamation 53,118 20,893 654,556 728,567 
Public buildings 103,785 98,643 48,000 250,428 
Construction of telephone & 
" 6,680 1,550 14,640 22,870 Telegraph lines& radio station 
Ilv'draulic works 4,230 5,740 17,000 26,970 
Sanitary works 6,200 635 - 6,835 
Railway construction 52,100 62,121 8,250 122,471 
Interest for amortization of loans 34,024 34,929 63,633 132,586 
Total 444,095 426,284 960,184 1,830.563 
Equivalence in Dollars ä O 58.017 49.765 51.028 158.810 
Source: Ghancin, S., The Libyan Economy before Independence in Joffe, E (eds) ( 1982) Social 
and Economic Development of Libya. 
2.2.1.2 The Libyan Economy under British Administration 
When the British Military set up its control over Libya in 1942, the Libyan economy 
was very gloomy and was suffering from severe recession. Total monetary disarray 
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followed the closing down of all Italian banks in that year. A branch of Barclays Bank 
was the only bank still open, which played the role of a central bank for the military 
administration. Furthermore, there were a number of different currencies in circulation 
such as the Military Lire in Tripolitania, the Egyptian Pound in Cyrenaica, and the Franc 
in the Fazzen. 
As mentioned above, in this bleak period for the Libyan economy, the trade balance was 
continually increasing in deficit, as shown in table 2.2. From the table Libyan exports 
are shown to have been primarily dependent on the agricultural sector, consisting of 
wheat, barley, olive oil, tobacco and esparto grass; whereas fuel, sugar, and grain (in 
famine years) constituted the bulk of the imported goods. 
Table 2.2: Libyan Imports and Exports, 1945-1950 (Libyan £ in 000) 
1945 3,007 1,191 1,186 
1946 2,826 1,806 1,061 
1947 4,466 1,797 2,669 
1948 5,459 2,262 3,197 
1949 6,125 2,143 3,982 
1950 7,038 3,444 3,594 
Source: Ghanem, S., The Libyan Economy before bidependcncc in Joffe, E (ea's) (1982) Social and 
Economic Development of Libya. 
Moreover, the budget deficit was highly significant, and as shown in table 2.3, the 
government was unable to pay the cost of its administration. Libya suffered severe 
financial problems directly resulting from the Second World War. 
Following a United Nations report on the poor economic situation in Libya it was 
suggested that Libya should be in receipt of greater help. Moreover, UN resolution 
No. 289/IU in 1949 declared Libya an independent state by the unification of 
Tripolitania, Cyrenaica and the Fezzan. 
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Table 2.3: Government Budgets from 1942/43 to 1950/51(Libyan £ in 000) 
1942-43 -373,010 -549,582 
1943-44 -358,265 -367,478 
1944-45 -398,977 7,648 -394 
1945-46 -119,801 -21,629 3,329 
1946-47 -445,240 192,330 346 
1947-48 412,300 -1,087,730 -3,487 
1948-49 737,311 -580,972 -71 
1949-50(9 months) 853,663 -403,160 _ -13,669 Total grants in aid 3,720,823 2,810,573 17,621 1 
1950-51 -1,564,265 -21,925 -80,000 
1 
1951(months) -1,181,740 -463,000 -75,600 
Source: Ghanem, S., The Libyan Economy before Independence in Joffe, E (eels) (IBIS? ) Social and 
Economic Development oJ'Lib , a. 
2.2.2 Independence and the Discovery of Oil 
2.2.2.1 Independence 
After the end of World War Il, Libya came under British and French Administrations 
until 21 November 1949, where upon the United Nations General Assembly resolved 
that the three territories should be reconciled to become an independent unified state. On 
December 24 1951, Libya officially became an independent state under the name the 
United Kingdom of Libya (Wright, 1982). At the time of independence Libya was one 
of the poorest nations in the world. E1-Fathly (1977) quoted Benjamin Higgins who 
described the situation in Libya as: 
"Prototype of a poor country.... the hulk of the people lived on a subsistence 
level... no sources of power and no mineral resources, where agricultural 
expansion is severely limited by climate conditions, where capital formation 
is zero or less, Where there is no skilled labour supply and no indigenous 
entrepreneurship ............... Libya is at the 
bottom of the rank in income 
and resources". 
The annual per-capita income was barely £15; there was little trade, high 
unemployment, and all the Italian banks had been closed (Wright, 1982). Thus Libya 
became dependent on aid from foreign states and payments for the use of military bases, 
particularly those of the USA and the UK as indicated in table 2.4. 
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UK 28,740 39 
France 893 1 
Italy 1070 1 
United Arab Republic 50 - 
Turkey 50 - 
Pakistan 10 - 
UN Technical Assistance 1964 3 
Total 73,915 100 
Source: The Economic Development of Lihya published for the I. h. r. d. by the John Hopkins press, 
Baltimore, 1960: cited in Abbas, (1987. " p. 68) 
2.2.2.2 Oil Discovery and its Impact on the Libyan Economy 
Before the oil discovery, Libya was one of the poorest countries in the world. In less 
than one decade, Libya became one of the largest exporters of crude oil, enjoying 
sustained growth rates of more than 20% annually during the 1960s (Ghanem, 1987). 
After independence, the government published the Minerals Law in 1953, allowing 
eleven international oil companies and geological surveyers to commence work in Libya 
(Wright, 1982). In June 1961, Libya jointed the Organization of Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC). At the end of 1967, a dynamic and nationalist movement led to the 
establishment of the so-called Libya General Petroleum Corporation (Lipetco), which 
officially commenced its activities in April 1968 ((Wright, 1982). 
Oil exploration and exportation have made a number of important changes in the Libyan 
economy, including the dominance of the oil sector the relative growth of imports, and 
the dependence on foreign markets. Furthermore, the oil revenues were under the direct 
control of the government, and therefore the government had to look for the best way to 
spend them (Ghanem, 1987). 
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2.2.2.3 The Impact of oil Revenues on the Libyan Economy 
Since the 1960s Libya's place in the world has dramatically changed, regarding its 
significant potential oil revenues. However, a few years after the first shipment, the 
Libyan economy had been transformed from one of the poorest in the world to one with 
highest potential in the region, since Libya had become the world's fourth largest 
exporter of crude oil (Wright, 1982). 
Eventually, this dramatic transformation was reflected in the government budget and the 
national economy, and therefore Libya's status had changed from being a capital deficit 
nation to a capital surplus nation (El-Fathly, 1977). Yet, the increase in oil revenues and 
their significant contribution to the total national income caused a decline in other 
sectors of the economy, particularly agriculture. Table 2.5 clearly illustrates this picture. 
The production of oil continued to grow sharply and oil became the biggest source of the 
national income; where the state income from oil, general domestic production, the 
standard of living, and per capita income all grew accordingly in a more dramatic and 
quick manner. As a result of the expansion of the oil exports and the development 
projects, the total imports began to increase sharply as shown on table 2.6 (Ghanem, 
1987). 
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Table 2.5: The Contribution of Oil Revenues to Total Libyan Revenues 
1962 86.698 7.8 
1963 121.050 20.0 
1964 212.918 37.6 
1965 289.027 63.6 
1966 423.360 66.6 
1967 1080.912 83.4 
1968 838.320 76.5 
1969 1205.904 77.4 
Source: "Volume 14 of Annual Report: Bank of Libya, Tripoli 1970; Volume 17 of' 
Annual Report: Bank of Libya 1975; Volume 20 of Annual Report: Bank 
of Libya 1975" in El frthly and Palmer, 1980 . 
As table 2.5 shows, the total income of Libya had become dependent on oil revenue and 
the phrase rentier state has been applied in the case of the Libyan economy. As El- 
Fathaly et al (1977) have noted, the "rentier state can achieve dramatic rises in per 
capita income without going through the social and organization changes usually 
associated with the processes of economic growth". In this situation, the problems of the 
Libyan economy remained, and oil has only provided the financial means to solve these 
problems (Wright, 1982). 
Table 2.6: Total Imports and Food Imports in Libya, 1963-69 (in $ inn) 
1963 28.46 237.98 
1964 37.38 291.54 
1965 45.20 319.16 
1966 54.96 403.69 
1967 74.01 478.37 
1968 77.15 646.56 
1969 85.85 675.07 
Source: Minim)' of Economy and Ministry oj Planning, Annual Fore ign Trade Statistical Bulletin, 1963- 
1970(Tripoli) in Gahnein, 1987. 
2.2.2.4 The Five -Year Social and Economic Development Plan 1963-69 
Prior to 1963, Libya did not have a national economic development plan. The economic 
planning during the period between 1952 and 1960 produced very little results (E1- 
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Maihub, 1981). Allocating 70 per cent of oil revenues for development and 
modernisation of national infrastructure characterised the first plan in 1963, when the 
government announced a five-year economic and social development plan from 1963 to 
1968. The total amount of LD 169 million (about $500 million) was to be spent on 
various sectors of the economy. The plan was extended for one more year until 1969 in 
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Table 2.7: Development Expenditure, 1963-69 (in LD mn) 
1.3 1.9 7.2 10.1 17.3 14.4 13.2 65.4 
0.1 0.6 2.0 4.7 7.4 7.4 6.3 28.4 
1.7 2.9 3.7 5.8 14.1 16.8 11.8 56.8 
4.4 6.4 13.0 10.2 18.7 24.3 14.5 91.6 
4.1 7.5 12.1 23.0 42.1 34.1 39.3 162.2 
- - 2.9 9.9 6.8 14.6 12.1 46.3 
0.6 1.0 5.6 10.7 8.1 13.6 8.0 47.6 
0.7 0.2 0.8 2.1 5.5 4.9 2.9 16.5 
0.7 1.6 3.5 3.4 5.3 5.3 1.0 20.2 
- 0.1 0.4 0.4 0.7 3.0 2.0 6.6 
0.1 0.6 0.5 0.6 1.0 1.1 0.4 4.3 
0.1 0.2 0.6 1.4 1.1 1.0 0.6 5.0 
13.8 23.0 52.4 82.3 128.1 140.5 112.1 551.0 
38.50 64.87 149.19 229.61 360.47 392.74 313.49 1540.19 
21.7 32.5 87.0 90.8 105.0 143.3 145.0 625.3 
38.5 75.2 125.4 186.0 223.3 357.8 419.7 1425.9 
Source: Ministry, of Planning, National Accounts 1962-1971 (Tripoli, I972) in Khaacr, eds., (1987) 
The Economic development of Libj'a. 
By the end of 1969, however, the allotment of funds for the first plan had reached LD 
625 million (about $1700), while the actual spending had amounted to LD 551 million 
(just over $1500 million) as shown in table 2.7. The main focus of the first plan was to 
improve the living standards of the people, and improving of public services such as 
transportation, communication, and electricity together absorbed about 43 per cent of the 
total budget of the plan (Ghanem, 1987; El- Fatahly, 1977). 
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As Ghanem (1987) argues, in the first plan the spending on agriculture and industry 
was primarily for the purpose of conducting research and feasibility studies on certain 
projects which were regarded as the most important for the country. 
The total actual expenditure on the development projects from 1963 to 1969 was LD 551 
million with the main emphasis on housing (301/o), transport and communication (17YO), 
agriculture (12`)/o) and electricity (10%). The total expenditure lör the period 1970-80 
was LDI 1.22 bn (about $35 billion) distributed according to the priorities of the 
development plans. For instance, the second five-year plan (1969-1974) was allocated 
US$3.2 billion i. e. almost 2.5 times the actual expenditures of the first five-year plan. 
I lowever, this was never implemented, as a new regime took control of the country on 
the first of September 1969, and subsequently the whole plan was rejected (EI-Maihub, 
1981). 
2.2.2.5 Population Growth 
Libya's population in 1954 was 1.1 million with an annual population growth rate of 
around 1.25 per cent. This low growth rate was due to lack of hygiene and other health 
issues. However, following the oil discovery, this picture completely changed, and the 
population growth rate in Libya has become one of the highest in the world (Kezeire and 
Lawless, 1987). 
Table 2.8: Population 1980-2003 (in million) 
1992 1995 
Population 3,246 3,790 4,250 4,480 4,750 5,240 5,660 
Source: The Five-Year Plan 1981-85, IMF, International Financial Statistics Yearbook 2004. 
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Table 2.8 shows that Libya's population in 1980 was 3.2 million and increasing to 
4.250 million in 1989 and to 5.660 million in 2003. The annual growth rate of 4.3 per 
cent between 1988 and 2000 was one of the highest population growth rates in the world 
(Special Report, 1986; EN, 1991a). This rapid increase can be explained by 
improvements in the standard of living, the availability of free medical services, and the 
return of Libyan emigrants who fled to neighbouring countries during the Libyan-Italian 
war. 
2.2.3 The New Strategy on the Libyan Economy and the Role of Government 
Among the basic motives which led to the 1969 September revolution, were the 
liberation of the national economy from foreign control and the achievement of 
integrated development in all sectors of the economy. To meet this fundamental goal the 
new government took a series of initiatives aimed basically at improving the terms of 
agreement with the foreign oil companies operating in the country. These initiatives 
ranged from the adjustment of the oil prices to the application of participation and 
nationalisation in the early 1970s. 
A study of the Libyan economy after the El-Faith revolution can be divided into three 
periods: nationalisation and pre-plan in the 1970s, the decline in oil prices and the 
economic crisis of the 1980s; and the new era and return to de- 
nationalisation/privatisation. 
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2.2.3.1 Nationalisation and Development Plans in the 1970s 
As mentioned above, the Libyan economy is dependent on oil revenues, where the 
contribution of these revenues to national income had reached 77% in 1969 (El-Fathally, 
1977). Nonetheless, the new regime spotted the strengths and weaknesses of the 
economy. As a matter of fact the income from oil was rapidly on the rise, reaching LD 
1200 million per year. As a result, the Libyan economy was faced with many problems. 
For instance, only 5 per cent of a total area of 1.7 million square kilometres (about 
680,000 square miles) was arable land, and therefore economically feasible. Moreover, 
the small size of the population and the under skilled workforce was added to the 
fundamental problem (Wright, 1982). 
Two years of economic stagnation was followed by the 1969 coup which brought the 
new government with its many development plans. The economic goals of the 
revolutionary government were as follows (El-Fathaly and Palmer, 1980): 
1. Agrarian self-sufciency; 
2. Industrialization and substitution of industrial production for oil production as 
the foundation of the Libyan economy; 
3. Reduced dependence on foreign labour; 
4. Involvement of Libyans in the production economy in order to break down the 
rentier state pattern; and 
5. The development of a viable economic infrastructure. 
The first plan, a tripartite programme (1973-5), allowed about $6.6 billion for overall 
spending as shown in table 2.9. As El-Fathaly (1977,1980) reported; the three-year plan 
had three fundamental objectives: 
1. Improve the productive capacity of the Libyan economy; 
2. Reduce dependency on the oil sector; and 
3. Build regime support by redistributing Libya's oil wealth as 
fairly as possible among Libya's populace. 
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Furthermore, the first economic quandary of the new government was to find a way to 
use the country's wealth, and to endeavour to rebuild a social welfare state with 
excellent international diplomatic relationships (Wright, 1982). 
The main goals of the first development plan under the new regime were self-sufficiency 
in basic foodstuffs, and to transform Libya into a modern industrial state (Wright, 1982; 
El-Fathaly, 1977). 
As table 2.9 suggests, with the advent of the new government, it can be seen that new 
sectors were established and priorities changed. Nearly 17 per cent of the total plan was 
allocated to agriculture, whereas manufacture received only 11 per cent of the total, 
reflecting the priorities of the new government focussing on the development and the 
diversification of the economy away from the oil sector (IF, l-IFathaly, 1977). 
Table2.9: AIlocalion anon,, 'ettor' in the 1973-P) Flailw. 
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Source: The Three- Year Plan (1973-75), Alinisn: r of Planning in (El-Fathaly and Ahusedira, 1980) 
The second socio-economic plan of the revolutionary government was introduced in 
March 1976, covering the period 1976-1980 and allocating $ 24.3 billion (about LD 7.2 
billion) for spending. The new plan was aimed at achieving an annual GDP growth of 
10 per cent and 25 per cent in industrial production. However, given the fact that 
manufacturing became the first priority of the second plan (LD 1.51 bn 21.1% of total 
investment) many factories were established to sustain this sector during this period. The 
next priority was transport and communications (LD 1.19 bn 16.7%), and the third 
sector was agriculture (LD 1.03 bn 14.4% of total investment) with the introduction of 
several new economic sectors. Thus, it can be seen that the priorities of this plan 
compared with the first plan (1973-75) had changed, in accordance with the changes in 
the development plan. 
Yet, during the late 1970s, a new socialist ideology was introduced which transformed 
the country's economic foundations. As a result, private sector activities had to be 
suspended, and most of these activities came to be run by workers committees (El- 
Fathaly, 1977; El-Fathaly and Palmer, 1980; Vandewalle, 1998). In fact, the second plan 
was not complete; only about three-quarters of the allocated funds were finally spent 
because of labour, infrastructure, bureaucratic and other constraints (Wright, 1982). 
2.2.3.2 Economic Performance in the 1970s 
Some of the main economic indicators for 1970-80 are presented in table 2.10 showing a 
noticeable rise in the value of exports from $ 2.43 billion (about LD 870 million) in 
1970 to $ 23.46 billion (about LD 6.96 billion) in 1980. However, during the same 
period, the value of imports increased from $1.12 billion (LD 403 m) in 1970 to $11.13 
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billion (LD 3.30 billion) in 1980. Correspondingly, the balance of trade surplus rose 
from $1.30 billion (LD 467 million) to $12.33 billion (LD 3.65 billion) in 1980. These 
Libyan imports mostly constituted foodstuffs and different manufactured goods, vehicles 
and luxury consumer goods, whereas crude and refined oil remained the main Libyan 
export. 
The per capita income in Libya, however, rose remarkably after the oil discovery, 
particularly in the 1970s. The discovery of oil lifted the per capita income in Libya from 
one of the lowest in the world in the 1950s to the highest among African countries. 
Before the oil discovery, the per capita income in 1951 was $30 per year, while by 1970 
it rose to its current level of $1,683 and then to $9,045 in 1980, representing the highest 
rate in the third world in the 1970s. 
On the other hand the gross domestic product (GDP), which was estimated at $ 3.98 
billion (LD 1.4 billion) in 1970, increased dramatically to $13.08 billion (I. D 3.8 billion) 
and then to $31.20 billion (about LD 10.88 billion) in 1980.1lowever, the contribution 
of oil to the economy has been very significant, representing around 60 per cent of the 
gross domestic product. 
Table 2.10: Economic Indicators in the 1970s (in S Killion) 
Year CDP Per capita Exports Imports (in 8 thousand) 
Ios,; 1.11 1.1 
_' 
1972 5. -lU 2098 1.67 1.16 
1974 13.08 5315 4.81 2.79 
1976 16.53 5889 9.70 5.63 
1978 19.16 6472 23.68 9.31 
1980 31.20 9045 23.46 11.13 
Source: Internation al Afoneta, i Fund, International Financial Statistics (Year book), /981. 
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To summarise the first decade after the revolution of 1969, the priorities of the new 
government changed and the new regime adopted a socialism system. The Libyan 
government's income from oil increased, and government planning continued with a 
different strategy. The first plan was a three-year economic and social plan (1973-75), 
followed by the transformation plan (1976-81). The total spending on development 
projects throughout the 11 years (1970-80) reached LD11.225bn (about $35 billion). 
However, according to Ghanmen (1985), direct state intervention into economic 
activities increased during this period: 
"By 1979 the private sector in the country was almost totally abolished. 
Ownership ceased to exist except in agriculture. In addition, people were 
not allowed to own more than the house they lived in" 
The economic structure was transformed by the government, the state started to take 
over all economic activities, and enterprises became state-dominated either through 
nationalization or otherwise through the application of the ideology of the new regime 
(Wright, 1982; Ghanem, 1985; Vandewalle, 1998). 
2.2.3.3 Oil Prices and the Economic Crisis of the 1980s 
By 1979, dramatic changes had been taking place in Libya. However, even more radical 
changes in Libya's political system were initiated in 1976. The name of state was 
changed to "The Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya". The structure of the 
economy was also profoundly affected by political change at the end of the 1970s (EIU, 
1991b). 
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From 1978 until 1989, Libya's economy and commerce were in the hands of state 
organisations. All private ownership was abolished, business enterprises were replaced 
by government agencies and workers took over the private and public sectors. The 
private sector retail trade was inhibited or replaced by people's supermarkets under the 
control of the rank-and-file of the People's Congresses (Mattes, 1987). 
Moreover, the industrialized countries had taken many steps to reduce their dependence 
on OPEC oil. The Libyan economy was affected by a sharp decline in the demand for 
oil, and the income from oil dropped sharply as a result of both price reduction and 
production cuts (see table 2.11). 
Table 2.11: Oil Revenues, 1980-90 ($billion) 
14.2 15.3 13.0 11.9 10.6 9.7 5.4 5.4 5.2 8.0 11.2 
Sources: EIU, in ElU(1991)"Lihia in ihr 1990s". 
While the total oil revenue of Libya was $14.2 billion in 1980, it fell to $13.0 billion in 
1982, and went down further to $10.6 billion in 1984. By the end of 1988, the figure had 
fallen to nearly $5.2 billion (EIU, 1991a). 
Meanwhile, a trade embargo was imposed by the US Reagan administration in April 
1982. In addition, in 1985 the ban on crude oil was extended to cover all hydrocarbons 
imports (EIU, 1991a). Yet, despite the attempts of the Libyan government, the economy 
still remained in an unbalanced state; heavily depending on oil as a major source of 
financing as well as on immigrant labour as a major source of the workforce (Ghanem 
1985, Burgat, 1987). Furthermore, Libya still remained heavily dependent on food 
imports, despite the large investment in agriculture made over the previous two decades 
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under the Fatih revolutionary government. However, in order to reduce this dependence 
on imported food, the government continued to promote food production as the basis of 
its agricultural policy, working towards achieving self-sufficiency in food materials 
(EIU, 1991a). 
So, in January 1981, the General People's Congress adopted a new five-year 
development plan with the aim of reinforcing non-oil economic activities. The 
productive sectors in particular (agriculture, industry and electricity) were to receive 
more than 50% of the total investment in the whole plan, as shown on table 2.12. 
Table2.12: Allocation of Developemnet Plan by Sectors (in per cent) 
Agriculture 17.9 18.2 
Industry 15.9 23.1 
Oil and Gas 10.1 1.2 
Housing 11.6 10.0 
Education 6.9 5.9 
Health 2.5 3.3 
Electricity 7.9 11.8 
Transport and Communication 13.2 12.3 
Utilities 9.2 7.6 
Source: The Cmm itteeJor A1iddlc East Trade 1986; In " The Fire-YL'ar Deevelopment Plan 1980-S5". 
Expenditure under the 1981-85 plan stood at LD17 billion with an additional LDI. 5 
billion in reserves, bringing the total allocation up to LDI8.5 billion ($62.5 billion). The 
greatest emphasis was placed been on the manufacturing sector (LD3.9 billion-23. l%) 
followed by the agriculture sector including land reform (LD3.1 billion-18.2%) and l1 
per cent was devoted to communications, When oil prices began to tremble, the Libyan 
economy did also, and started to suffer difficulties in financing many of its development 
projects, hence causing the government to consider restrictions on imports. However, 
after the dramatic drop of oil revenues in 1985-86, the Libyan government introduced a 
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new system of partnership called "Tachrokyaat", whereby small businesses such as 
hotels, services, and light industries were run by cooperatives. The private ownership of 
shops, small businesses, farms and medical practices was also allowed. Moreover, in 
1989, all state-owned import and export organisations were disbanded and the private 
sector was reinstated (EIU, 199 lb). 
This change towards liberalisation began after 1985 when the country's oil revenues 
declined from $14.2 billion to $9.7 billion in 1985 declining sharply to $6 billion in 
1986. However, shortly after that, the Ministry of Industry announced a schedule for the 
future privatization of all economic enterprises. Yet, by the end of 1988, about 140 
companies had already come under the control of self-management committees, 
whereby most light and medium-sized manufacturing enterprises became self-operated 
and many big supermarkets were reopened (Vandewalle, 1995). 
2.2.3.4 The Economic Trends in the 1980s 
Despite the change in the structure of the Libyan economy that started in 1980, the 
economy still remained dependent on oil revenues. Oil represented 45.5 %, 40 % and 
42.1 % of the GDP in 1980,1985 and 1989 respectively. As table 2.13 shows, GDP in 
1980 had increased to $31.2 billion, following the oil boom of the early 1980s. 
However, the decline in both the oil prices and demand between 1981 and 1986 had 
reduced GDP by 22% in 1985 (to about $24.3 billion) then dropping sharply to $19.1 
billion in 1989. On the other hand government expenditure had also been affected, 
where most projects had been frozen and the state had started to practice control over the 
foreign exchange surpluses by imposing restrictions on imports (EN, 1991 a and b). 
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As table 2.13 shows, per capita income reached its peak in 1980 at $9,045, as a result of 
the second world oil crisis and then by 1985 it dropped to two-thirds its 1980 level, then 
decreasing to an estimated $4,360 in 1989. This trend in personal income was 
synchronous with the size of the Libyan population, which rose from 3.24 million in 
1980 to 4.25 million by 1989. 
Table2.13: Trends in GDP, 1980-1989 
Agriculture 593 1.9 486 2.0 360 1.9 
Petroleum 14,242 45.5 9,720 40.0 8,040 42.1 
IndustrN', mines 1,189 3.8 1,220 5.0 1,090 5.7 
Construction 3,756 12.0 3,640 15.0 2,865 15.0 
Transport 1,439 4.6 1,215 5.0 960 5.0 
Electricity 282 0.9 240 10.0 210 1.1 
Services 9,701 31.2 7,780 32.0 5,575 29.2 
Total GDP ($ million) 31,200 100.0 24,300 100.0 19,100 100.0 
GDP per head (S thousand) 9,045 5,900 4,360 
Population (million) 3.24 4.12 4.25 
Sources. Central Bank of Libya; Secretariat of Planning' in ElU (1991)"Libya in the I990s". 
As mentioned above, in this period Libya suffered from many problems. Oil revenues 
had declined from $14.2 billion in 1980 to only $5 billion in 1988. The lall in revenues 
caused serious cash-flow problems, which affected the 1981/85-development plan 
(Ghanern and Burgat, 1987). The drop in total income led to restrained government 
spending and brought down the levels of imported goods, resulting in lower standards of 
living. 
By the end of 1987, many transtormations had appeared in the economy after the 
government had adopted and introduced the new economic system. Nevertheless, the 
Libyan economy was still dependent on oil revenues despite the heavy investment in the 
agriculture and manufacturing sectors. 
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2.2.3.5 Towards Privatisation 
From 1970 until 1990 the Libyan economy had been centrally planned, where the 
government had controlled both the production and services sectors. Yet, by the end of 
1987, government introduced a series of measures with regard to economic 
liberalisation. This was primarily to do with the significant decline in Libyan economic 
performance, which continued during 1990-93 when annual development expenditure 
was estimated at about $2 billion. 
The Libyan economy still depended mainly on revenues from the oil sector, which 
constituted about 95 per cent of export earnings and about one-third of Gf)P in the 
1990s. Nonetheless, due to this large dependence on the oil exports, the Libyan economy 
had become susceptible to external factors, especially fluctuations in world oil prices. 
The GDP had either contracted or grown very lethargically since 1992, as shown in table 
2.14 (Newafrica. com, 1999). However, during the period 1990-2000 the Libyan 
economy had become far weaker than it used to be in the early 1980s (I-cias. com, 1996). 
Table2.14: GDP for Libyan Economy in 1990s (S billion) 
GDP 27.13 29.08 30.68 33.61 35.27 27.65 30.83 25.90 24.3 
Oil 9.51 8.36 9.37 10.68 11.57 5.94 8.85 10.86 10.3 
Non-oil 17.62 20.72 20.31 22.93 24.70 21.71 21.98 15.04 14.0 
Sources: The Natioiral Corporation fin /njormation and Document (different rears), and* International 
Financial Statistical YearBook2004. 
Table 2.14 shows the country's GDP in 1990s. Libya's GDP was registered at $27.13 
billion in 1990 with a 35% contribution from the oil sector ($9.51 billion), gradually 
increasing to S30.68 billion in 1995 and creeping up to $35.27 billion by 1997. 
I lowever, after the decline in world oil prices in 1998, coupled with the effect off the UN 
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sanctions on the economy, the GDP had declined to $27.65 billion in 1998, leading to 
import restrictions. At the same time, inefficient resource allocations caused periodic 
crises in the supply of basic goods and foodstuffs (New Africa, 1999). However, the 
GDP declined to $25.9 and $24.3 billion in 2001 and 2003 respectively. 
Table 2.15: Contribution of Oil Sector from 1990-99(äs percentage) 
35 28.27 31.67 32.80 32.67 22.08 28.72 40.69 42.38 
Sources: The National Corporation for Information and Docilmolt (different years). 
Nevertheless, the Libyan government had succeeded in reducing its dependence on oil 
from 63.5`% of the GDP in 1970 to 42.3% in 2003, as shown on table 2.15. 
Yet, seven years on from the previous socio-economic development plan, the 
government announced its fourth economic plan covering the period 1994-96. The main 
goals of this programme were to proceed with the uncompleted projects of the previous 
development plan, besides establishing new projects in health, public utilities, education 
and energy, and the first priority of this programme was to encourage investment in the 
industrial sector in order to improve production. However, the total allocation for the 
three-year programme stood at LD2.4 billion. 
Due to the decline in oil prices there were severe shortages of funds, and actual 
expenditure was LDI. 5 billion, representing 60%, of the total allocation. The energy 
sector, however, was the main priority of the programme, taking LI) 371.5 million, 
followed by an administration development budget of LD 271.9 million. The housing 
sector received LD 140.4 million and the industrial sector LD 112.8 million (Secretariat 
of Planning, Economics and Trade, 1997). 
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As mentioned earlier, oil export revenues, which had previously accounted for about 
95% of Libya's hard currency earnings, were severely reduced after the dramatic decline 
in the prices of oil during 1998, as well as by reductions in oil exports partly, due to the 
US and UN sanctions. However, the rise in oil prices in 1999 led to a significant growth 
of oil export revenues, which improved the macroeconomic balance and helped to 
energize the economy as these revenues more than doubled to $11.0 billion in 2001 and 
$10.3 billion in 2003. 
Meanwhile, Libya's real GDP growth rate had been negative, standing at -2.3% for the 
period 1992-96 and showing only 0.5% growth in 1997. Yet, following years of 
economic recession, real GDP had increased by around 4.5% in 2000, owing to a 
favourable swing in the oil market (EIU, 2001 a). 
After more than eight years of their imposition, the U. N. suspended its economic and 
other sanctions against Libya on April 5,1999. Since then, Libya has been trying to 
increase its attractiveness to foreign investment, and many foreign companies have 
visited Libya to search for lucrative contracts. It is therefore hoped that Libya will 
reduce its dependency on oil as the country's sole source of income, through increased 
investment in agriculture, fisheries, tourism and mining (ibid 2001a). 
The Libyan economy will therefore continue to rely heavily on oil revenues, while the 
authorities are keen to attract foreign participation in a number of non-oil sectors. 
Libya's first government-sponsored foreign investment conference was held in Tripoli in 
November 2000, followed by another conference in London in July 2001 which focused 
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on investment in Libya in the hydrocarbons sectors, manufacturing, financial services, 
tourism and housing (EIU, 2001 a). As Colonel Qadhafi argued in 2000: 
"The Libyan economic system in not opposed to investment, 
development, foreign capital and foreign participation "...... 
"there is no prospect of nationalization of foreign investment 
at all "(EIU, 2001a). 
2.2.4 Foreign Trade 
Foreign trade is an engine of growth. Historically, trade-led growth has been the bulwark 
of development policy in both the industrialised and the developing countries alike. 
Before the oil bonanza, the foreign trade sector was very small indeed in Libya. 
However, the rise in exports is likely to reflect the significant developments that have 
occurred with regard to the foreign trade sector. 
In the case of Libya, there are no financial constraints on foreign trade. After the oil 
discovery in the early 1960s the trade balance of payments has registered surpluses. 
Furthermore, the discovery of oil and the development of the oil industry have 
accounted for this high rate of growth in imports as well as in exports. On the other 
hand, Libyan foreign trade in the 1970s and 1980s was completely controlled by the 
government. However, given the main goals of the state to reduce the dependency of its 
economy on foreign trade, it has adopted a slogan from the Green Book Part II, which 
reads "No freedom for people who are eating from overseas". Therefore the only way 
forward is to focus on the self-sufficiency programme (Oreibi, 1985). 
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However, petroleum is the main item in Libyan foreign trade, representing around 95 
per cent of total export earnings. However, the share of crude oil has dropped Ihilowing 
the rise in the exports of refined oil and natural gas (EIU, 1991 a). 
Table2.16: Foreign Trade ($ billion) 
Export fob 10.9 6.4 7.2 7.0 7.5 11.0 8.0 10.0 8.0 
Import CIF -4.0 -3.3 -3.6 -4.4 -3.8 -8.0 -4.1 -3.7 -4.4 
Balance 6.9 3.1 3.6 2.6 3.7 3.0 3.9 6.3 3.6 
Source: RAIF, Direct of Trade Statistics Year Book 2004; OPEC, Annual Statistics Bulletin in E/U, 1991. 
By the year 1985, exports were only $10.9 billion or less than hall' their level of $21.9 
billion in the 1970s. Furthermore, following the crash in world oil prices in 1986, the 
total earnings fron exports tell to $6.4 billion, and although export receipts have 
recovered in subsequent years; they remained below their 1985 level until the end of the 
decade and reached only $8.0 billion in 2002 see table 2.16. 
The petroleum sector remained the engine of economic growth, and made the highest 
contribution to total GDP in the 1990s and for at least the next ten years. I lowcvcr, the 
EIU (2001b) forecasts that a return of some growth in the economy will be reflected by 
the rise in the imports of goods and services, seriously affecting foreign trade. 
Given its location in the Mediterranean basin, Libya has had a long experience oC trade 
with Europe. Yet, despite the ambivalent relationship between Libya and the European 
countries, Libya's trade relations will remain as strong as ever with its nearest 
neighbouring markets in Europe. The major pattern of foreign trade with western 
countries is that Italy and Germany have been dominant among Libya's trading partners, 
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with the ex-USSR being a more important market than other countries as shown in 
table 2.17. 
The trade figures clearly explain Libya's access to the industrialised world and Italy, 
Germany and Spain are likely to absorb 80 per cent of its exports, generating 75 per cent 
of its imports. The main partners are Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom, besides 
Turkey which is a major developing world trade partner given the fact that trade with the 
United States of America is still blocked in the aftermath of its trade embargo on Libya 
since 1982. Table 2.17 shows trade patterns in the 1990s, and this picture was very 
similar in the 1970s and 1980s (FlU, 2001a). 
Table2.17: Percentage Distribution of Libyan "Trade, 1989-2000 
198 9 19 90 11 11 1993 1994 1995 111 I(' 
Industrial countries 93.2 84.5 88.2 86.4 90.3 87.9 85.2 83.3 85.3 
Developing countries 6.8 15.5 11.8 14.6 9.7 12.1 14.8 16.7 14.7 
including: 
1) Africa 0.5 2.7 3.3 3.1 3.4 4.9 4.9 6.7 5.2 
2) Asia 2.2 0.2 0.7 1.4 2.4 0.9 2.1 7.0 8.0 
3) Eastern Europe 3.7 11.6 7.1 9.3 2.6 4.8 6.7 2.5 1.0 
4) Middle East - 0.9 0.4 0.6 1.2 1.0 0.9 0.5 0.5 
5) Others 0.3 0.1 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.5 0.2 0.0 0.0 
'%1 Imports 
Industrial countries 71.5 75.3 71.2 68.9 75.1 75.2 74.9 62.7 60.2 
Developing countries 28.5 23.7 28.3 31.1 24.9 24.8 25.1 36.3 39.8 
including: 
1) Africa 5.4 4.6 6.2 9.0 7.3 7.6 7.9 8.3 9.6 
2) Asia 7.1 7.1 7.6 8.0 4.2 3.8 4.3 13.2 12.5 
3) Eastern Europe 13.6 8.8 9.7 9.9 8.6 7.5 7.4 6.2 5.9 
4) Middle East 0.2 1.5 2.7 2.4 2.5 3.5 3.4 3.5 3.9 
5) Others 2.2 2.7 2.1 1.8 2.3 2.4 2.1 5.1 7.9 
Source: IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook 1996,2000 (Washington, DC.: 1997) in EIU. 
In 1989, the government made the decision to follow trade liberalisation No: 249/89, 
which opened up the import trade to private companies. This is having some impact 
according to IMF, such as creating opportunities for individuals and partnerships to play 
a vital role in the economic process. 
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2.3 The Financial Sector 
This section gives some background information about the financial sector and in Libya. 
It will be divided into two subsections, first discussing the financial sector and financial 
institutions and describing the general characteristics and evolution of the banking 
system in Libya; and secondly explaining the role of the banking sector in the 
development plans. Moreover, information concerning the monetary authorities and 
goals and the role to direction of the banking system can be found in appendix one. 
2.3.1 The General Characteristics of the Financial Sector 
2.3.1.1 Financial Markets 
Libya is a new country. Before 1951, it consisted of the three provinces of Tripolitania, 
Cyrecenica, and the Fezzan ruled by the British and French Administration, with no 
government, no resources, no monetary system, and no banking sector. The Libyan 
economy lacked the active and efficient money supplies as well as capital market, and 
those factors were the main reasons behind Libya's poor pre-oil economic performance. 
Furthermore, the Libyan people preferred to own real assets rather than financial assets. 
Generally speaking, the Libyans would believe that making profits out of the activities 
of others contradicts the teachings of Islam. Moreover, the range of capital market 
instruments has been very limited. This may have led to reduce opportunities for the 
Libyan banking sector to managing their resources. For example, commercial banks 
suffer from high liquidity, recorded at LD 1.4 billion at the end of the year 2000; this 
figure exceeds the reserves requirement by 144% (CBL, 2001b). 
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Nonetheless, the government intervention into the financial markets has become 
marked, with the government taking full control of some institutions of the financial 
sector, while keeping the upper hand in others by allowing only 49% to be owned by 
the public. This situation had continued until 1978 and then, as mentioned in section 1, 
until the 1990s no private sector existed in Libya (Baryun, 1984). 
2.3.1.2 The Financial Institutions 
The following paragraphs examine the financial institutions in Libya. The financial 
sector in general is divided into two parts: the banking system and financial and 
investment companies. However, until the year 2000,57 banks were operating within 
the Libyan banking sector. Five of these banks were fully state-owned commercial 
banks, whereas 47 were domestic banks (Al-Massarif Al-Ahleya) that opened during the 
period 1997-2000. One private bank was opened in 1995 in addition to the already 
existing four state-owned specialist banks, as shown in figure 2.1 (CBL different issues). 
This situation affected banking performance, resulting in poor management quality, and 
a lack of internal control systems, as found in questionnaire results in chapter six (such 
as increased levels of cases of corruption). In addition, this 
led to deterioration in the 
quality of services. For example bad loans, which 
in some banks reached more than 50% 
of total loans, and leading to reduced overall efficiency 
levels in commercial banks by 
6% (from 85.4 to 79.8 per cent). Moreover, since the nationalisation and Libyanisation 
programmes, the objectives of commercial 
banks have shifted to become channels to 
facilitate credit to pre-selected sectors. 
For instance, average of the ROA ratio, in most 
of the 5 commercial banks stood at 
less than 2% during the period 1980 and 2000. 
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However, to be more precise, banks can be divided into state-owned and private banks. 
This classification will be examined with regard to recent developments in the banking 
sector in Libya. Finally, the financial, investment, and service companies will be 
classified as companies that are strongly linked to the banking system. These companies 
include the Libyan foreign investment company, insurance companies, and foreign 
exchange and financial services companies. 
2.3.2 Banking sector Evolution, Developments and Types 
2.3.2.1 The Central Bank of Libya 
In 1955, The National Bank of Libya was established to replace the Commission. Until 
now this Bank has seen many changes, and the evolution of the bank and objectives and 
its roles in issuing the national currency and in the Libyan banking sector are 
investigated in appendix One. 
Figure 2.1: Structure of the Libyan Banking System 
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2.3.2.2 The Evolution and Development of the Commercial Banking Sector in 
Libya 
The evolution of the Libyan banking system involves three important stages after to 
1951. These are the Libyanisation of banks, nationalisation, and then recent 
developments in the banking sector. The evolution of these banks and objectives and 
their roles are investigated as follows: 
2.3.2.2.1 Before 1951 
In the mid nineteenth century the importance of the Libyan economy had become 
recognised by the ottoman government. Nonetheless, the Libyan economy was mainly 
dependent on agriculture and trade. Hence to improve its economic performance the 
government established relevant financial institutions that tended to reflect the 
importance of the agriculture sector to the Libyan economy. So in 1868 the first 
agriculture bank in Libya was established in Benghazi, followed by another in Tripoli in 
1901. 
Furthermore, when the economic system became 
important to the Ottoman government, 
two branches of the Ottomani Bank were opened 
in Tripoli and Benghazi in1906 and 
1911 respectively, and the number of the agricultural 
banks in different parts of the 
country were increased. 
As mentioned above, Italian banks played an 
important role in sustaining Italian colonial 
rule in Libya. Hence, in 1907, the 
first branch of Banco De Romea: was opened in 
Tripoli, followed by two more branches in Benghazi and Derna 
in 1912. This opened the 
42 
door for other Italian banks such as Banco De Napoli, De Banco of Sicily and the Bank 
of Italy, to establish branches in Libya (CBL, 1976). 
However, the main objective of these banks was to facilitate the credit process to Italian 
settlers, given the fact that during the Italian occupation era, both the Libyan banking 
sector and the monetary system were linked to the Italian banking system. Nonetheless, 
at the end of World War II in 1945, this situation changed, since the Italians left Libya 
giving way to the French and the British administrations to take over the country. Hence 
the Italian lira had been replaced by different currencies including the Egyptian pound in 
Cyrenaica, the Military Authority Lire (MAL) in Tripolitania, and the French Franc in 
Fezzan (Linder, 1953). 
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Consequently, the Italian banks in Libya were closed and the monetary system broke 
down. Banking activity was then limited to a branch of Barclays Bank, which played the 
role of central bank to the military administration (Ghanem, 1987). 
2.3.2.2.2 The Banking System during Independence and Libyanisation 
The termination of Italian colonial rule left the economy in total chaos. The closure of 
the Italian banks in 1943 had resulted in a lack of credit and other banking facilities. 
Before independence, however, a United Nations subcommittee produced a list of the 
most urgent services that needed to be provided including, in order of priority, a banking 
system and a currency (Pelt, 1970). Furthermore, in 1951 a meeting was held in Geneva 
in which the Libyan Minister of Finance announced a new currency, the Libyan pound, 
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and appointing Barclays Bank as the agent of the currency authority, joining the 
Sterling area (ibid, 1970). 
Italian banks such, as Banco De Romea, Banco de Napoli, and the Bank of Sicily 
restarted their activities in the country in 1951, followed by other banks in 1952 such as 
the Arab Bank, the British Bank for the Middle East, and in 1954 the Bank of Egypt 
followed by the Algerian Real Estate Bank in 1955. 
On the other hand the Libyan National Bank was first founded in 1955 according to the 
banking law No. 30 of 1955. Its main function was the issuing of banknotes and coins, 
besides maintaining monetary stability in Libya and playing the role of the government's 
bank. 
In 1958, however, the first unified banking law was issued, stipulating the organisation 
of credit and money supply and the supervision of liquidity held by commercial banks. 
Yet, regarding the strong relationship between the Bank of England and the National 
Bank of Libya the latter was divided into two departments, an issue department and a 
banking department similar to the Bank of England (Bank of Libya, 1967). 
Due to the large number of foreign bank branches; the Libyan National bank was unable 
to persuade other banks to comply with its established policies, which were in the best 
interest of Libya. As a result, a new banking law (No 4 of the year 1963) was issued, 
changing the name of the National bank to become the Bank of Libya, giving it more an 
extensive authority and new functions. Therefore, under the new law, the function of the 
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Central Bank became clearer and its supervisory role over the commercial banks was 
enhanced. 
Consequently, the other motivation of banking law No. 4 of 1963 was to Libyanise all 
commercial banks. The rationale behind the law, according to the Libyan government, 
was that all foreign banks in Libya were not working in the best interest of the country 
but rather for the interests of their parent banks. The main purpose behind the 
government's policy of Libyanisation was to encourage and promote the local banking 
industry. Consequently, to confirm the dominance and control of the Bank of Libya the 
law stipulated that 51% of the capital of every foreign bank was to be owned by the 
Bank of Libya. 
The 1960s were marked by the Libyanisation of the banking sector was adopted by the 
Bank of Libya in compliance with the Banking law No. 4 of 1963. Some of the foreign 
banks, however, accepted the new policy and became 
incorporated into the new system 
as follows: 
¢ The Commercial Bank was 51 per cent owned by Libyans and the 
Eastern Bank by 49 per cent. 
The African Banking Company had 51 per cent of its capital owned by 
Libyans and the remainder was owned 
by the Tunisian-Algerian Real 
Estate Bank. 
> Nahda Arabia bank 51 per cent owned by Libyans and 
49 per cent by the 
Bank of Egypt. 
Secondly 
some banks were owned by two or more partners: 
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Sahara Bank, 51 per cent of capital was possessed by Libyans, 29 
percent by the Bank of America, and the remainder (20 per cent) by the 
Bank of Sicily. 
> The Bank of North Africa: the Libyan government owned 51 percent, 39 
per cent by the British Bank of the Middle East and the Morgan Guaranty 
Bank owned only 10 per cent. 
The two biggest banks, Banco de Roma and Barclays Bank followed by Banco de 
Napoli and the Arab bank, refused the Libyan government policy. Under the new policy 
the commercial banking sector consisted of nine banks, including the commercial 
division of the Bank of Libya (Bank of Libya, 1967). 
2.3.2.2.3 The Nationalisation Period 
As mentioned earlier in the introduction to this section, the new government that took 
control in Libya on the Ist of September 1969 viewed the 
banking sector as a primary 
objective of its general programme of Libyanisation and nationalisation. 
In November 
1969 the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) required that all banks in the country 
should be Libyan-controlled, especially, the remaining branches of 
foreign banks in the 
country, namely Barclays Bank, Banco di Roma, Banco 
di Napoli, and the Arab Bank. 
This completed the process which had started 
in 1964, and accordingly the state owned 
51 per cent of their capital (Abdussalam, 1985). 
However, the Banking law No. 153 issued 
in December 1970, declared the 
nationalisation and reorganisation of all 
foreign commercial banks. Consequently, the 
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government, represented by the Bank of Libya, would own all foreign shares in all 
commercial banks. Commercial banks were reduced to only five banks, due to the 
mergers that occurred between some of the former banks, and given the fact that Libyan 
citizens were permitted to purchase shares in these banks (Libyan Banking Law No. 153, 
1970). 
Furthermore, the name of the Bank of Libya was changed by the banking law No. 63 of 
1971 to become the Central Bank of Libya (CBL), and it was given more power to 
control and supervise commercial banks. Yet, until 1970, the commercial division of the 
CBL also carried out commercial operations, but in that year the National Commercial 
Bank was founded to undertake the commercial operations on behalf of the CBL. 
The commercial banking sector then consisted of only five banks, of which the 
government owned three: Umma Bank, Jumhoriya Bank, and the National Commercial 
Bank, whereas in the cases of the Wahada and Sahara Banks the government owned 51 
per cent of the capital and the remaining 49 per cent was owned by the public. 
According to the articles of the Banking law No. 63 of 1971, the CBL would act as a co- 
ordinator and watchdog of the operations of the commercial banks, and would encourage 
various economic activities in accordance with state policies. However, following the 
introduction of more socialist measures in 1977, all banks became completely stated- 
owned (Abdussalam, 1985). 
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Nonetheless, despite the recent developments of the 1990s and in the new millennium, 
the banking sector in Libya is still controlled by the state. These developments will be 
investigated later in this chapter. 
2.3.3 Specialised Banks 
1) The Industrial and Real Estate Bank (IREB) 
As a result of the Libyan economic conditions in the early 1960s, the rate of migration 
from the countryside to the big cities had sharply increased, leading to sharp increases in 
house prices. Meanwhile, the government had become aware of the fact that commercial 
banks were unwilling to invest in the housing industry. Consequently, in 1965 the 
government established the Industrial and Real Estate Bank (IREB), in order to extend 
long-term credit for housing and industrial projects without interest on its loans. The 
capital of IREB was 10 million Libyan Dinars financed by the government, and this 
figure further increased to LD45 million in 1969, fully financed by the government 
(IREB, 1969-70). 
The IREB continued its operations until 1981, when it was liquidated and merged with 
the National Investment Corporation (NIC). In the aftermath of this merger, however, 
three new enterprises were established, which were the Real Estate Saving and 
Investment Bank, the Development Bank, and the Libyan Foreign Investment Company. 
¢ The Real Estate Saving and Investment Bank 
According to law No. 2 of the year 1981 the Real Estate, Savings and Investment Bank 
was established with an authorised capital of LD 100 million. The new bank was 
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assigned to support construction development activities, and to extend credit facilities 
towards the accomplishment plan (CBL, 1984). 
¢ The Development Bank 
This bank was established according to law No. 8 of 1981, and it follows the Secretariat 
of the Treasury, with a stated owned capital of one hundred million dinars. The bank 
offers loans to finance the investments required for industrial, agricultural, and tourism 
projects. Besides, this it provides production projects with technical advice. 
¢ Libyan Arab Foreign Investment Company (LAFIC) 
The Libyan Arab Foreign Investment Company has shares in the associated Libyan 
Company. As mentioned above, this company was established according to the law No. 
6 of 1981. More details concerning the objectives and role of this company in the Libyan 
economy will be given in brief in the following subsection in page 52. 
2) The Libyan Arab Foreign Bank (LAFB) 
During the 1970s and 1980s, the rises in oil prices resulted in large income surpluses for 
the Libyan economy. Therefore, the Libyan government considered investing income 
surpluses by establishing a specialist bank to manage foreign investment (Economic 
Directory, 1984). 
The LAFB was opened in June 1972 in accordance with law No. 18 of 1972, with a total 
capital of LD 20 million fully paid by the owner (i. e. the Central Bank of Libya), rising 
to LD 222 million in 1999. This bank is mainly concerned with foreign banking activities 
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such as the world financial markets as well as financing development and investment 
projects in accordance with commercial principles. 
The main activities of the LAFB cover the following areas: 
- To take part in foreign financial enterprises and activities. 
- Issuing, buying, and selling shares, as well as other international financial 
documents. 
- Accepting and giving short-term deposits as well as on-demand deposits. 
- Financing foreign trade. 
- Issuing credit letters (Economic Directory, 1984). 
The bank also extends its activities to include foreign residents and foreign companies 
working in Libya. However, since it was established, the bank has continued to focus on 
the development of its financial resources by adopting the same strategy designed to 
maintain a tradition of financial strength coupled with high quality service provision. 
The total assets and liabilities of the bank at the end of 1999 stood at LD 4,5 billion, the 
total net profits LD 3.50 billion, and the total participation was estimated at around LD 
361 million (LAFB, 1999). 
3) The Agricultural Bank 
Prior to the oil discovery, the Libyan economy was dependent on agriculture. Due to the 
lack of natural resources, the government proceeded with the establishment of this bank 
in order to support small farmers by offering agricultural credit and sustenance to fight 
plant disease, as well as to provide assistance to cope with other agricultural problems. 
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This bank was founded under the provision of law No. 18 of the year 1955, and started 
its operation in 1957 with an authorized capital of LD 5 million rising to 10 million 
dinars in 1970, and then to LD 56 million in 2001 fully paid by the government. The 
bank is specialised in offering the agricultural credit. It now has 45 branches and offices 
around the country. Total loans at the end of 2000 amounted to around LD 113 million 
(Agriculture Bank, 2000). 
2.3.4 The Financial and Investment Companies 
1) The National Investment Corporation 
This corporation was established in 1971 with a capital of 4 million Libyan dinars. The 
commercial banks contributed 30 per cent of this capital, and the other 70 per cent was 
shared between the National Institution for Social Security (30 per cent), the General 
Housing Institution (30%), and the Libya Insurance Company and A1-Makhtar Insurance 
Company paid the remaining 10%. It serves as an intermediary between the suppliers of 
funds, such as commercial banks and other financial institutions, and customers who use 
these funds, such as publicly owned companies involved in housing and many other 
projects (in areas such as tourism through share equity in many hotels in the country). 
The activities of the National Investment Corporation continued until early 1981, when 
it was liquidated and merged with the Industrial Real Estate Bank to establish new 
enterprises (CBL, 1973). 
2) Libyan Arab Foreign Investment Company (LAFIC) 
As mentioned earlier, the LAFIC was established by the provision of law No. 6 of 1981, 
following the liquidation of the National Investment Company, Industrial Real Estate 
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Bank and the Real Estate Investment Company. The main purpose of the establishment 
of the LAFIC has been to run, control and manage Libyan investment funds abroad, in 
areas such as tourism, agriculture, manufacturing industry, marine fisheries. It also aims 
at expanding economic co-operation with Third World countries to help them liberate 
themselves from economic subordination to foreign control. To meet its objectives and 
carry out its responsibility the company has the obligation to establish or contribute 
towards the establishment and partial or total ownership of projects in the areas related 
consistent with its objectives, including to: 
1) Lend or borrow finance; 
2) Carry out all legal obligations regarding its ownership of fixed or liquid assets and 
properties or other rights by selling, buying, mortgaging, transfer ownership and other 
aspects of legal activities; 
3) Carry out any other activities that ensure the fulfilment of its aims or activities 
delegated to it within the framework of the mutual agreements between Libya and other 
countries (Economic Directory, 1984). 
3) Insurance Companies 
Before 1959, there were no national insurance companies in Libya, and all such 
companies were foreign companies. Moreover, those companies were in excess of 
Libyan's demand. The first insurance law in Libya regarding supervision and control was 
issued in 1959 (Bank of Libya, 1970). However, by the year 1969, there were more than 
30 insurance companies in Libya; four of which were Libyan and the rest were either 
branches or agencies of foreign insurance companies. These companies covered almost 
all types of insurance activities such as, life, fire, automobiles, and accident insurance. 
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However, those insurance companies identified as foreign companies were nationalized 
in 1970. Subsequently, all these companies were merged into two companies, the Libya 
Insurance Company and Al-Mohktar Insurance Company. The latter was also then 
liquidated and merged with the Libya Insurance Company. The new insurance company 
was established in 1998, and government acquired 60 per cent of the capital and the 
public has been allowed to subscribe to the rest (Bank of Libya, 1966). The Libya 
Insurance Company has become more important to the Libyan economy given its vital 
role in many activities such as participation/establishment in the development plans of 
many enterprises. The total capital of the company was estimated at LD30 million at the 
end of 1998. 
Regarding recent policy in the financial sector in the 1990s, new insurance companies 
were established in 1997 and 2000. The United Insurance Company was founded and 
allowed to operate in all areas of insurance activity in the country. Furthermore, two 
private companies were founded following legal provision in 1999-2000. These two 
companies are the Al-Hussein Insurance Company and Rabate Insurance Services 
Company. 
2.4 The Role of the Banking Sector in the Development Plans 
The role of the banking sector in the Libyan economy has changed since the 1970s, 
particularly in the area of commercial banking. However, government intervention in the 
banking system has been markedly important since nationalization and the 
reorganization of this sector. 
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The government no longer defined the basic aim of commercial banks as being profit 
maximising organisations at the expense of the country's economic development plans. 
Given the significant proportional contribution of the government to their capital, the 
primary function of these banks was to make contributions to the development of the 
country in accordance with the government's projected economic and social plans. 
Under the Banking law No. 63 of 1971, and the amendment of the Banking law No. 4 of 
1963, commercial banking was to become more involved in development plans as a part 
of Article 2 in banking law No. 63 of 1971, which stipulated: 
"The Central Bank of Libya shall control and supervise commercial 
banks, regulate the relations between them, coordinate their activities 
and follow-up their work in implementation of the general policy lied 
down for the banking sector, in accordance with the general plans of 
the state" (Banking Law No. 63 of 1971 Article 2). 
In order to direct the over-increasing potential of the commercial banks to the best 
interest of the national economy, the CBL instructed the commercial banks to establish a 
new enterprise in cooperation with other Libyan institutions dealing in the area of 
economic and social development. Consequently, many new enterprises were 
established, such as the National Company for Investment, Machinery and Commerce 
National Company, Tourism and Libyan Hotels Company, Real Estate Investment 
Company, Arab Reinsurance Company, Libyan Arab Foreign Investment Company, and 
the Real Estate and Savings Bank (CBL, 1972b). 
Yet, to accomplish its duties as advisors to both commercial banks and the government, 
the CBL directive led the commercial banks towards solving housing problems by 
granting direct real estate loans, and supporting the nation's economic development 
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plans (Bank of Libya, 1970). Generally speaking, the activities of commercial banks in 
Libya were extended to all fields all over the country by guaranteeing government 
contracts for development plans in housing, agricultural and industrial projects. 
2.5 Recent Developments in the Banking Sector in Libya 
As mentioned earlier, economic policy changed when the Libyan government adopted 
the green pestroika (liberalisation) and the economy is now moving towards 
privatisation. As a result, the government has issued many decrees through the General 
People's Congress and General People's Committee to encourage the public and foreign 
investors to invest in the country. 
Furthermore, many state-owned enterprises were put on offer to producers; for instance, 
small hotels, many small and medium factories in light industry and transportation. 
Nevertheless, the banking sector has remained state-owned, and under full government 
control. The state has also invited the private sector to invest in the banking and 
financial institutions. At the end of the 1980s and in the 1990s many developments have 
occurred in the financial sector. The important of these developments are the following: 
2.5.1 The New Banking Law 
The state has sought to decrease dependence on petroleum as a sole source for foreign 
hard currency, by opening the doors to private investors from abroad. This point will be 
discussed in chapter four. 
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2.5.2 The Bank of Commerce and Development (BCD) 
The Bank of Commerce and Development is a wholly private commercial bank in Libya 
which was established by Banking law No. 1 of 1993, Banking, Currency and Credit and 
its amendments, the Secretariat of the People's Committee of Planning and Finance 
resolution No 234 of 1993 and the Secretariat of the People's Committee of Planning, 
Economics and Commerce resolution No 529 of 1994. With an authorised capital of LD 
9 million, the bank initially started as a stock company in November 1995. 
The main objectives of the BCD have been referred to by the second Article of the 
bank's by-law as follows: 
a. Accepting demand and time deposits, opening the current accounts, 
granting loans and providing other credit facilities, and granting it for 
variety terms. 
b. Collecting and paying notes payable, drafts and other commercial 
papers, and issue of bank letters of guarantee of all types. 
c. Discounting and re-discounting and dealing in all kinds of all 
commercial instruments. 
d. Financing international trade by providing credit facilities to importers 
and granting advance financing to exporters. 
e. Undertaking to achieve the objectives of development by sponsoring 
agricultural, industrial and services projects to reduce dependence on 
foreign imports. 
By the end of the year 2000, the BCD had maintained a total profit of about LD7 
million, and the bank's balance sheet at the end of 2000 demonstrated significant 
growth. The total assets and liabilities were about LD315.1 million, and total deposits 
(current accounts, long term deposits in CBL and commercial banks) were LD192 
million. It now has three main branches and three agencies in the country. Two other 
branches and five agencies were being opened in other cities in the coming years (BCD, 
2000). 
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2.5.3 Foreign Exchange and Financial Services Company (FEFSC) 
The FEFSC is a Libyan Stock Company, which was founded in accordance with the 
Commercial Law and Law No. 65 of 1970, and the resolution of the General People's 
Committee No. 611 of 1994, with a capital of LD 7 million equally distributed between 
current owners. The shareholders are the Libyan Arab Foreign Bank, the Libyan Arab 
Foreign Investment Company and the commercial banks operating in the country 
(Umma, Wahda, Sahara, Gamhuriya, and National Commercial Bank). 
The Board of Directors of FEFSC has decided to increase its capital to LD10 million. 
The aim of the company has been to engage in financial services and in foreign 
exchange within the country. The by-laws of the FEFCS's outline its general objectives 
as follows: 
"Selling and buying of foreign currencies; issuing and marketing 
of traveller's cheques; issuing of credit cards and other means 
ofpayment; buying and selling of securities and shares and 
other banknote; and ownership of movable assets and 
". real estate as the company may need to carry out its activity 
To meet its objectives, the company may enter into partnership and co-operation in 
many ways with banks, financial institutions and other local and foreign investors in 
securing funds for its activities, including lending to and borrowing from banks and 
other financial institutions inside and outside the country (FEFSC, 1995; 1996). 
2.5.3 Domestic Banks (AI-Massarif Al-Ahliya) 
The Libyan Arab Jamahiriya witnessed many developments in the socio-economic area. 
As a result of the government intentions to achieve effective privatisation and 
liberalization policies, forth-seven domestic banks were established according to law 
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No. 1 of 1993, in different cities in the country. These banks are controlled by a state- 
owned National Banking Corporation. 
The main objectives of the domestic banks are the following: 
0 Acceptance of deposits and opening current accounts. 
" Offering all kinds of credit facilities to fund economic, industrial, and tourism 
projects. 
0 Creating new opportunities for investment. 
" Practising all commercial activities allowed by the banking law No. 1 of 1993. 
The total capital of the domestic banks in 2000 was 60 million Libyan dinars, and the 
total deposits were LD547.0 million, where 28 percent of these deposits (LD 153 
million) belonged to the private sector (CBL, 2000). Further discussion is given in 
chapter four. 
2.6 Summary 
Over the last century, the Libyan economy has been completely transformed from being 
one of the poorest countries in the world to one of the highest annual per capita incomes 
in the world. Prior to the discovery of oil, the Libyan economy was primarily dependent 
on agriculture, which was mainly limited and constrained by climate and other 
conditions. Furthermore, Libya had undergone difficult economic conditions: limited 
resources, low levels of trade activity, high rates of unemployment, low skills, lack of 
education, and no banking and monetary system. Therefore, these conditions had left the 
state totally dependent on foreign and military aid. 
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This situation has changed significantly since the first shipment of crude oil, improving 
GDP growth, imports, and per capita income. However, the phase of the rentier State 
began when Libya has became heavily dependent on oil revenues. On the other hand, 
development plans commenced from 1963 until 1986 with different goals, objectives 
and priorities. The first plan concentrated on the modernisation of the national 
infrastructure, whereas the second and third development plans in the 1970s focussed on 
self-sufficiency by encouraging higher agriculture production and industrial activity 
aiming to reduce dependency on oil revenues. 
At the end of the 1970s, the government by adopted a new socialist economic system. 
The Libyan economy became completely centrally planned and controlled by the 
government. Consequently all activities became state-owned, and the private sector was 
completely abolished until 1989. As a result of its dependence on the oil revenues, the 
Libyan economy was adversely affected by oil price fluctuations since the 1980s, and oil 
revenues fell from $14.2 billion to $5.2 billion. Therefore the Libyan economy began to 
face severe difficulties as many projects had to cease while others were frozen. This 
acute situation forced the government, led by Colonel Mummer El-Qadhafi, to introduce 
a new economic system bringing about privatisation in the form of small-scale private 
ownership. 
Moreover, Libya suffered from US and United Nation sanctions which cost the country 
billions of US dollars, causing a significant decline in oil's contribution to total GDP 
from 65 % in 1970 to only around 40 % in 2001. 
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Before 1956, there was no reliable banking or monetary system in the country. The 
banking sector consisted of many branches of foreign banks, mainly affiliated to the 
Italian banking system. The Bank of Libya was the first national state bank, and was 
founded in 1956. It played a vital role in promoting the Libyan banking system. 
However, since then many banking laws were introduced from thel960s to 1990s, in 
order to enhance the functions of the banking system and the related monetary policies. 
Libyanisation and the nationalisation of the banking system, on the other hand, were the 
most important steps taken in the 1970s. Furthermore, the banking sector had been 
allowed to become more involved in the development plans using the credit facilities 
they provided and by making contributions to the new enterprises directly involved in 
the development projects. Generally speaking, in the 1990s many significant 
developments in the financial sector occurred. Private banks were reinstated, and many 
by-laws and redemption policies have been enforced to enhance foreign investment. 
To sum up, this chapter has referred to many environmental factors that have affected 
the Libyan banking sector, including the economic and political regimes. For example, 
oil revenues have given the Libyan government sufficient funds to allow it to play a 
major role in development. This factor has encouraged the Libyan government to 
commence establishing an independent monetary authority by taking advantage of the 
new situation of economic recovery following the oil discovery. 
The Libyan banking sector, therefore, has been subject to various levels of regulation, 
including restrictions on entry and exist, reserve and liquidity requirements, number of 
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branches, interest rate on deposits and credit, and limitations on and the direction of 
credit facilities. Consequently, the Libyan banking sector has become a state-owned 
enterprise and its objectives have been adjusted accordingly in order to provide crediting 
facilities to public sector organisations. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE BANKING INDUSTRY AN 
INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
The banking sector plays a special role in the economy as an intermediate body between 
the suppliers and the users of funds (Christopher et al, 2002). Banks receive funds from 
depositors (suppliers), and in return they assure depositors that their money is used 
efficiently and monitored carefully. However, the functions of banking institutions have 
become recently significantly broader; as both the products and the geographic markets 
have become much more integrated. Therefore, banks have tended to provide new 
services such as credit cards, discount, brokerage, leasing, options, swaps, and futures 
and trust services. 
Over the last two decades, the globalisation of the financial market has gained additional 
force as a result of the liberalisation programmes undertaken by various countries. As a 
result, these financial institutions face today a fast-paced, dynamic, and competitive 
environment on a global scale. Within such a competitive environment, these financial 
institutions are forced to examine their performance, because their survival in the 
dynamic economics of the twenty-first century will be dependent upon their productive 
efficiencies. For the past twenty years these circumstances have prompted many 
countries to liberalise their financial sector through deregulation in order to improve and 
efficiency performance (Denizer et al., 2000). 
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The rapid expansion and growth of banks have rendered them more vulnerable to crisis 
leading to the shaking of public confidence and the deterioration of the quality of their 
services. The 1980s and 1990s have witnessed major banking crises in many developing 
and industrial countries (Honohan, 1997). 
Yet, it can be argued that the banking system plays an important part in the financial 
structure of the state that bears the responsibility to maintain the confidence of the public 
in the integrity and security of banks. Such integrity and trust is maintained at the 
international level through the World Bank (WB), the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) and the Basle Committee, ensuring a sound and efficient banking sector through 
continual reforms. However, the main objective of these reforms is to increase the 
efficiency of banking operations. The general structures of the financial service industry 
are changing rapidly. As discussed earlier, commercial banking is expected to be 
managed efficiently, prudently, safely, and profitably. Thus institutions should become 
more efficient by improving profitability; larger amounts of funds intermediated; 
maintaining competitive prices; raising the quality of services; and offering greater 
safety and soundness. 
It is noteworthy that the international economic environment has experienced major 
changes in recent years owing to globalisation. Furthermore, the financial sector has also 
witnessed fundamental changes including the consolidation of organisations and 
increasing of competitiveness. It therefore becomes logical to assume that globalisation 
would affect banking efficiency. These situations have encouraged many countries to 
liberalise their financial sectors through deregulation in order to improve efficiency in 
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performance and to increase the soundness of banking systems. However, the link 
between deregulation and improved efficiency has been established by some studies. For 
example, Bhattacharyya and Kumthakar (1997) found that deregulation had a major 
impact on productivity and efficiency in the Eastern and Central European countries and 
China, whereas other studies have suggested that efficiency has remained unchanged 
following the deregulation measures undertaken by the US banking system (Bauer et al., 
1993). However, Humphrey and Pulley (1997) have concluded that productivity has 
fallen following the deregulation of banks in the US in the 1980s and the early 1990s. 
Financial sectors in developing countries, including the Arab countries, have 
traditionally been characterised by relatively high levels of government control. 
Therefore, the liberalisation and deregulation process has tended to reduce direct 
government control and strengthen prudential regulations. 
Thus, this chapter aims to critically examine the role of the banking sector and its 
associated problems with regard to performance and efficiency. In addition, it will 
review the relevant literature that highlights the potential problem faced. Therefore it 
will be more appropriate at this point to discuss the research procedures as depicted in 
figure 3.1. The concept of efficiency in banking firms will be considered in chapter 5. In 
the present chapter, the main focus is to illustrate the banking sector in the world and 
problems affecting its performance 
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Figure 3.1: Research concept 
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The next section reviews the development of the banking industry and its roles. Section 
two discusses financial and banking crises by looking at their causes and effects on the 
banking industry. The subsequent section highlights the main problems that have 
intensified these banking crises, and which have prompted international cooperation in 
the main banking reform. For the evaluation of the experience of banking reform in 
regard to developing economies, the final section will examine recent banking policies 
in Malaysia and Saudi Arabia as cases in point. 
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3.2 The Banking Industry in the Global Economy 
Generally speaking, banks are the financial institutions that accept deposits and provide 
loans and other funds for investment. Through banks funds can be circulated between 
savers and investors, and therefore banks play a major role in the process of economic 
development as a whole. However, the process of transferring funds from banks 
(lenders) to investors (borrowers) is known as "indirect finance" (Mishkin, 2003). 
Commercial banks are the financial intermediaries that raise funds primarily by issuing 
demand, time and savings deposits. These activities demonstrate that the commercial 
banking system is vital for the economy to function properly. However, the ability of the 
commercial banking system to perform efficiently and in harmony with our needs and 
economic goals depends, to a great extent, on the efficiency of its management (Reed et. 
al, 1984). 
From a historical point of view, people have engaged in financial transactions since the 
early twelfth Century. Moreover, banking institutions arose in the city-states such as 
Genoa in the twelfth century and in Florence and Venice some time after the twelfth 
century (Merton and Bedie, 1995), giving rise to merchant bankers as well as an 
important group of banking institutions. These banking institutions, however, have dealt 
with bills, goods and thereby providing for the transfer of funds and payment of 
accounts, at a distance but without shipping actual coin (Wilson, 1986). Besides 
demand deposits, they organized exchanges for trading financial future contracts and 
other financial derivatives (Merton and Bodie, 1995). The evolution of the banking 
industry has a long history. For example, English bankers in particular had begun to 
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develop a deposit banking business as early as the seventeenth century. Nonetheless, 
the demand for larger banking units has been generally associated with the pace of 
economic growth. 
Models of banking systems across the globe began with many types. The English model, 
for instance, was primarily developed on a deposit banking business and was conducted 
on the basis of a large number of small private banks. As a result of the significant 
increase in banking activities, an urgent need for adopting new legislation meant that 
banks are made eligible to become joint stock companies, which would be likely to pave 
the way for the wider population to contribute to their capital. 
The banking system in the US, on the other hand, consists of a small number of 
commercial banks with widespread networks of branches, centrally controlled by so- 
called "unit banking". Banking organization in the United States is thus very different 
from that of England. The third model of banking structure is the 'hybrid' system, which 
was adopted in France and India. The hybrid bank model in France has large banks with 
nationwide networks of branches (Willson, 1986). 
In recent years, the banking sector in developed countries has changed significantly. The 
first model of banking system based on 'market-orientation' has a fragmented 
shareholding structure, resulting from the distribution of shares through capital markets. 
So, banking efficiency is driven by the consideration of maximising the market value of 
the corporation (Copeland et al., 1996). The second type of banking in developed 
countries is considered as 'bank-based', such as the Japanese and German banks. Bank- 
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based models historically played an important role in industrialisation in most 
economies in the world (Franck and Hudson, 1984). 
3.2.1 The Functions of the Banking Institutions 
Banks as financial intermediaries accept deposits and provide loans and undertake other 
investment activities for profit. This function is called indirect finance. Thus, the process 
of indirect finance takes place through financial intermediation (Mishkin, 2003). 
Cameron et al (1972) summarise the functions of the banking system as follows: 
(i) Intermediation; (ii) to furnish part of all means of payments or money supply; and 
(iii) provision of entrepreneurial talent and guidance for the economy as a whole. 
The functions of banks usually come in different forms. The basic and main functions 
are to accept and safeguard customers' money deposits and allow the withdrawal and the 
transfer of money from one account to another locally or abroad. Furthermore, they lend 
the surplus of the deposited money to customers who are willing to borrow. Therefore 
the banking sector constitutes part of the financial system, which can make significant 
contributions to economic development through: 
a) Mobilising more domestic resources, 
b) Dealing with loan and lending problems 
c) Improving the quality of investment so as to increase the production capacity of 
the economy (Taylor, 1973). 
However, the ability of commercial banking to perform its tasks efficiently and in 
harmony with the potential needs of the economy depends, to a great extent, on an 
efficient management system (Reed et al., 1984). 
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Like other industries, the financial industry is in business to earn profits by selling its 
products. The simple function of a bank's balance sheet is: 
Total assets = Total liabilities + capital 
Furthermore, a bank balance sheet determines the sources of bank funds (liabilities) and 
uses (assets). Banks obtain funds by borrowing and issuing other liabilities such as 
deposits. Then they use these funds to acquire assets such as securities and loans. 
However, to make profits banks tend to charge interest rates on their holding securities 
and loans and these charges must be higher than the interest expenses on their liabilities. 
In order to understand the way a bank manages its assets and liabilities to earn the 
highest possible profit, the following must be of primary concern to management: 
a) Liquidity management, 
b) Assets management, 
c) Liability management, and 
d) Capital adequacy management. 
These factors have been used in many banks as internal tools to assess banking 
performance, and are applied in subsequent chapters in order to measure banking 
efficiency in conjunction with efficiency scores (more details about these factors are 
offered in chapters 5 and 6. 
To maximise their profits, banks must, at the same time, seek the highest returns 
possible on loans and securities, reduce risk, and make adequate provisions for liquidity 
by holding liquid assets. 
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With regard to modem economies, banks are well known for their role as 
intermediaries, performing four fundamental services; they provide portfolio 
management services; they use their liabilities as of payment; they transform liquid 
assets into illiquid assets; and they monitor borrowers (Yang, 1996). Furthermore, 
modem banking system should practice three elementary functions: payment settlement 
and record keeping, efficient intermediation between savers and investors, and the 
provision of appropriate system-wide liquidity using indirect monetary policy 
instruments (Stavarek, 2003). 
3.2.2 Theories of Financial Intermediaries 
Financial intermediaries, and particularly the banking system, play an active and 
important role in the allocation of resources (Yang, 1996). The functions of the financial 
system as suggested by Levine (1997) are the following to: 
- Facilitate the trading, hedging, diversifying, and pooling of risk; 
- Allocate resources; 
- Monitor managers and exert corporate control; 
- Mobilize savings; and 
- Facilitate the exchange of goods and services. 
However, financial development is usually associated with economic development. 
Nonetheless the financial development can be defined as the increase in financial 
intermediation reflected by the increased separation between savers and investors. 
As Yang (1996) points out, when a system of financial flows involving financial 
intermediation becomes necessary, the means of regulating this system also becomes 
very important in order jointly to satisfy the interests of lenders and borrowers. Financial 
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development tends to start with the banking systems and then gradually spreads to non- 
bank financial institutions. 
During the twentieth century, however, the world witnessed unprecedented 
technological changes. These changes have also permanently altered the face of banking. 
However, a sound microeconomic foundation for aggregate economic analysis has been 
increasingly emphasised. Under this circumstance, a satisfactory theory of bank 
behaviour appears as an essential condition for a clear understanding of the work of the 
financial sector (Baltesperger, 1980). A complete theory of banking, however, should 
not only provide an integrated view of the firm's asset and liability choice, but also the 
determination of the total size of the firm. Therefore, any discussion involving the 
banking system as an institution or as an industry should deal with many aspects of the 
banking industry, including banking structure, risk management, quality of services, 
profitability, conduct, regulation and supervision. These features would lead to banking 
efficiency. 
Traditionally, bank's acceptance of deposits in order to provide loans for investment was 
primarily concerned with managing the bank's balance sheet. This model worked well 
with agriculture and industrial society. In contrast, the recent model has shifted towards 
a complicated network of new banking services, such as financial derivatives products. 
This situation may intensify competition within the financial sector in general and in the 
banking sector in particular (Siems and Klemme, 1997). 
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However, owing to the complex nature of the subject, researchers are still divided 
concerning the best model of behaviour of banking firms. In general, the banking field 
may be studied through two main approaches: the production approach, and the 
intermediation approach. The production approach treats banks as firms that use capital 
and labour to produce different types of services for their final customers. An 
intermediation approach sees banks as providing balance sheet or intermediation 
services, by transferring funds from one end to another. Moreover, the modem approach 
seeks to integrate elements such as risk management, agency costs and the quality of 
services. 
The classic theories of intermediation are based on transaction costs and asymmetric 
information, which have provided the foundation for understanding intermediaries 
(Allen and Santomero, 2001). However, Gurley and Shaw (1960) have focused on the 
role of transaction costs. For example, the evaluation of fixed costs of assets means that 
intermediaries have an advantage over individuals because they allow such costs to be 
shared. Financial intermediaries exist because of their expertise, among other things, in 
minimising transaction costs, which can be subdivided into exchange costs, contract 
costs, and information costs (Benston and Smith, 1976). 
On the other hand, numerous authors have stressed the role of asymmetric information 
as an alternative rationalisation for the importance of intermediaries (Allen and 
Santomero, 2001). Asymmetric information occurs when different agents do not have 
identical information. This leads to adverse selection, which is the problem created by 
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asymmetric information before the transaction occurs. Moral hazards are the second 
problem created by asymmetric information after transactions occur (Bondt, 2000). 
Leland and Pyle (1977) were the first among authors to suggest that an intermediary can 
signal its informed status by investing its wealth in assets about which it has special 
knowledge. As Allen and Santomero (1998) have argued, many current theories of 
intermediation are too heavily focused on the function of institutions that are no longer 
crucial in many developed financial systems. However, in recent decades there have 
been significant changes in financial intermediation leading to the development of the 
financial markets themselves. 
Nevertheless, there is little agreement as to what constitutes a workable and productive 
theory of a banking firm. The main reason for this may be attributed to little agreement 
concerning fundamental concepts (Klein, 1971). 
In the theoretical literature a large number of rival models and approaches are dedicated 
to banking as a financial intermediary. Yet, some authors emphasise the assets side of 
the balance sheet of the financial intermediaries (Leland and Pyle, 1977; Diamond, 
1984), while others focus on either the liability side (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983), or 
otherwise focus on both sides of the balance sheet (Pyle, 1971). 
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3.2.3 Recent Changes in the Market and Intermediaries 
Banks have existed since ancient times, taking deposits from households and making 
loans to economic agents requiring capital. Moreover, banks have played a major role in 
the alteration of the household sector (savings) to the investment in real assets. 
However, the financial systems in many countries have undergone dramatic changes in 
the last four decades. For example, financial markets such as the stock and bond markets 
have significantly grown in size. In the meantime, however, in the 1970s and 1980s 
there has been extensive financial innovation, including a variety of mortgage packages 
as well as derivative instruments such as swaps and options and futures contracts, which 
have all experienced a virtual explosion in volume (Allen and Santomero, 1998). 
The rise in the breadth and depth of financial markets has been the result of the 
increased use of these tools by financial intermediaries and firms. Yet, as a result of the 
dramatic changes in the financial markets, the contemporaneous activities in traditional 
financial institutions such as banks have also changed. Therefore, to be more precise, the 
traditional financial theories have been based on transaction costs and asymmetric 
information, whereas the current financial theories are obviously based on risk 
management. 
Allen and Santomero (1998) have noted that risk management has now become a central 
activity of many intermediaries, pointing out that most current theories of intermediation 
tend to consider risk management as an integrated tool in the activities of the 
intermediaries. They add that the understanding of these changes requires different 
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theories of intermediation that stress risk-trading management and participation costs as 
the key reasons for the existence of modem intermediaries (Allen and Santomero, 2001). 
On the other hand, Bert and Dick (2000) have introduced a recent view of the theory of 
intermediation, by focusing on market efficiency. Thus, financial intermediaries are 
becoming an endangered species. They believed that risk management has not just 
become important only in the recent past, but rather it represents the root of financial 
intermediation. 
As Cull (1996) suggests, a growing body of evidence has demonstrated that financial 
sector development is important for economic growth. That development, however, is 
unlikely to occur without some risk, and the past twenty years have witnessed bank 
insolvencies in more than one hundred countries. 
As mentioned earlier, the world of the financial system has changed significantly. 
Likewise, banking functions have also been subject to significant changes in the last two 
decades. Banks have moved away from the traditional role of taking deposits and 
making loans to firms and customers towards free-producing activities such as trusts, 
annuities mutual funds, mortgage banking insurance brokerage and transactions services 
(Allen, and Santomero. 2001). Figure 3.2 gives a summary of services provided by 
financial intermediation. 
Figure 3.2 shows that the financial intermediary now provides many services, which is a 
reflection of both recent developments in banking activities, and the assumed high risk 
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taken (Bhattacharya and Thakor, 1993). Moreover, the number of banking activities 
has increased and banks have become, in many ways, a global industry, which may well 
have led to many banking problems such as banking crises or banking insolvency in 
many parts of the world. This may be attributed to the increase in competitiveness 
among the various banking organisations as well as among other non-financial 
institutions. 






Transaction services (e. g. check- writing, buying/ 
Selling securities and safekeeping) 
Financial advice (e. g. advice on where to invest, 
Portfolio management) 
Screening and certification (e. g. bond ratings) 
Origination (e. g. bank initiating a loan to a 
borrower) 
Issuance (e. g. taking a security offering to 
market) 
Miscellaneous (e. g. trust activities) 




Term to maturity (e. g. bank financing assets with 
longer maturity than liabilities 
Divisibility (e. g. a mutual fund holding assets 
with larger unit size than its liabilities) 
Liquidity (e. g. a bank funding illiquid loans with 
Liquid liabilities) 
Credit Risk (e. g. a bank monitoring a borrower to 
reduce default risk) 
Source: Bhattacharyya and Thakor, (1993) 
Nonetheless, the general structures of the financial service industries are changing 
rapidly. Thus an institution should become more efficient by improving its profitability, 
greater amounts of funds intermediated, competitive prices, quality services, and greater 
safety and soundness (Berger et al., 1993). These changes in the financial industry are 
occurring around the globe. For instance, the banking industry in the US witnessed a 
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dramatic consolidation wave in which many of the nation's largest banking 
organisations merged. Likewise, in Western Europe there has been considerable 
consolidation of banks within countries in anticipation of EC integration and the 
accompanying consolidation across the borders of the member countries. 
Meanwhile, in Eastern Europe a capitalist style has been adopted, whereas in Asia and 
South America, countries have started to review the regulations regarding the separation 
of commercial banking, underwriting and insurance, in an attempt to augment the 
efficiency of the financial industry (Berger et al., 1993). 
However, in order to protect the public from financial crisis, governments have 
implemented many types of banking regulations, such as restrictions on entry, 
restrictions on assets and activities, deposits insurance, limits on competition, disclosure 
requirements, risk assessment, and strengthening banking supervision (Caprio and 
Klingebiel, 1996). 
3.3 Financial and Banking Crises: Reasons and Effects 
Since the Great Depression of the 1930s, many banking crises have occurred in many 
countries in the world. In the 1970s and 1980s, the Third World debt crisis led to the 
collapse of the banking system in the developing countries. Moreover, the recent 
financial and economic policies leading to liberalization and privatisation have added 
insult to injury in many countries the world over. 
Many financial crises have occurred in recent times, such as in Latin America and the 
Wall Street crises in 1987, the crisis in the Nordic countries in the 1990s, and the Asian 
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foreign currency crisis at the end of 1990s (Mishkin, 2000). The frequency and the 
extent of stringency of the financial crises in the industrialised and the developing 
countries has prompted researchers to develop different theories and policies regarding 
these financial crises, including the fragility of the banking system at both the macro and 
microeconomic levels. 
The macroeconomic approach to financial crises usually seeks to explain the totality of 
these events through either monetary disturbances or business cycle fluctuation. This 
approach considers the importance of the banking crises in terms of their effects on the 
money market. According to this approach, however, banking panics caused by the 
money market will eventually lead to the contraction of economic activities. Yet, the 
monetarist model is considered deficient because of its failure to contemplate the more 
pronounced movements which are characteristic of severe depression and inflation 
(Freidman and Schwartz, 1963). 
Financial crises have recently occurred in developed economies after financial 
liberalisation, and equally in developing countries that have adopted liberalisation of the 
financial system, as is the case with the Nordic countries (i. e. Finland, Norway, and 
Sweden) in the late 1980s and early 1990s. However, factors such as credit expansion, 
lax fiscal polices, collapses in oil prices, deregulation, and the lifting of exchange rate 
controls have been the common denominator of fiscal crises in these countries. 
The second example of financial crises, which occurred towards the end of the 1990s, 
was the Asian financial crisis of 1997-1998. The main reasons were huge budget 
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deficits, the unrealistic appreciation of exchange rates as Asian currencies were linked 
to the US dollar, large credit booms and weak banking systems. In recent years, 
however, financial crises have become commonplace in countries within the emerging 
markets and transition countries (IMF, 1997), For example, both the Mexican financial 
crisis in 1994, and the crisis in East Asia in 1997 have led to declines in the growth rates 
of the GDP in the order of ten percentage points, whereas the Russian and Ecuador 
crises in 1998 and 1999 respectively have had similar negative effects on the real output 
of the GDP (Mishkin, 2000). 
Thus, a financial system must confront problems of asymmetric information in both 
parties to any financial transaction in the market. Regarding the asymmetric information 
problems in market transaction in the financial crises, Mishkin (2000) offers the 
following definition: 
"A financial crisis is a disruption to financial markets in which adverse 
selection and hazard problems become much worse, so that financial 
markets are unable to efficiently channel funds to those who have the 
most productive investment opportunities ". 
The immediate outcome of financial crisis is the inability of the financial markets to 
function efficiently, which has resulted in a sharp contraction in economic activity. 
However, it has been suggested that four types of factors can lead to increases in 
asymmetric information problems, and thus to financial crises. These factors are: 
1) The deterioration of the financial sector balance sheets; 
2) Increases in interest rates; 
3) Increases in uncertainty; and 
4) The deterioration of non-financial balance sheets 
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As mentioned above concerning the financial crises and their effects on promoting 
factors, the literature attempts to define financial policies which may have helped 
prevent financial crises: for instance, prudential supervision and regulation, reduction of 
the role of state-owned financial institutions, legal and judicial systems, development of 
monetary policies, accounting and disclosure requirements, and exchange rate regimes 
and exchange reserves (Mishkin, 2000). 
In recent decades, many countries rich and poor alike have experienced systematic 
banking crisis requiring major and expensive overhauls of their financial systems, and 
particularly of banking systems (Honohan and Klingebiel, 2000). A systemic banking 
crisis is a situation where an economy faces large-scale financial and corporate distress 
within a short period of time. Yet, the solution to a systemic banking and corporate crisis 
involves many policy choices, ranging from macroeconomic policies such as monetary 
and fiscal policies to microeconomic policies that incorporate capital adequacy rules and 
corporate governance requirements (Klingebiel and Leaven, 2001). 
As has been previously suggested, recent examples include the crises in the Nordic 
countries in the early 1990s, in Mexico in 1994-95, in the East Asian countries of 1997, 
and in transition economies in the 1990s. 
Banking crises appear to have become more common since the early 1980s. As Caprio 
and Klingebiel (1996) identify 93 countries experienced a systematic financial crises 
during the 1980s or 1990s. Moreover, Rose (2001) points out that banking problems are 
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the root of the crises in Asia. Banking problems occur as the result of over-borrowing 
and over-lending without strong fundamental regulatory and supervisory means. 
Furthermore, Bascom (1994) emphasises that a financial crises in the banking system 
tends to follow a certain pattern. It might begin with technical mismanagement 
associated with asset growth and asset concentration errors. Then, as a result of these 
errors, both profits and capital start to decline; the next stage is cosmetic management. 
At the same time, non-performing loans are renegotiated and replaced by new longer 
term loans with overvalued real estate or overvalued fixed assets as collateral. 
Banking failure in the 1980s was a widespread phenomenon in several developing 
countries. For example in the Latin American countries which had adopted financial 
reform policies in the 1970s, government failed to put right the prudential regulation and 
supervision of their financial institutions. 
As Bascom (1994), points out, a commercial bank may be considered insolvent when: 
i. its capital accounts or equity and all its assets are together less 
than its deposits and other liabilities; 
ii. it is unable to meet its current obligations as they mature, even 
though its assets may exceed its liabilities; 
iii. its equity is exhausted by losses and no immediate prospect for 
replenishing this equity exists. 
In addition, if the supervision system, disclosure standards, and internal control systems 
are generally weak, this might lead to banking insolvencies (Rose, 2001). 
As stated earlier, the 1980s witnessed several banking crises in developing countries. 
The causes were mismanagement of the macro economy, an unsound banking system, 
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sharp changes in commodity prices, and the weakness of prudential regulatory and 
supervision frameworks. In other words, the banking problems of the 1980s and the 
1990s resulted from a combination of inappropriate policies, incompetent management, 
government intervention, and inefficient institutional frameworks. 
A diffusion of the failures of financial systems has occurred in both the developing and 
the developed countries (Honohan, 1997). The banking crises have hit government 
budgets with expenditures that have had to be absorbed through higher taxes. Since the 
late 1970s, more than one hundred systemic banking crises have occurred in 93 
countries, and 50 borderline crises have arisen in 44 countries. The costs of these crises 
in some countries have been estimated at 10-20 percent of GDP, while in others the 
costs might be as high as 40-55 per cent of GDP (for more details, see Caprio and 
Klingebiel, 1996). 
Governments have used many approaches to try to resolve systematic banking and 
corporate distress. In a pioneering work, Sheng (1996) has attempted to draw lessons 
from several banking crises. Caprio and Klingebiel (1996) have also discussed those 
lessons referring to more countries as examples. However, the main lesson from both 
studies is that the management of the financial crises in industrial countries is very 
different from that in developing countries (emerging markets). Because emerging 
markets have weaker institutions, crises are often larger, and other initial circumstances 
differ. Conversely, the "best practice" lessons from developed countries do not translate 
easily to developing countries. 
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As Rose (2001) argues many lessons can be learnt from the underlying causes of the 
Asian crises. Banking problems occurred owing to over-confidence in the banking 
system, inflamed by massive borrowing from abroad. Rose added that in order to 
prevent behaviour such as over-borrowing and over-lending, the banking system has to 
impose measures such as capital adequacy requirements, strengthening loan 
classification, provisioning of rules and the reinforcement of internal control systems. 
Furthermore, the central bank should help to build a prudent regulatory environment, so 
that if a: 
"Strong financial system is built, the banking system will be more resilient in 
facing adverse macroeconomic and asset price fluctuations. Healthy banking 
system will also promote economic growth, which in turn will help balance 
account deficit that may occurred in the country" (Rose, 2001). 
To resolve banking problems, however, several measures may be implemented to 
prevent a recurrence of financial crisis (particularly banking crisis). These measures 
include the establishment of sustainable macroeconomic policies and competent 
macroeconomic management, and the implementation of a sound prudential regulatory 
and supervisory framework (Bascom, 1994). These are discussed in the following 
section, highlighting the features of banking reforms policy. 
3.4 The Role of International Organisations in the Banking Reforms: A Review of 
Reform Rolicies 
Episodes of bank insolvency have increased in recent years and few areas of the world 
have escaped without significant losses (Caprio and Klengbiel, 1996). The boom in 
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banking crises, both implicit and explicit, around the world in the last 15 years has 
drawn more attention to this issue. 
Recent literature on the banking crises in the developing countries suggests that a variety 
of macroeconomic and microeconomic factors account for systematic bank insolvency. 
Based on the results of studies conducted in 29 countries, Caprio and Klengbiel 1996) 
believed that the main reasons behind bank insolvency are that: 
"in all of them, deficient management, faulty supervision and regulation, 
government intervention and / or some degree of connected or politically 
motivated lending are cited as primary factors behind bank insolvency". 
Economists and other policy advisers have responded to this development with more 
concerted efforts, involving organizations such as the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), the World Bank (WB) and other multilateral development banks and 
organisations including the G-10 and the Bank for International Settlement (BIS), with 
the developing countries being at the forefront of their efforts (Caprio, 1997). 
As mentioned earlier, many causes of bank failure in various countries of the world have 
led to an international cooperation focused on the need to reduce financial fragility and 
systemic risks in the global financial markets. Many international organisations, such as 
the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, the Bank for International Settlement, 
and the Basle Committee, have played a pivotal role in the management of the debt 
crises in the 1970s and 1980s, and in financial crises and banking crises. Furthermore, 
the primary role of these international organisations is to provide development financing 
for specific projects in the countries concerned. For example, crisis management of 
Asian currencies was undertaken through the tripartite corporation of the IMF, WB, and 
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Asian Development Bank (ADB). Responsibility for the reform of the banking sector 
was assigned to the IMF, whereas the WB was put in charge of financial sector reform. 
However, the World Bank's role in these reforms begins with assisting the governments 
concerned in diagnosing the strengths and weaknesses of their financial systems 
analysing how the system compares with others, training bank supervisors and giving 
advice to the authorities on the reform process. Furthermore, the WB is currently 
involved in projects related to issues such as financial structure, deposit insurance, 
financial regulation, banking crises, bank insolvency, and banking privatisation and 
internationalisation (Biagio and Larry, 1998). 
3.4.1 Banking Reform Theory 
Many countries in the world liberalized their financial sectors in the late 1980s or 1990s 
to encourage greater financial efficiency and to reduce direct government control. The 
principle aim of the liberalization process is to increase bank lending to the private 
sector, which is a major part of any country as well as the engine of economic growth. 
On the other hand the economic reforms have reduced the risk of bank distress caused 
by governments directing banks to lend to unviable and uncreditworthy borrowers. 
The reform policy included: removing interest rate controls; removal of quantitative 
controls on banks in lending to specific sectors; privatization of state-owned banks; the 
lifting of barriers to competition; introduction of market based securities, and allowing 
the establishment of private banks and other financial institutions with the potential 
involvement of foreign investors. At the same time, to promote sounder banking systems 
and to help protect bank deposits, reforms were introduced to strengthen the prudential 
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regulation and supervision of banks by improving bank laws and expanding 
supervisory capacities (Brown bridge, 2002; Brown bridge and Harvey, 1998; Daniel 
and Emilia, 2001). 
The main purposes of the reform policies have generally been to raise both the level of 
investment as well as the efficient allocation of resources, besides enhancing the 
provisions of financial services in all sectors of the economy (Daniel and Emilia, 2001). 
During the 1980s and 1990s bank systems in both the developed and the developing 
countries alike underwent fundamental changes. Many banks were devastated by the 
burden of non- performing loans, brought on by different causes. 
However, bank restructuring has become a centrepiece of financial reform policies. 
Accordingly, bank restructuring has been defined as the package of macroeconomic, 
microeconomic, institutional, and regulatory measures taken to restore problematic 
banking systems from financial solvency. Sheng (1996) gathered evidence in a study 
conducted in different developed and developing countries that the banking problems in 
the 1980s were essentially an outcome of bad policies, poor management and a weak 
institutional framework. However, Honohan (1997) emphasised that the causes of 
banking failures can often be ascribed to poor lending decisions, recoverability of 
delinquent loans, and concentration of lending in certain sectors under government 
directives or to particular borrowers. Furthermore, banking crises attributed to poor 
management may also be imputed to poor supervision and regulation (Honohan, 1997). 
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Nevertheless, major steps have been undertaken in regard to financial sector reform, 
including the building of new legal and regulatory frameworks, the strengthening of 
banking and financial intermediation, the removal of interests rates and exchange rate 
control, the liberalisation of market entry into the financial sector, the commercialisation 
and privatisation of state-owned financial institutions, and the opening of the financial 
markets to wider domestic and foreign competition (Sheng, 1996). 
To this end, it could be argued that financial liberalisation has not created the results 
expected by theory. For instance, in many countries liberalisation resulted in financial 
crises a few years after it had been implemented. Furthermore, it is commonly observed 
that credit supply tends to increase after liberalisation. The most important observation is 
that some interventionist countries have achieved remarkable levels of financial 
deepening without significant liberalisation (e. g. Korea and Taiwan). 
It is logical to ask whether the banking reforms have made significant differences. 
Whilst some countries have been successful in eliminating underlying distortions by 
restructuring their financial sectors following reform, in others the financial sectors have 
remained underdeveloped and the rates of financial intermediation in particular banking 
institutions continue to be quite low. This may be attributed to differences in the type 
and scale of banking problems between countries. Furthermore, the process of choosing 
the right time and the right polices is the first step towards the success of banking 
reforms. The success of banking reforms is dependent on several factors, including the 
correct identification of banking problems, the selection of the appropriate and 
applicable policies, and finally the right sequencing as well as the right timing. 
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3.4.2 Banking Regulation and Supervision: Objectives, Rules, and Perspectives 
Any banking system is prone to many problems and weaknesses, These problems are 
usually due to a multitude of factors, including macroeconomic shocks, microeconomic 
actions, overcapacity in banking, excessive competition, operational inefficiencies, 
repressive taxation, structural rigidities, portfolio concentration, speculation, 
mismanagement and fraud, external shocks, policy mistakes, and inadequate 
supervision. All these factors contribute to bank insolvency and poor performance 
(Sheng, 1996). The government controlled structural banking system has advantages for 
economic development in developing countries. However, many cases have proven that 
not all developing countries succeed in their efforts to achieve economic development 
under government guidance and the control of the banking system. The main goal for 
regulatory and supervisory authorities is to achieve credibility and stability of the 
banking system. However, to achieve effective regulatory and supervisory operation, 
some degree of independence, and non-political interference should be provided 
(Bascom, 1994). 
3.4.2.1 Banking Supervision 
Banking supervision tends to minimize moral hazard behaviour relating to lending, 
conflicts of interest, fraud and mismanagement. Moreover, the main objectives of bank 
supervision are: (i) competition and operational efficiency; (ii) safety and soundness; 
(iii) monetary policy and allocation efficiency; and (iv) protection of small depositors 
(Sheng, 1996). Therefore, international cooperation regarding the supervision has 
become necessary following the globalisation of services. 
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Bank supervision helps determine whether or not the objectives of bank regulation have 
been achieved. It usually includes the examination of commercial banks to determine 
capital adequacy, asset quality, management, internal controls and audit, earnings, and 
liquidity. However, supervision in most banks broadly adopts the US CAMEL model for 
assessing bank performance with regard to issues such as capital adequacy, assets 
quality, management quality, earnings, and liquidity (Bascom, 1994). Further details of 
this model will be considered in chapter 5. 
3.4.2.2 Banking Regulation 
As has been mentioned earlier, the banking system constitutes part of the financial 
structure of the country. It shoulders the responsibility to maintain the confidence of the 
public in the safety and soundness of banks. Therefore, it is in the public interest to 
regulate the banking system and supervise its operation in the best interest of the 
economy. 
Banking regulation must provide an environment in which banks can exercise schemes 
to respond promptly and flexibly to the changing economic environment. A regulatory 
and supervisory framework will require the introduction of set of standard rules, for 
instance loan classification, loan concentration norms for asset quality determination, 
and rules for preventing banks from accruing interest on non-performing loans. This 
framework should also involve financial reporting and capital adequacy requirement and 
should raise the enforcement powers of the regulatory and supervisory agencies. 
Furthermore, this framework should emphasize the triggering of the banks' financial 
condition, the evaluation of their management and asset quality and the assessment of 
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their accounting, and internal control and auditing functions (Bascom, 1994). One can 
draw the conclusion that the banking system must be regulated so that it can carry out its 
role in the interest of the public as well as the interests of its owners. 
3.4.2.3 Capital Adequacy 
Debt and banking crises have caused a great deterioration in the quality of the 
international banking system. Therefore, a capital adequacy in banks has become the 
main concern of the international supervisory authorities. According to Barge (1985), 
capital is defined as the amount of losses that a bank can sustain over and above the 
level of its annual profit before depositors' funds are placed at risk. It is a reserve to 
absorb unexpected losses, and is necessary to support depositor confidence. The capital 
adequacy measures for banking institutions should be treated as a foundation stone of 
prudential regulation and supervision which guarantees that the banking institutions do 
not take imprudent risks and that they manage their assets and sources of funds in a 
prudent and honest manner in both the domestic and the international context. The main 
aims of capital adequacy in national banks are justified in terms of safety and soundness 
(Norton, 1995). 
Since the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision agreed a uniform standard of risk- 
weight capital adequacy of 8 per cent, most developing countries are now moving 
towards the required standards (Sheng, 1996). Under the Basle capital accord, capital 
adequacy measures are justified for the safety and soundness of the international 
banking system and competitive equality and transparency within internal banking 
(Norton, 1995). Furthermore, in June 1999, the Committee released a proposal to replace 
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the 1988 capital accord with a more risk-sensitive framework. The framework intends 
to improve safety and soundness in the financial system by focusing on aspects such as 
bank ownership, internal control systems, the management and supervision review 
process and market discipline (Basle Secretariat, 2001). 
Moreover, there is strong evidence suggesting that banking regulation and supervision, 
and in particular capital requirements would help establish a sound foundation for the 
explanation of customer loans. 
3.4.2.4 Loan Classification 
The bank's assets and loan quality are most important to the safety and soundness of its 
services because loans are the ordinary bank's single largest asset and represent the 
greatest potential for loss. In the regulatory and supervisory framework, the loan 
component should be given special emphasis because the volume of non-performing 
loans was the main cause of financial crises in the developing countries during the 1980s 
(Bascom, 1994). To meet the Basle capital adequacy rule, the regulatory and supervisory 
authorities in each country should set out clearly the criteria, rules and practices for loan 
classification and loan provision. 
Therefore, each individual bank should establish its own loan classification standard, 
which may appropriately and adequately reflect its own specific circumstances. So 
standards of loan classification should be based on the borrower's creditworthiness, the 
market value of collateral and the financial performance of the customer: in the past, 
currently and in projections into the future. 
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Bascom (1994) highlighted that bank supervision may focus on commercial loans. So 
the supervision of the bank's commercial lending should have at least the following six 
objectives: 
a) To determine if related lending policy objectives, procedures 
and internal control are adequate; 
b) To determine if bank officers operate in compliance with the 
bank's policies, directives, and guidelines; 
c) To evaluate the portfolio for asset quality, collectibility and 
collateral sufciency; 
d) To determine the scope and adequacy of audit function; 
e) To determine compliance with applicable loans and regulation; 
f) To implement corrective measures when policies, procedures 
objectives or internal controls are deficient. 
The banking regulatory and supervisory framework should establish loan classification, 
which may depend on its environment. Therefore, bank regulation in developing 
countries should lend all banks to classify their asset portfolios as well as requiring a 
loan classification system based on the following guidelines: substandard loans, doubtful 
loans, loss loans and special mention loan. Loan provision is based on loan 
classification. In general, countries with strong loan classification systems have tended 
to have satisfactory loan provision policies and practices. However, in order to conform 
to adequate loan provision, financial reform policies should require the tightening of 
loan provisioning and the linking of such provisioning to loan classification systems as 
specified by the country's bank regulations (Bascom, 1994). 
Bascom (1994) suggested a model of the minimum specific provision based on loan 
classification as percentage of outstanding balance based on non-performing loans as 
follows: 
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Substandard 25 per cent 
I)otihtlul Loans oNerdue 
180-225 days 50 per cent 
226-270 days 60 per cent 
271-315 days 70 per cent 
316-364 days 80 per cent 
Loss 100 per cent 
3.4.2.5 Internal Control Systems: Definition and Components 
Generally speaking the internal control systems in banking organisations and their rules 
and scope are increasingly important following the liberalisation of financial markets. 
The main question is why internal control systems are needed. 
Strong internal control systems, including an internal audit function and an independent 
external audit, are vitally important in banking organisations for the safety and 
soundness of operations. They can contribute to an efficient and constructive working 
relationship between the bank management and the banking supervisors (Basle, 2002). 
The importance of effective internal control systems has grown in significance in recent 
years, given the recent spate of bank failures and losses (Dalvinder, 1998). The 
importance of internal control systems arises from the fact that they have the following 
advantages: 
(i) An effective internal control system is a critical component of bank management and 
a strong foundation for the safe and sound operations of banking organisations; 
(ii) A strong internal control system can help to ensure that the goals and objectives of 




(iii) Control system can ensure that the bank will comply with laws and regulations, 
policies and plans as well as the internal rules and procedures, and will decrease the risk 
of uncertain losses that may be likely to damage the bank's reputation (Basle, 1998). 
Internal controls now constitute a central feature of the operational and management 
structures of banks. Kinselia (1995) defined internal controls as follows: 
"Systems established in order to provide reasonable assurance 
of effective and efficient operations, reliable financial inform- 
ation and reporting and compliance with laws and regulations ". 
The Basle committee defined internal control systems as: 
"A process put in place by the board of directors, senior management 
and all levels of personnel to provide reasonable assurance that an 
organisation's objectives well be achieved. It includes all measures 
and practices that are used to mitigate exposures to risk that could 
potentially prevent an organisation from achieving its objectives" 
(Basle, 1998). 
The lack of effective and strong internal control systems will lead to significant losses to 
banks. These losses can be avoided by improved internal control systems, which is the 
main responsibility of the board of directors and senior management in implementing a 
strong control culture. 
The Basle committee has highlighted five factors, which have led to bank failures as 
follows: 
¢ Lack of adequate management oversight and accountability and failures to 
develop a strong control culture within the bank; 
> Inadequate recognition and assessment of the risk associated with certain 
banking activities; 
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> The absence or failure of key control structures and activities such as 
segregation of duties, approval, verifications reconciliation and review of 
operating performance; 
> Inadequate communication of information between levels of management within 
the bank particularly in the upward communication of problems; and 
> Inadequate or ineffective audit programmes and monitoring activities. 
The main objectives of the internal control process can be categorized as follows: 
1. Safeguarding of assets (securities objectives) 
2. Efficiency and effectiveness of operations (operational objectives) 
3. Reliability and completeness of accounting/ financial management information 
(information objectives) 
4. Compliance with organisational policies and procedures as well as applicable 
laws and regulations (Compliance objectives) (Dalvinder, 1998). 
The objectives of internal control systems have changed from prevention, reduction of 
potential errors, fraud, misappropriation and corruption to become more comprehensive 
to include risk management. Furthermore, internal control systems now maintain that a 
sound internal control process could efficiently test the bank's ability to meet its 
established goals and to maintain its financial viability. The Basle committee considers 
these components of the internal control process as indispensable to achieving the 
bank's performance, information and compliance objectives (Basle, 1998). 
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Under the new extensive process internal control consists of five components: 
a. Management oversight and the control culture; 
b. Risk recognition and assessment; 
c. Control activities and segregation of duties; 
d. Information and communication; and 
e. Monitoring activities and correcting deficiencies (Basle, 1998). 
To further explain the components of internal control systems, one may consider the 
following: 
1) An Appropriate Organisational Structures 
A) Board of Directors 
In order to render the job of the board of directors more effective, banks need to 
establish sound and adequate internal control systems. However, the board of directors 
should undertake the following responsibilities: (i) approving and reviewing the overall 
business strategies and operational policies of the bank as well as the organisational 
structure particularly for adequate and effective internal control systems to be 
established and maintained; (ii) ensuring that the top management should identify, 
measure, monitor and control the major risks run by the bank; and (iii) ensuring that top 
management monitors the effectiveness of the internal controls system. 
The board of directors should follow up with top management the effectiveness of the 
internal controls and their ongoing evaluation by management and internal and external 
auditors (Basle, 1998). To achieve this duty, many banks in different countries establish 
an independent audit committee. 
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The audit committee plays a very important role in the corporate governance of banks. 
Its responsibility typically includes reviewing financial statements and important 
accounting policies, supervising the audit activities of the internal and external auditors 
and monitoring bank internal controls including those relating to compliance with laws 
and regulations (GAO, 1991). 
B) Top Management 
Top management is responsible for carrying out the directives of the board of directors. 
Moreover, top management is responsible for implementing strategies and policies 
approved by the board of directors, developing processes such as identifying, monitoring 
and controlling risks incurred by the bank, opting for the appropriate internal control 
policies and monitoring the adequacy and effectiveness of internal control systems. 
However, to ensure management's proper functioning, top management needs to take 
steps so that tasks should be delegated to qualified and experienced staff in order to 
diffuse any possible government influence or intervention (Basle, 1998). 
C) Internal Audit 
Adequate internal controls within banking organisations must be supplemented by an 
effective internal audit function that independently evaluates the control systems within 
the organisation (Basle, 2001). The internal audit function is an important part of the 
ongoing monitoring of the system of internal controls because it provides an 
independent assessment of the adequacy of and compliance with the established policies 
and procedures. Therefore, the internal audit function should report directly to the board 
of directors or its audit committee, and top management (Basle, 1998). 
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The Basle committee defines the internal audit as follows: 
"An independent, objective assurance and consulting activity 
designed to add value and improve an organisation's operation. It helps an 
organisation accomplish its objectives by bringing a systematic, disciplined 
approach to evaluate and improve the effectiveness of risk management, control, 
and governance processes (Basle, 2001). 
On the other hand, the American Institute of Internal Auditors defines internal audit 
as: 
"An independent appraisal function established within an organisation 
to examine and evaluate its activities as a service to the organisation" 
(Jack and Fredrick, 1985). 
The objective of internal auditing is to assist members of the organisation in the 
effective discharge of their obligations. To this end, interim auditing furnishes them with 
analysis, appraisal, recommendation, counsel and information concerning the activities 
reviewed (ibid, 1985). Therefore, the scope of internal auditing is extended to every 
activity and every unit of the bank. The internal audit should include the examination 
and evaluation of the appropriateness and effectiveness of the internal control systems 
and the manner in which assigned responsibilities are fulfilled (Basle, 2001). 
2) Adequate Credit Policies and Strengthening the Control Culture 
A) Adequate Credit Policies 
Appropriate internal control systems create a sound credit culture necessary to the 
banking system in the new economic environment, such as in lending policy. Lack of 
good internal controls and weak management lead to excessive risk taking, 
mismanagement, waste, fraud and abuse. Thus, sound bank management and lending 
standards need to include lending policy, prudent credit approval procedures, risk 
limitation, and administration procedures (Basle, 1998). 
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A sound credit culture is one of the key elements necessary to the development of 
reform in financial system. To establish and maintain a sound credit culture, any banking 
organisation needs to establish the appropriate internal controls systems, which create 
the foundations of good institutional governance. 
B) Control Culture 
The main element of the effective system of internal controls is to enhance a strong 
control culture. The board of directors and top management can achieve this by: 
(i) promoting high ethical values and standards integrity ; (ii) establishing a culture 
within the organisation that emphasises and demonstrates to all levels of personnel the 
importance of internal control system (Basle, 1998). 
The Basle committee recognises that a strong culture of control reduces the likelihood of 
errors going undetected, which will ultimately lead to future losses or collapse 
(Dalvinder, 1998). 
3) Risk Management 
An effective internal control system requires banks to determine their own adequate risk 
management standards (Basle, 1998). Risk assessment incorporates a process of 
analysing both internal and external factors such as credit risk, country risk, market risk, 
interest rate risk, and operational risk. All these risks need to be assessed continually so 
that the bank can meet its objectives and prevent a situation arising which could be 
detrimental to its financial well being (ibid, 1998). 
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3.4.2.6 Government Intervention in the Banking System 
In developing countries one of the major causes of financial and banking crises may be 
associated with government control over the banking system or frequent government 
intervention in the activities of the banking sector. Therefore, one of the main objectives 
of the banking regulation and supervision is to provide protection against systematic 
instability in the banking system. 
As explained earlier, to establish a safe, sound and effective banking system, one needs 
to find an approach that reduces the chance of any intervention by government and 
banking regulatory and supervisory authorities intervention, which strips the banks of 
their commercial and effective business orientation. 
In this approach, banks have greater incentive to act independently in their market 
operations, which will improve autonomy in their lending activities and avoid 
malfunctioning policies, including non-performing loans. From the foregoing, it could 
be concluded that bank regulators and supervisors should establish a comprehensive set 
of prudential standards that would possibly lead to financial stability. 
3.5 Lessons from Other Experiences 
This part of the study reviews the banking reform policy in two developing economies: 
Malaysia and Saudi Arabia. The main reason behind this choice is that both countries 
have achieved success in adopting appropriate economic and financial policies which 
have significantly helped to improve the quality of life and to achieve the modernization 
of different sectors, and particularly the banking sector. Moreover, both countries are 
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economically similar to Libya, as they rely on oil revenues to implement their 
development plans. 
3.5.1 The Malaysian Experience 
Malaysia is a clear success story among developing countries. It has adopted adjustment 
programmes since the early 1980s, and has moved to a market based system to manage 
its economy by improving the infrastructure of the financial markets through adopting 
the CAMEL approach. 
The motivation behind the reforms in Malaysia was primarily the world economic 
depression of 1981-83, which badly hit its export trading activities. However, the sharp 
decline in the country's revenues forced the state to re-evaluate its development strategy, 
including banking reforms (Anwar, 1998). The Malaysian economy has enjoyed a rapid 
economic growth with a rising per capita income and price stability. Real GDP growth 
accelerated from an average of 5.2 per cent annually in 1961-70 to about 8 per cent in 
the 1970s (Aznam et al, 1994). Malaysia has a political and social system, which is very 
stable. Moreover, its per capita income in 1993 of $3140 increased to $3601 in 2002. 
However, between 1985 and 1993, total government spending expressed as a percentage 
of the GDP dropped from 32.9% to 25.4% and then increased to 103.8% in 2002, as 
shown in table (3.1) 
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Table3.1: Key Macroeconomic Indicators 1997-2002 In Malaysia 
Economic Indicators 1970-1980 1980-1993 1999-2002 
* Average annual rate of inflation in percent 7.3 2.2 1.4 
* Average annual growth rate of GDP In percent 7.9 6.2 4.7 
* Income per capita $ 1993 2002 
3140 3601 
* GNP 
* As per cent of GDP 1985 1993 2002 
* Total expenditures 32.9 25.4 103.8 
* Fiscal deficit 5.7 -0.2 -20.3 
* Nominal interest rates of banks annual average % 1985 1993 2002 
* Deposit rates 6.2 7.2 4.0 
* Lending rates 7.8 8.1 6.39 
Source: World Bank, World Development [report IYY. ), Asian Ueveiopment tann in: ose m., Koninion 
(1998) "Financial Reform in Developing Countries " and Bank of Negara: Annual Report 2003. 
3.5.1.1 The Financial System in Malaysia 
The Malaysian financial system can be divided into monetary and non-monetary 
institutions. The monetary institutions are the central bank (Bank Negara Malaysia, 
BNM) and commercial banks including the Islamic Banks. On the other hand the non- 
monetary institutions consist of two groups. The first group, which is supervised by the 
BNM, includes finance companies, merchant banks, discount houses, representative 
offices of foreign banks, and offshore banks; whereas the second group includes various 
government departments and agencies such as finance development institutions savings 
institutions provident and pension funds, insurance companies, and other financial 
intermediaries. 
By 1997 the Malaysian banking system consisted of 35 commercial banks, 22 
domestically owned and 13 foreign owned banks, one Islamic bank, 39 finance 
companies, 12 merchant banks, and 8 money and foreign exchange brokers (Soo, 1999). 
In 2002 the financial institutions in Malaysia comprised of 45 organisations: 24 
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commercial banks, 22 finance companies, and 10 merchant banks (Bank Nergara, 
2003). 
Table 3.2: Assets of the Banking SYstem in Malaysia in 1997 and 2003 
Banking institutions Assets in 1997 Assets in 2003 
(S bn) °/u ($ bn) %, 
Bank \egara Nlalaýsia 28.6 13.4 52.8 19.2 
Commercial banks 128.0 60.0 165.6 60.2 
Financial companies 40.2 18.7 37.6 13.6 
Merchant banks 11.6 5.4 11.6 4.2 
Discount houses 5.6 2.5 7.9 2.8 
Total 214.0 100.0 275.5 100.0 
Source: Bank : Ve ara ! Malaysia: in Sou, N. (1999), and Bank Negara, Annual Report 2004 
As table 3.2 shows, commercial banks accounted for 60 per cent of the total assets of the 
banking system (about 43.9 per cent of the total assets of the financial sector) at the end 
of 1997, compared with 60.2 per cent at the end of 2002. Furthermore, in terms of total 
assets and number of institutions and branch offices, they represent the core of the 
financial sector in Malaysia. The total resources of the financial system, expressed in 
current prices grew phenomenally from $11.6 billion in 1970 to $309.1 billion in 1990, 
achieving an average annual growth rate of 17.8 per cent (Aznam et at., 1994). 
3.5.1.2 Recent Developments in the Malaysian Banking Sector 
The Malaysian banking sector has played a leading role in the Malaysian economy. In 
addition, it plays a vital role in indirect financing. Banking institutions have shown 
remarkable growth in total assets. In terms of growth, the total assets of the banking 
system have grown by nearly 4 times from $66.54 billion in 1990 to $174.14 billion in 
1997, and registered S214.94 billion at the end of 2003. 
IU) 
As tables 3.3 and 3.4 show, the performance and growth in loans and advances in the 
Malaysian banking institutions rose 2.5 fold from $42.20 bn to $103.21 bn over the 
period 1990-1997. However, the total loans and advances rose to reach $124.65 bn in 
2003. Consequently, the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans has increased from 
3.9 in 1996 to 5.7 in 1997, and reached 6.8 by the end of 2003 (Soo, 1999; and Bank 
Negara, 2004). 
Table 3.3: Performance of the Malaysian Banking System, 1990-2002 
Amount (S billion) 
Net Interest Income 1.15 1.76 2.14 2.48 3.43 4.05 5.25 4.26 4.65 
Pre-tax Profit 0.703 0.807 0.995 1.36 2.03 2.67 3.44 2.03 2.44 
Per cent 
Return on Assets 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.5 1.7 1.9 2.0 1.3 1.3 
Return on Equity 21.5 17.6 16.8 20.2 24.2 26.2 27.5 19.0 16.3 
Non-performing 
' ' 
20.3 15.6 14.9 12.6 8.1 5.5 9 3 5 7 6.8 Loans/ t otal Loans . . 
General prop ision/ 0.7 0.9 1.1 1.3 1.6 1.6 1.9 2.0 2.0 Total Loans 
Source: Bank Negaru Malaysia 
, 
in Soo, N. (1999) and Bank Negern, Annual Report 2004 
Table 3.4: Assets and Loans of the Malaysian Banking; System ($ billion) 
Total Assets 't'otal l.. ouns and Advances 
Institution 
Commercial 
Banks 30.59 47.85 123.61 165.68 20.16 29.89 70.96 93.63 
Financial 
7.3 5 14.60 I 39.15 37.66 5.01 10 00 26 34 28 12 Companies . . . 
Merchantý 2.59 4.09 11.38 11.60 1.51 2 31 91 5 90 2 Banks . . . 
Total 40.53 66.54 174.14 214.94 26.68 42.20 103.21 124.65 
Source: Yank, Aegura Malaysia, in Soo, N. (1999), and Bank Negara: Annual Report 2004 
3.5.1.3 The Reform Policy in Malaysia 
The initial steps of banking reform policy in the 1980s followed by a gradual approach 
in Malaysia. l lowev er, the Bank Negara has been the initiator of the financial 
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liberalisation and has played a supporting role (Anwar, 1998). As a result of the budget 
and current account deficit, a new policy was introduced in 1985, as the government 
announced various measures of economic stabilisation and adjustment, which included 
significant, cuts in government investment spending. The privatisation policy was 
announced in 1983 and a master plan of privatisation was issued in 1991. 
Yet, a major phase of reform came as early as 1978, allowing commercial banks to 
determine their number of depositors and borrowers. Therefore, the Bank Negara 
introduced the Base Lending Rate (BLR) in 1983. Every bank or finance company's 
lending rates were anchored to its declared BLR, which was based on the cost of funds 
after allowing for the cost of statutory reserves, liquid assets, requirements and 
overheads. In 1991, the BLR was finally freed from the administrative and ceiling rate 
for priority sector lending control of the Bank Negara. Furthermore, the priority of the 
Bank Negara was to improve financial market infrastructure and develop more markets 
as well as government securities (Aznam et al., 1998). Malaysia's reform policies also 
included the deregulation of interest rates. 
One step towards the removal of controls on exchange rates commenced in 1972, when 
the Malaysian government severed its historical links with Sterling, introducing the US 
dollar as the intervention currency. Then, a year later the Ringgit (the Malaysian 
currency) was allowed to float upward against a basket of representative major 
currencies as well as the major trading partners of Malaysia (Aznam et al., 1994). 
Nonetheless the credit system in Malaysia has remained segmented and pro-cyclical. 
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Therefore, banks in Malaysia are still mandated to channel certain portions of their 
credit to specific economic sectors (Anwar, 1998). 
In 1975, the Malaysian government issued guidelines requiring commercial banks and 
finance companies to extend a minimum of 50 per cent of the net credit during that year 
to priority sectors, which declined to 20 per cent in the early of 1980s (Aznam, 1994). 
For credit regulation the Bank Negara issued lending guidelines that required 
commercial banks to channel certain percentages of their credit to certain classes of 
customers and specific economic sectors (Anwar, 1998). 
Most resources of commercial banks have been used to finance loans and advances to 
different sectors of the economy. The commercial banks' share of loans and advances to 
total assets rose from an average of 59 per cent in 1975-77 to 60-66 per cent in 1978-90, 
and to 66.2 per cent at the end of 2003. As is often the case, the decline in the quality of 
bank loans resulted from insufficient diversification. In Malaysia's case the over 
concentration of loans to one sector or a small group of major customers such as the 
property sector, left many banks and finance companies with large percentage of non- 
performing loans. Therefore, the rate of provision for bad and doubtful debts to the total 
loans and advances rose from an average ratio of 2.5 per cent in 1984 to 6 and 10 per 
cent at the end of 1990 and 2003 respectively, as shown in table 3.5. As Sheng (1987) 
pointed out, mismanagement, fraud, overstretched managerial resources, and poor 
internal procedures and controls had led to lax control over costs and a rapid rise in non- 
performing loans. This situation affected most Malaysian institutions (with similar 
results to those in the Libyan banking system shown in chapters 4 and 6, for instance, 
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that the ratio of non-performing loans in one bank exceeded 45 percent of total loans). 
In the banking system there was a big overhang of non-performing loans. For the 
commercial banking sector in Malaysia, the share of substandard loans in non- 
performing loans rose in 1987, as table 3.5 indicates. However, the reduction of the 
classification period has partly contributed to the recent rise in NPL. 
Table 3.5: Non-Performing Loans of Commercial banks as Percentage 
Interest in suspense/ Provision for bad debts/ Non-performing loans/ Year total loans und advances Total loans und advances Total loans and advances 
1)S1 ui: 
1984 1.2 2.5 10.3 
1986 4.4 6.2 26.8 
1987 6.0 7.3 32.6 
1988 7.7 7.7 24.6 
1989 7.9 7.3 20.8 
1990 7.5 6.2 - 
2003 3.8 10.0 25.0 
Source: 
. -1_nam et al., 
1998, and Bank Negara, 2004 
The role of the Bank Negara was the initial approach to directing a change in 
management. The other resolution was that the owners and management of the hank 
were responsible for strengthening the capital base and solving the problem of loans in 
their banks. On the other hand, if they were not able to resolve these problems the Bank 
Neoara would advise them to undergo a merger, consolidation or take- over by new 
investors, or provide them with fresh capital injections (Anwar, 1998). Since the 
introduction of these guidelines, the priority sectors were reduced as well as the 
proportion of loans covered by the guidelines (Aznam et al., 1998). 
The reform policy in regard to the financial system usually affects savings, and therefore 
by definition will affect economic growth and development as well. Yet, a major role of 
any financial system is to mobilize savings for investment. Hence before the 
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liberalisation of interest rates, the concentration in the commercial banking industry 
was very high, with the 10 largest banks accounting for 80 per cent of the industry's 
total deposits and loans and almost 80 percent of all assets. 
To improve the performance of the Malaysian banking system, the Bank Negara 
strengthened the regulatory and supervisory framework of the banking sector. The 
approach to liberalisation in the Malaysian financial system has been one of cautious and 
gradual structural deregulation and prudential regulation (Aznam et al., 1994). 
The Bank Negara was established in 1958 as a Central Bank of Malaysia. Its main 
objective was to help promote monetary stability and a sound of financial structure. Its 
powers were extended and strengthened by the Banking and Financial Institutions Act of 
1989. Under this act, the Bank Negara would monitor the financial institutions by 
requiring them to submit regular financial returns so as to ensure that they were 
operating within prudential limits and observing legal requirements. 
Guidelines have been issued to regulate the financial institutions. Subsequently the 
banking system has become under tight control through examinations of financial 
institutions, including: 
1) appraisal of asset quality; (2) verification of types and sizes of various liabilities; (3) 
appraisal of management; (4) asset and liabilities management; (5) compliance with the 
legal and regulatory requirements as well as with the broad national policies; and (6) 
evaluation of records systems and internal controls (Aznam, et al., 1998). 
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Prior to the financial crisis in 1997, Malaysia was experiencing a period of growth and 
economic stability; the GDP had been growing at a rate of over 8 per cent since 1990. 
Following the sharp depreciation of the Thai Bank in 1997, the Malaysian currency 
began to experience waves of speculative pressure, which had a negative effect on 
earnings and the overall performance of the banking sector (Wa, 2000). The main 
reasons for this problem were the downturn of the economy and the collapse of both the 
property and stock markets. However, more fundamental reasons may be related to 
state-directed loan policies, lack of competition, and lack of prudential regulations (Soo, 
1999) 
In this situation, the Malaysian government represented by the Bank Negara Malaysia, 
moved to improve the soundness of the banking institutions by adopting measures which 
included: i) improvement in credit allocation; (ii) strengthening of prudential 
regulations; (iii) resolution of non-performing loans (NPL), including reclassification of 
loans as non-performing loans. Increasing the rate of general provisioning, and requiring 
greater financial disclosure (Wa, 2000); and (v) recapitalisation and consolidation of the 
banking sector by the establishment of agencies to treat NPL in the banking sector in 
Malaysia. For instance, the role of the national asset management company is to address 
the rise in NPL (Soo, 1999; and Wa, 2000). 
3.5.1.4 Lessons from the Malaysian Experience 
As an emerging market, Malaysia is a clear success story. In the past three decades 
Malaysia has implemented many development plans to improve the quality of life and to 
modernise its agrarian economy towards being a service-oriented industry. Therefore, 
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the Malaysian economy appeared healthier than other Southeast Asian countries during 
the Asian crises of 1997. The main reason behind Malaysia's success may be attributed 
to: a) the implementation of a gradual and consistent approach in financial sector 
deregulation, accompanied by a more proper sequencing as prescribed by the textbook. 
b) The adoption of a complete interest rate liberalisation policy implemented over a 
short period of time. 
3.5.2 The Saudi Arabian Experience 
Since the early 1970s, oil revenues have transformed the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
(KSA) into a modem industrialised economy (Wilson, 1998). In the early part of the 
twentieth century the financial situation in the KSA, consisted of a few foreign based 
trading and money changers that provided most of the finance services including deposit 
taking and lending funds. In 1939, however, in the aftermath of the oil discovery, 
government revenues and expenditures rose rapidly and foreign banks started entering 
the market. In order to, achieve a stable monetary mechanism and a stable currency, the 
government established the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA) in 1952. 
Meanwhile, the government continued to use the services of the money changer Al-Kaki 
and Bin Mahfouz Co. to act as its agent. However, by 1953, the SAMA, permitted this 
money changer to start the first bank in the Kingdom under the name of the National 
Commercial Bank, which was followed by Riyad Bank and Bank Al-watany in 1957 and 
1958 respectively (BIS, 1999). 
However, the SAMA suffered its first problems in 1960, when the Bank of Riyad and 
Bank Al-Watany confronted serious problems a rising from mismanagement and the 
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provisions of improper loans. A new Banking Control law was issued in 1966, which 
gave SAMA unreserved supervisory powers. Under the new Law, banks were required 
to meet capital adequacy, liquidity and lending ratios and reserve requirements. 
3.5.2.1 The Structure of the Banking System in KSA 
The Saudi banking system consists of eleven commercial banks all of which are wholly 
or partially owned by Saudi nationals. Other banking institutions include five state- 
owned banks. These banks were mainly involved in development activities, providing 
sott facilities to projects related to infrastructure (Wilson, 1998). By 1979, there were 
twelve banks in operation, only three of which were non-Saudi, which merged into the 
United Saudi Commercial Bank in 1982 with 300 branches throughout the Kingdom. 
At present, the number of commercial banks is eleven following the Saudisation of 
foreign banks and the commencement of the International Gulf Bank. By 2001, the 
number of operating bank branches increased to 1,186 as shown on table 3.6 (SAMA, 
2001). 
Table 3.6: Bank Branches Operating in the Saudi Arabia 3rd Qrt 2001 
National Commercial Bank 
Riyadh Bank 
AI-Bank A[-Saudi Al-Franci 
The Arab National Bank 
Saudi British Bank 
Bank AI- Jazira 
Saudi Hollandi Bank 
Saudi Investment Bank 
Al-Rajhi Banking & investment Corporation 
Saudi American Bankl 
United Saudi Bank] 













Source: Saudi :I ra/ iun . I(n Marv Agency (2001) 
3.5.2.2 Banking Growth, Consolidation and Restructuring 
1) The Banking Boom in the 1970s 
The 1970s witnessed the rapid expansion of the banking system. There was enormous 
growth in Saudi commercial banks during the period 1970-1979 as the total assets 
increased 3.5 fold from SR2.7 billion ($818 million) to SR9.3 billion ($2.8 billion) 
between 1970 and 1979, and bank deposits increased over 40 fold from SR1.6 billion 
(about $485 Million) to SR68 billion (about $19.4 bn) (Al-Suhaimi, 1999). 
Consequently the foreign assets of the commercial banks grew rapidly from 11 per cent 
of the total assets in 1977 to 25 per cent by the end of 1979 ((BIS, 1999). 
In contrast to this growth, the main problems facing banks still remained. These 
problems included: small business having limited access to credit; cheque facilities were 
limited to cash withdrawals; foreign currency transfers were available only through 
money changers; consumer loans and facilities for small savers were lacking of banking 
methods were antiquated; and computer technology was non-existent (BIS, 1999 and Al- 
Suhaimi, 1999). 
2) The Trials of Saudi Banks in the 1980s 
The decade of the 1980s was a tumultuous and testing period for the banking system in 
the Kingdom. During 1980 and 1981, the growth in commercial credit averaged 26 per- 
cent, falling to 10 per cent from 1982 to 1989. The bank deposit base grew rapidly from 
SR 68 billion ($20.6 bn) in 1980 to SR 146 billion ($38.9bn) by the end of 1989. 
Nonetheless, oil prices tumbled in 1981 and continued to decline for the next five years, 
putting significant pressure on the quality of bank assets. On the other hand, after 
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reaching SR 333 billion ($100.9bn) in 1981 government revenues dropped to just SR 
74 billion ($ 20.2bn) in 1987. Credits to the private sector that had increased over five 
fold during the period 1976-81 grew by 29 per cent over the next five years. Moreover 
non-performing loans were in excess of 20% in 1986, whereby bank profits had suffered 
significantly, and loan loss provisions and loan write-offs became more frequent. (Basle, 
1999; and Al-Suhaimi, 1999). 
To resolve these problems, new measures to strengthen the banking system were 
developed. Firstly, in 1982 the three remaining branches of foreign banks were merged 
into the United Saudi Commercial Bank. Secondly, the government passed the law for 
Money Changing Business, which required SAMA to license and regulate the money- 
changing organisations and also prohibited them from deposit taking and lending. 
Thirdly, the role of the banking sector was improved through measures such as the 
introduction of the Banking Security Deposit Account and more effective liquidity 
management. Finally, SAMA put huge pressure on Saudi banks to embark on a 
substantive training programme for the Saudi people, and to invest money in developing 
computer and information technology (BIS, 1999). 
3) The Growth of the Banks in the 1990s 
By the 1990s the Saudi banking system had largely recovered from the difficulties of the 
1980s, by expanding their branch network, introducing more efficient managerial 
methods and new technologies, raising their capital, improving their profitability and 
strengthening their provision for doubtful accounts, as shown in table 3.7 (ibid, 1999). 
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Table 3.7: The Saudi Banking System in 1980-2002 
Assets (in L'SS billion) 21 69 109 135.5 
Numbers of banks 10 12 11 11 
Branches 247 1,011 1,236 1186 
Return on assets (%) 1.9 1.4 1.7 - 
I Simple capital ratio 6.1 7.2 10.4 19* 
Source:. 41-Suhainii, 1999 and SAMA, 2002(* until September 2001) 
As a result of the Gulf crises in 1991, however, the monetary system in KSA was 
profoundly affected, following customer withdrawals of domestic deposits (11 per cent 
of total customer deposits). The withdrawn deposits were converted into foreign 
currency and transferred broad. 
I lence, domestic bank loans and advances grew by 90 per cent during the period 1990 
95, and all other banking indicators such as return on equity (ROE) and return on assets 
(ROA) continued to be significantly positive with many banks making record profits 
during that period (BIS, 1999). 
However, despite the difficult situation, the Saudi banks continued to show sound and 
stable growth and strong profitability during the second half of the 1990s. The trends in 
Saudi banks' capital continued to increase during 1993-97. The objectives have been 
achieved and with a risk /asset ratio of over 19 per cent at the end of September 2001 see 
table 3.7. 
Alongside sustained long term growth and development of the banking sector, there has 
been concerted support by strong and comprehensive banking supervision. SAMA has 
powers to promulgate rules, regulations and guidelines to banks on matters such as 
capital adequacy, liquidity, limited lending, credit and market risk. 
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Furthermore, bank restructuring has become the focus of attention of both SAMA and 
Saudi banks regarding the area of corporate governance. SAMA has issued guidance to 
banks on a range of issues such as, the role of a member of the board of directors, the 
formation of audit committees, and the minimum internal control standards. These 
initiatives aim at promoting the management control culture and enhancing risk 
management in the Saudi banking system (BIS, 1999). 
Despite the difficulties faced by the Saudi banking system over the past four decades, 
they have been able to maintain a stable and steady course. Hence, they have been able 
to avoid a systemic banking crisis. In addition, Saudi Arabia has entered the new 
millennium with more flexible banking system, becoming responsive to matters related 
to technology advancement, deregulation and globalisation. Moreover, Saudi banks have 
been in a position to with stand the challenges of an open, liberal and competitive 
environment around the world in general and in the Gulf region in particular (Al- 
Suhaimi, 1999). 
In order to assess the Saudi Arabian experience with regard to the banking reforms, it 
can be seen that the introduction of stronger managerial methods and comprehensive 
supervision from SAMA have been the main factors in successful in implementation of 
reform policy and in avoiding failure. The Saudi government has been supporting the 
liberalisation of the economic and financial sectors in order to render them less reliant 
on petroleum revenues. 
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3.6 Summary 
The history of banks goes back to the thirteenth century, while the current banking 
system was created in England in the seventeenth century. The main factors, which have 
contributed to the development of the banking system, were population growth, 
industrialisation and the development of infrastructure facilities such as roads and 
telecommunications. 
The English model represents one of the prevailing models in the current banking 
system. The main feature of the English model is that it relies on the acceptance of 
deposits from customers. In contrast, the American model is mainly based on a small 
number of commercial banks with a widespread centrally controlled network of 
branches. However, the third model is the hybrid banking system prevailing in France 
and India. This model is based on the idea of a large bank with a national network of 
branches. Yet modern banks are generally market based, as prevailing in England, the 
USA, Germany and Japan. 
The development of intermediation theory changed the theoretical focus from 
transaction cost and asymmetric information to focus on the function and efficiency of 
the organisation. The functions of the financial sector have changed, particularly in the 
banking system. Banking activities have moved to new services such as trusts, 
mortgages, banking insurances. This expansion has contributed significantly to the 
major problems that have affected the banking industry. 
However, other events also contributed to the banking crises, which have led to the 
shaking of public confidence in the banking system. These events include the debt crisis 
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in the 1970s and the 1980s, the financial crisis in Latin America in 1987 and in the 
Nordic countries in the 1990s and the Asian crisis in 1997-98. However, other causes of 
financial crises are either management-related, or policy-related such as credit 
expansion, weakness of fiscal policies, liberalisation and deregulation, and instability in 
macro and micro economic policies. 
As a result of the expansion of banking services, banking crises have become common 
phenomenon since the early 1980s. The main factors that have led to the banking crisis 
include inflation, the slow growth of the GDP, as well as government intervention at 
macroeconomic level. Yet, at the microeconomic level these factors include poor 
lending decisions, weak capital adequacy, and lack of supervision and regulation 
frameworks, lax internal control systems, mismanagement, and fraud. 
Consequently, a gloomy picture seems to emerge of the banking industry, making many 
international organisations such as the World Bank, IMF, BIS, and Basle committee 
focus on restructuring this situation by adopting standard policies that may lead to 
reforms in the banking sector. The main principles of the reforms of the banking system 
aim to reduce the risk of bank distress and to promote a safer, sounder and more efficient 
banking system. Policy reforms include the removal of controlled interest rate and 
quantitative control on bank lending, strengthening the framework of banking 
supervision and regulation and enhancing the internal control systems. 
By reviewing banking in Malaysia and Saudi Arabia, which have both experienced 
significant reforms and restructuring of the banking sector, it has been found that reform 
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policies were generally extended to cover both macro and micro economic issues. In 
addition it was found that several measures had been taken towards restructuring the 
banking sector through the adoption of policies such as: 1) the liberalization of the 
financial sector including privatisation policies, removal of controls on exchange rates, 
and deposit rates; 2) strengthening the capital base by raising banks' capital or through 
mergers; 3) improving bank performance by introducing a comprehensive framework of 
banking supervision and regulation; and 4) strengthening efficiency and effectiveness of 
banking by introducing new guidelines concerning the base lending rate, banking 
security deposits, liquidity management tools, accounting standards, minimum standards 
of internal controls system guidance, and loan classification. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
GROWTH, DEVELOPMENT, AND PRE-REFORMS 
POLICIES IN THE LIBYAN BANKING SECTOR 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
Prior to 1970, the Libyan commercial banking sector was fairly weak and consisted of 
only one national bank (the Bank of Libya) and some branches of foreign banks. Until 
1969 only eight branches of foreign banks existed, which were located in the main cities 
such as Tripoli, Benghazi, Darna, and Sabaha. However, with the advent of the 
revolution in September 1s` 1969, the government made an attempt to control the 
financial sector through the nationalisation of the banking sector. Consequently, 
commercial banks fell under direct government control, while a new banking law gave 
the CBL the upper hand with regard to the new banking system. 
However, over the last three decades, the Libyan banking sector has been subject to 
intensive governmental regulation and control. Moreover, such governmental control of 
the banking sector has led to a number of problems, such as moral hazard, 
mismanagement, inefficiency and poor performance. The latest falls in oil prices in the 
1990s, coupled with the UN sanctions imposed on Libya in 1992, have tended to 
highlight the many weaknesses in the Libyan economic structure, paving the way for 
fundamental reform policies in relation to the commercial banking sector. 
119 
This chapter includes five sections. The first section examines the Libyan commercial 
banking sector, highlighting some historical indicators over the period 1970-2001 by 
analysing their assets and liabilities. This section particularly focuses on the growth of 
credit, investment, and deposits. An analysis of assets and liabilities is made in relation 
to banking effectiveness in mobilizing the savings from several sources. Moreover, it 
discusses the growth of branches or networks as well as the effects of this growth on the 
banks' profitability. Finally this section includes a comparative study featuring the 
banking systems in Libya, Malaysia and Saudi Arabia. 
Section two discusses the functions of monetary policy in regulating the banking sector, 
whereas the third section considers the initial reforms during the period 1970-2001, 
highlighting the main policies that have been implemented. Section four, on the other 
hand, discusses the main problems resulting from the government control of the 
commercial banking system, whereas a conclusion of the preceding sections will be 
given in section five. 
4.2 The Development of the Libyan Commercial Banking Sector 
In the last two decades the link between financial intermediation and economic growth 
has received a great deal of interest among academics, policy makers and economists 
around the world (Aziakpono, 2003). According to Shirai (2001), strengthening financial 
systems is one of the central issues facing both developed and the developing countries. 
This is because sound financial systems serve as an important channel in achieving 
economic growth by the mobilization and productive use of financial savings and in 
transforming various risks. Schumpeter (1934) was the first to discuss this relationship 
at the beginning of the twentieth century. He suggested that the explanation of financial 
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services would help promote economic growth. However, since then numerous studies 
have to analysed and measured the relationship between the financial sector and 
economic growth. Goldsmith (1969), for example, showed a statistical relationship 
between the financial sector and economic growth, suggesting that the size of the 
financial sector could be measured by a financial interrelation ratio. This ratio could be 
defined by the value of financial assets divided as the value of all tangible national 
assets. So, the higher the financial interrelation ratio, the more important is the financial 
sector. He also used the ratio of financial intermediary assets to GDP as a measure of 
financial development. 
McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) argued that there is a positive correlation between 
financial depression (involving policies such as government control on interest rates, or 
direct controls on credit allocation, trends to retard financial development) and economic 
growth. Yet, another study by King and Levine (1993) suggested that a positive 
relationship exists between financial development and the long-run growth of real per 
capita GDP, and that this effect is particularly pronounced for middle and low-income 
countries. These authors demonstrated a negative relationship between financial 
development and economic growth in Latin America during the 1970s and 1980s 
attributing their results to the financial liberalisation at the time. However, Odedokun 
(1996), after careful assessment of data from 71 countries spanning the period 1960- 
1980, concluded that financial intermediation would be more likely promote economic 
growth. 
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In the case of Libya, as a result of lack of information about the total assets of the 
financial sector, the importance of commercial banks is measured here via a slight 
modification of the financial interrelation ratio of the banking sector's total assets and 
the total deposits to the GDP. 
The growth of the banking system is indicated by net changes in the value of the total 
assets in the commercial banking to the GDP, as shown in table 4.1. According to this 
table, the total assets of the banking system as a percentage of GDP rose from 11.2 per 
cent in 1970 to 79.3 per cent in 2001, with the highest ratio of 88.2 per cent recorded in 
1994. However, the overall growth of the total assets of commercial banks is thought to 
have suffered significant fluctuations during the period 1970-2001. The ratio of the total 
assets to GDP during that period is shown to have been steadily on the increase. 
However, the years 1981,1986 and 1987 were associated with the peak of net changes, 
corresponding to the period when oil prices dropped sharply, producing significant 
reductions in GDP as shown in table 4.1 and figure 4.1. 
Meanwhile, the period 1996-97 witnessed a large and negative net change in the ratio of 
the financial assets of commercial banks to GDP; pointing towards unstable financial 
markets. The average assets-GDP ratio stood at 53.6% over the entire period, with an 
annual growth rate of 2.2 per cent. In general some specific factors have affected the 
development of the banking system in Libya, for instance, the nationalisation of the 
banking system in 1970, rises in oil prices, and the introduction of new banking laws in 
1970s and 1990s. These represent some of the factors that have generally contributed, 
either positively or negatively, to the development of the banking system in Libya. 
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Table 4.1: Commercial Banks' Assets, Total Deposits and CUP (LD million) 
1970 160.0 1426.0 11.2 129.7 9.1 
1971 270.0 1627.0 16.6 5.4 211.5 13.0 3.9 
1972 322.3 1798.0 17.9 1.3 263.6 14.7 1.7 
1973 452.3 2246.0 20.1 2.2 367.1 16.3 1.7 
1974 704.7 3883.0 18.1 -2.0 602.3 15.5 -0.8 
1975 923.0 3780.0 24.4 6.3 615.9 16.3 0.8 
1976 1,160.0 4907.0 23.6 -0.8 826.5 16.8 0.5 
1977 1,474.7 5763.0 25.6 1.9 1004.4 18.1 1.3 
1978 1,524.9 5688.0 26.8 1.2 1043.4 18.3 0.2 
1979 2,054.3 7846.0 26.2 -0.6 1423.2 18.1 -0.2 
1980 3,436.3 10882.0 31.6 5.4 2416.2 22.2 4.1 
1981 3,946.9 9401.0 42.0 10.4 2841.3 30.2 8.0 
1982 3,772.7 9373.0 40.3 -1.7 2517.0 26.9 -3.4 
1983 3,873.5 8932.0 43.4 3.1 2581.6 28.9 2.0 
1984 4,367.1 8364.0 52.2 8.8 2858.8 34.2 5.3 
1985 4,694.1 8227.0 57.1 4.8 3247.7 39.5 5.3 
1986 4,939.5 7132.0 69.3 12.2 3437.9 48.2 8.7 
1987 5,246.8 6253.0 83.9 14.7 3567.4 57.1 8.8 
1988 5,282.0 6791.0 77.8 -6.1 3310.0 48.7 -8.3 
1989 5,291.2 7537.0 70.2 -7.6 3374.7 44.8 -4.0 
1990 6,115.6 8095.0 75.5 5.3 3321.4 41.0 -3.7 
1991 6,287.7 8887.0 70.8 -4.8 3565.9 40.1 -0.9 
1992 7,232.5 9269.0 78.0 7.3 4173.0 45.0 4.9 
1993 7,327.9 9148.0 80.1 2.1 4301.8 47.0 2.0 
1994 8,331.3 9444.0 88.2 8.1 5035.9 53.3 6.3 
1995 8,931.1 10232.0 87.3 -0.9 5503.1 53.8 0.5 
1996 9,673.1 11945.0 81.0 -6.3 5879.0 49.2 -4.6 
1997 9,528.5 13284.0 71.7 -9.3 6039.6 45.5 -3.8 
1998 9,871.9 12619.0 78.2 6.5 6577.8 52.1 6.7 
1999 10,231.1 14314.0 70.7 -7.5 7117.8 49.7 -2.4 
2000 10,855.3 14321.4 75.8 5.1 7463.0 52.1 2.4 
2001 11,729.7 14795.5 79.3 3.5 7984.0 54.0 1.9 
Average 53.6 2.2 35.0 1.4 
Sources: Total Assets and Total Deposits: CBL Economic Bulletin (different issues); GDP International 
Financial Statistics Yearbook (different issue). 
The fluctuations in the ratio of the total assets in the commercial banking system shown 
in table 4.1 may be imputed to phenomena such as the rise in the price of crude 
petroleum, which increased total government revenues, following by increasing 
government expenditure. It also led to huge increases in government deposits, and 
government control over the banking sector affected the commercial banks by prompting 
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them to increase their credit and/or purchasing of treasury bills and securities 
(government tools). Another phenomenon that might be associated with the ratios shown 
in table 4.1 is the impact of the inflation rate on the banking system in the 1980s and 
1990s, associated with the rise of incomes and leading to the rise of nominal deposits. 
Table 4.1 shows that by the year 2001 the percentage of total deposits to GDP has risen 
to 54 per cent, reaching a peak of 57.1 per cent in 1987 as result of the growth in 
government deposits as shown in figure 4.1. The annual average change in the total bank 
deposits as a percentage of GDP during the last three decades has been 1.4 per cent, 
whereas the ratio of the total assets and total deposits to the GDP over the entire period 
would reflect the vital role that the banking system has played in the process of 
economic development, as shown in figure 4.1. 
It is has been noted that certain specific factors have aided the development of the 
banking sector, while others have tended to impede that development. As table 4.1 and 
figure 4.1 show, specific events have had a short-run effect on the development of the 
Libyan commercial banking sector. 
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For example, rises in crude oil prices as well as amendments of the banking laws have, 
to some extent, affected the development of the commercial banking sector in Libya. 
Meanwhile this development has been delayed by other factors. For instance, the 
abolition of the private sector affected banking growth by constraining loans portfolios 
in pre-selected public sectors leading to the deterioration of banking assets in the long 
term by increasing non-performing loans (which for example, were LD1.5 billion in 
1999). 
To sum up, the fluctuation of total assets and total deposits in Libyan commercial banks 
as percentage of GDP could be associated with fluctuation in GDP which may be 
attributed to other factors affecting growth in the Libyan economy, as already stated 
earlier in this chapter. 
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4.2.1 Assets and Liability Structure of the Commercial Banking System 
From a historical point of view, banking activities in most Third World countries have 
been designed in order to support and contribute towards development plans. Thus, 
development in the economy as a whole is accompanied by essential changes in the 
structure of the assets and liabilities of the banking system. Hence this study analyses the 
composition of the financial assets and liabilities in the Libyan commercial banking 
system and their impact on the economy as a whole. However, to do that, it is necessary 
to focus on some of the figures associated with the banking balance sheets, including 
both primary and secondary reserves, loan portfolios, and deposit liabilities. 
4.2.1.1 Structure of Assets 
The portfolio of the assets of commercial banks in Libya can be classified into four 
groups, as shown in table 4.2. 
1) Liquid assets, including: 
¢ Cash in vault 
> Demand deposits in the Central Bank of Libya and other banks 
> Time deposits in the Central Bank of Libya and other banks 
¢ Foreign currency 
2) The Libyan Treasury Bills and Securities 
3) Credit banking including: 
> Loans and overdrafts 
> Bills discounted and negotiated 
¢ Other loans 
4) Other assets 
¢ Fixed assets 
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Balances with foreign banks 
Others 
Table 4.2 shows the development of the structure of assets and liabilities in commercial 
banks in Libya over the period 1970-2001. It becomes evident this over that period, the 
value of the total assets increased over 70-fold from LDI60 million in 1970 to LDl 1.3 
billion in 2001, mainly owing to the massive increases in oil revenues, as figure 4.2 
suggests. 
Table 4.2: Assets and Liabilities Structure of the Commercial Banks in Libya (1970- 2001) 
(in percentages) 
1970 7.3 16.5 0.0 53.3 6.8 2.5 13.3 IOU 
1971 4.6 44.8 0.0 35.6 4.3 1.5 9.3 100 
1972 5.7 41.2 0.0 41.2 4.7 1.4 5.8 100 
1973 8.9 29.8 0.0 47.9 5.3 1.0 7.1 100 
1974 7.3 21.0 0.4 58.5 5.2 0.7 7.0 100 
1975 5.9 17.3 0.7 64.9 4.6 0.6 6.0 100 
1976 6.5 15.6 8.2 60.8 3.0 0.5 5.4 100 
1977 6.2 15.1 14.9 54.3 3.6 0.5 5.5 100 
1978 6.1 15.1 12.0 57.7 3.0 0.6 5.6 100 
1979 6.6 14.3 22.2 49.0 1.7 0.4 5.8 100 
1980 6.9 26.3 24.1 37.5 0.9 0.3 3.9 100 
1981 7.7 15.3 13.6 51.9 3.0 0.3 8.2 100 
1982 7.8 18.4 8.6 55.3 2.0 0.4 7.5 100 
1983 6.6 15.0 14.5 55.4 1.7 0.5 6.4 100 
1984 5.4 14.4 25.1 47.0 2.3 0.5 5.1 100 
1985 4.0 18.3 30.0 41.4 1.9 0.6 3.8 100 
1986 3.6 18.2 31.3 38.3 2.8 0.6 5.1 100 
1987 2.5 24.7 25.1 38.5 2.6 0.6 5.9 100 
1988 2.6 15.9 30.2 42.6 1.2 0.7 6.7 100 
1989 1.6 18.5 27.2 45.2 1.0 0.8 5.8 100 
1990 1.9 17.6 23.5 49.1 0.8 0.8 6.3 100 
1991 2.0 19.8 22.8 49.0 1.1 0.9 4.3 100 
1992 2.7 24.3 20.0 45.9 1.0 0.9 5.2 100 
1993 2.8 20.0 19.7 49.4 1.3 1.0 5.9 100 
1994 3.1 25.5 17.4 46.5 1.4 0.9 5.3 100 
1995 3.0 25.4 16.2 46.6 1.3 0.9 6.5 100 
1996 3.2 26.5 14.9 37.6 2.8 0.8 14.2 100 
1997 5.7 28.2 14.6 41.3 2.5 1.0 6.8 100 
1998 3.8 28.1 14.1 43.9 2.0 1.1 7.1 100 
1999 4.4 23.2 13.7 50.7 0.7 1.8 5.5 100 
2000 5.7 21.2 12.8 51.3 0.1 1.9 6.9 100 
2001 6.1 19.4 12.3 51.6 0.0 1.8 8.7 100 
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4.2 continue: Assets and Liabilities Structure 
1970 6.2 50.4 21.0 9.6 1.5 11.3 100 
1971 3.7 58.0 15.9 4.4 0.8 17.2 100 
1972 6.3 51.3 26.2 4.3 1.7 10.3 100 
1973 5.4 46.6 31.0 3.6 1.9 11.6 100 
1974 4.4 47.5 35.1 2.8 0.7 9.4 100 
1975 4.7 40.2 24.0 2.6 19.7 8.9 100 
1976 4.1 45.8 22.9 2.5 15.3 9.4 100 
1977 4.4 43.8 24.5 2.5 13.5 11.2 100 
1978 5.9 43.1 23.5 1.8 13.6 12.0 100 
1979 5.7 39.2 28.5 1.6 10.5 14.5 100 
1980 4.3 48.3 20.6 1.5 6.3 19.1 100 
1981 4.2 55.7 15.3 1.0 8.8 15.0 100 
1982 5.8 50.5 15.0 1.2 9.1 18.3 100 
1983 6.1 47.7 17.7 1.3 9.1 18.1 loo 
1984 4.3 46.6 17.5 1.3 8.8 21.4 100 
1985 4.4 48.8 19.0 1.4 6.8 19.5 100 
1986 4.6 47.2 20.8 1.6 6.7 19.2 100 
1987 4.8 45.8 20.5 1.6 7.0 20.3 100 
1988 5.5 41.5 19.7 1.5 10.3 21.4 100 
1989 5.4 45.5 16.7 1.5 9.6 21.2 100 
1990 5.1 40.0 12.9 1.5 12.4 28.2 100 
1991 5.7 41.0 14.2 1.5 9.8 27.8 100 
1992 5.2 41.6 14.3 1.7 7.6 29.6 100 
1993 5.3 41.0 15.6 2.1 4.9 31.1 100 
1994 4.9 43.5 14.7 2.3 4.2 30.5 100 
1995 4.6 41.8 17.4 2.4 4.3 29.5 100 
1996 5.1 40.2 18.1 2.5 3.0 31.1 100 
1997 5.8 41.7 18.9 2.8 4.3 26.5 100 
1998 6.1 42.4 21.3 2.9 2.0 25.3 100 
1999 7.2 44.9 21.9 3.4 1.5 21.0 100 
2000 7.3 44.0 20.9 3.8 1.1 22.8 100 
2001 6.9 40.3 23.4 4.3 1.3 23.8 100 
Source: C. B. L; (2001d) Economic Bulletin; Monetary and Statistical Book 1966-2000. 
l: Cash in rault; foreign currency; balances with banks abroad 
2: Demand and time deposits in CBL and other banks 
3: Lihtvan Treaswi , Bills Discounted and Securities 
4: Bills discounted and negotiated 
5. Borrowing: firom CBL; Libyan commercial banks: banks abroad 
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Figure 4.2: Development of Total Assets 








For the purpose of understanding these figures brief clarification regarding the balance 
sheets of commercial banks will be helpful. 
A) Cash in Vault, Foreign Currency, and Balances Abroad 
Table 4.2 shows that a ratio of the cash in vault, foreign currency and balances abroad 
stood at 7.3 per cent in 1970, and yet sharp increases in government revenues, following 
the sudden increase in oil prices, pushed this figure up to 8.91%, in 1973. This ratio 
currently in 2001 stands at 6.1%. 
B) Deposits in Banks 
Commercial banks are bound to deposit a defined proportion in the CBI, with free 
interest under demand deposits requirements. In addition, commercial banks may hold 
funds with other banks as part of inter-bank funds to cover short-term liquidity 
requirements. Article 36 of the Act (1) of 1993 concerning Banking, Currency, and 
Credit stipulates the following: 
"Commercial hunks shall maintain reserves with the Central 
Runk of Lib a without interest against their deposits liabilities 
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Time deposits are another option in which commercial banks may hold funds with the 
CBL and/or other banks as time deposits as part of their loans portfolio diversification as 
means for the generation of profits. The percentage of this item was fluctuated during 
1971-72, reaching a highest value of nearly 44%. 
However, one of the major banking problems in Libya has been high liquidity. Liquidity 
management serves various purposes, some of which are the following: 
(a) It ensures the availability of funds to meet withdrawals on demand, 
(b) It meets the reserve requirement needs of banks, and 
(c) It meets short-term expenses of the bank. 
In the case of Libya, commercial banks suffer from high liquidity, recorded at LD1323.9 
million at the end of the year 2000. This figure exceeds the reserves requirement by 
144% (CBL, 2001b). 
Cash and deposits represent the primary reserves provided by commercial banks in 
Libya, where the average figure associated with these services during the period of study 
is 27 per cent, which is an indication of high liquidity. However, this high liquidity may 
be attributed to the conservative policies adopted by the managers of these banks aiming 
at securing liquidity in short-term, and at avoiding a lack of cash flow and a capital 
market. Therefore high liquidity is an advantage, as it tends to assist a bank in meeting 
its monetary obligations, even though it might affect its investment activities by 
reducing its total revenues. 
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C) Treasury Bills and Securities 
In order to make contributions to economic development, commercial banks in Libya are 
encouraged to invest in bills and securities produced by the government treasury. These 
bills and securities were issued by the government for the first time, in 1974, when 
bonds were mainly sold to state-owned banks and other government offices. Hence, 
from that time, in response to the directives of the CBL it became an obligation to 
commercial banks to invest in government bills and securities, a policy mainly aimed at 
assisting the government in coping with the budget deficits. Yet, this aim is likely to be 
consistent with the notion that confines the role of commercial banks to channelling 
credit rather than contributing to the process of economic growth. 
As shown in table 4.2, this tool has become a regular means for the government to raise 
funds representing the base of the money market. As can be seen in table 4.2, this figure 
reached its maximum share of 31.3 per cent of total assets in 1986. Generally, this item 
rose sharply from 0.4 per cent of the total banks' assets in 1974 to 24.1 per cent in 1980, 
owing to the government's increasing dependence on development bonds. However, 
despite is, in the aftermath of the sharp drops in the prices of oil, the state has suffered 
from massive budget deficits, amounting to LD 2.3 billion in 1981. 
D) Credit 
Banking credit is the most important part of the asset portfolio of the bank balance sheet, 
rendering it the highest income yielding asset. However, determining the size of credit 
depends on banking policy, as well as the nature of Central Bank directives. 
Furthermore, the lending principles in commercial banks are based on furnishing aspects 
such as safety, suitability of lending credit policy, and profitability (Ghobashy, 1966). 
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Nonetheless, as mentioned earlier, the nationalisation of the banking sector was mainly 
aimed at establishing an efficient banking system. Also, given the conditions of central 
planning following the nationalisation of the banking sector in Libya, the role of 
commercial banking has completely changed, whereby the new role has been defined by 
Article (57) of Act (63) of 1971 as follows: 
"The Central Bank of Libya shall control and supervise commercial banks, 
regulate the relations between them, coordinate their activities and follow-up 
their work in implementation of the general policy laid down for the banking 
sector, in accordance with the general plans of state" (CBL, 1972a). 
Since then, the primary role of commercial banking has become mainly to channel funds 
to the real sector, which efficiency and profitability as only minor priorities. For 
instance, the ratio of ROE in all commercial banks has rarely managed to exceed 1%, 
whereas the ratio of ROA is less than 1% in all banks. Moreover, banking credit policy 
has been expanded to incorporate various economic sectors in order to streamline the 
ever-increasing potentialities of commercial banks in the best interest of the national 
economy. Hence, for the first time, commercial banks services have been extended to 
cover activities such as real estate loans to lower and medium income groups, provided 
that the borrower meets the specific conditions set by the rules. Generally, loans, 
advances and overdrafts are the most important components of the total credit regarding 
the activities of commercial banks in Libya. This being so, these elements constitute the 
highest income yielding bank assets necessary to meet the requirements of investment 
and the current expenditures of the productive system (CBL, 1977). 
The total credit of Libyan commercial banks represented approximately 69.5 per cent of 
total assets in 1975. This ratio, however, decreased sharply in 1980 to 38.4 per cent in, 
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and in the period 1982-83 it stood at 57 per cent, and then declined to register 30.3 and 
51.6 per cent in 1996 and 2001 respectively (see table 4.2). Total credit rose from LD 
96.2 million in 1970 to LD 6.1 billion in 2001. It grew 62-fold during that period. 
Although overdrafts are often regarded as unsecured lines of credit, in Libyan 
commercial banking loans and overdrafts represent the highest share of total credit 
during the period 1970-2001, rising to 100 per cent for the years 1999-2001(see table 
4.9). 
This phenomenon may be attributed to many factors. One important factor is the new 
role of the banking sector in state policy through its contribution to the development 
plans by financing trade and the real estate sector, as well as other sectors. Furthermore, 
the lack of both money and capital markets have confined the commercial banking 
sector to dealing in specific types of credit, which has restricted short-term investment 
both nationally and internationally. Another factor is the dramatic political changes 
when Libya opted for a socialist system in 1979 and the subsequent abolition of the 
private sector and restrictions on private ownership. This factor may have forced the 
banking sector to follow severe measures in allowing credit by concentrating on their 
credit facilities. Finally, the CBL's ownership of commercial banks in Libya meant that 
the latter a formal departments of the CBL, leading to government monopoly of the 
banking system. 
To sum up, it can be seen that over the entire period 1970-2001 there has been 
significant growth in total credit. On the other hand, the quality of loan portfolios has 
suffered from an increase of bad loans as a consequence of government intervention. 
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This situation that might lead to the deterioration of asset quality or even the long-term 
failure of the whole banking system. 
4.2.1.2 Structure of Liabilities 
With regard to commercial banks in Libya, liabilities represent an important source of 
funds on the balance sheet. These funds include capital reserves and liabilities incurred 
during the bank's routine operations. Table 4.2 indicates that the liabilities of 
commercial banks in Libya are divided into three main divisions: capital and reserves, 
deposits, and borrowing from other banks. On the other hand deposits are subdivided 
into three types including demand deposits (in the case of Libya these are interest-free), 
time deposits and savings deposits. However, demand deposits represented 62 per cent 
of the total deposit liabilities of the Libyan banks in 1970, declining to 60 per cent in 
1975, before rising again to 73.5 per cent in 1990. Nevertheless this ratio fell to 59% by 
the end of 2001 indicating the high liquidity associated with commercial banking in 
Libya. This is a sign of instability, which will usually lead to inflation. However, the 
high ratio of 77.5 per cent in 1981 has been attributed to the CBL's cancellation of the 
ten and five dinar banknotes, and the restriction on withdrawals of more than LD 500 
per month from any one account under all circumstances (see figure 4.3 and table 4.3). 
In other words, demand deposits represented 50 per cent of the total commercial banks' 
assets in 1970. However, these deposits started to decline, recording 39.2 per cent in 
1979 and reaching 57.5 per cent in 1982. Yet, during the period 1983-2001 they 
remained very close to 40 per cent (see table 4.2). 
Time and savings deposits have shown significant development during the period under 
review. In terms of importance, they were rated second in priority regarding banking 
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deposits. These time deposits particularly represent the deposits of the different 
government organisations and departments. They rose from LD 33.6 million in 1970 to 
LD 2.8 billion by the end of 2001 i. e. increasing 80 times during the period under 
review. Time deposits represented 26 per cent of total deposits in 1970 (about 21 per 
cent of total assets). The gradual trend of growth started during the period 1972-79, 
reaching a maximum share of 41.1 per cent in 1974 and 1979. This increase can be 
ascribed to rises in total deposits of the government. Time deposits as a percentage of 
the total deposits witnessed a significant fall during the period 1983-1997, primarily 
owing to a sharp decline in the government deposits, following the government socialist 
policies as indicated by figure 4.3. 
The third type of banking deposits is the savings deposit. Although these rose from LD 
15.4 million in 1970 to LD 506.5 in 2001, nonetheless they constituted only 4.3 per cent 
of total assets, rising to 9.6 per cent in 1970 before dropping to a record low of 1.0 per 
cent in 1980. However, during the period 1994 to 2001 savings deposits began to 
increase, registering up to 4.3 % in 2001. This growth may be attributed to the 
enforcement of Act No 1 of 1993 which has encouraged savings deposits, coupled with 
the CBL decision in relation to amending interest rates on deposits and changing the 
Libyan banking habits. 
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Figure 4.3: Deposits Growth in Libyan Commercial Bank (1970-2001) 


















As Table 4.3 shows, Libyan commercial banking has in recent time been only 
marginally successful in attracting time and savings deposits. The ratio of demand 
deposits to the money supply rose from 25.2 per cent in 1970 to 29.7 per cent in 1976. 
After a period of fluctuation between 1978-1989, this ratio moved up to 39.7 per cent in 
1990 following slightly to 38.6 per cent in 2001. The ratios of the annual average of 
demand and time deposits to money supply for the entire period 1970-2001 were 27.2 
per cent and 13.5 per cent respectively (see table 4.3). The decline in deposits with 
regard to commercial banks in Libya could be imputed to the preference of individual 
Libyans to keeping their money in places other than banks, and this might have been the 
reason behind the commercial banks being incapable of upgrading their banking habits. 
On the other hand, the proportion of time and savings deposits to money supply stood at 
15.3 per cent and 18 per cent in 1970 and 1975 respectively, declining to 10 per cent in 
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Moreover, it is important to note that demand deposits, as shown on table 4.3, have 
grown in relative terms as a basic tool in the money economy. However, in relation to 
the GDP, these demand deposits stood at 5.7 per cent in 1970, whereas they recorded 14 
and 30 per cent in 1981 and 1990 respectively, with an average growth rate of 16% 
during the period 1970 to 2001. 
The increasing ratio for the different types of deposits can be attributed to the significant 
rise in incomes created by oil revenues. However, this phenomenon as an economic 
indicator may support the argument that the Libyan commercial banks have under- 
performed in mobilising economic resources. 
A second major source of funds in banks may be classed as other liabilities which 
include credit to suspended accounts, interest on deposits, accounts to pay taxes and 
accrued payroll, notes payable, credit cheques and so on. The ratio of these liabilities to 
total liabilities has fluctuated over time, increasing from 11.3 per cent in 1970 to 17.2 
per cent in 1971, and then declining to 14.5 per cent in 1979. The highest ratio was 31.1 
per cent in 1993. Notwithstanding this, during the 1990s the ratio remained more or less 
stable at an average of 29.2 per cent. 
The third source of funds is borrowing from the Central Bank and other banks in Libya 
or/and banks abroad. This constitutes a very small portion of the total liabilities. It 
represented 1.5 per cent of the total liabilities in 1970, rising to a record 19.7 per cent in 
1975. However, during the period 1977-89 this item witnessed sharp declines, falling to 
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9.6 in 1989, and finally to 1.3 per cent in 2001. This may have been attributed to banks 
having maintained very high level of liquidity. 
"kable 4.3: Commercial Bank's Growth in Libya: Deposits Structure 
1970 62.2 25.9 11.9 25.2 15.3 5.7 3.4 
1971 74.1 20.3 5.6 32.2 11.3 9.2 3.2 
1972 62.7 32.0 5.3 25.1 14.9 8.2 4.9 
1973 57.4 38.1 4.5 17.9 13.3 6.5 4.8 
1974 55.6 41.1 3.3 18.2 14.5 6.3 5.0 
1975 60.3 35.9 3.8 27.3 18 9.8 6.5 
1976 64.3 32.2 3.5 29.7 16.5 10.3 5.7 
1977 61.9 34.7 3.5 27.1 16.7 10.0 6.2 
1978 63.0 34.3 2.7 19.1 11.2 8.0 4.7 
1979 56.6 41.1 2.3 18.3 14.1 7.5 5.7 
1980 68.6 29.3 2.1 22 10 8.3 3.8 
1981 77.4 21.2 1.4 28.3 8.3 14.0 4.1 
1982 75.7 22.5 1.8 25.1 8.0 11.5 3.7 
1983 71.5 26.6 1.9 23.8 9.5 11.0 4.4 
1984 71.2 26.8 2.0 26.5 10.7 13.2 5.3 
1985 70.6 27.5 2.0 25.7 10.7 15.8 6.6 
1986 67.8 29.8 2.3 27.7 13.1 18.3 8.7 
1987 64.9 32.6 2.5 23.9 12.9 19.4 10.5 
1988 66.2 31.5 2.3 26.0 13.2 18.0 9.2 
1989 71.4 26.2 2.4 26.1 10.5 17.7 7.1 
1990 73.6 23.7 2.7 39.7 14.3 30.2 10.8 
1991 72.3 25.0 2.7 38.2 14.7 26.0 9.9 
1992 72.2 24.8 3.1 35.6 13.7 26.6 10.2 
1993 69.9 26.6 3.5 34.1 14.7 27.1 11.6 
1994 72.0 24.3 3.8 30.2 11.8 25.9 10.1 
1995 67.9 28.2 3.9 27.4 13.0 24.0 11.3 
1996 66.1 29.8 4.1 32.9 16.8 20.4 10.4 
1997 65.8 29.8 4.4 24.0 12.4 18.0 9.3 
1998 63.6 32.0 4.4 23.8 13.6 19.5 11.2 
1999 63.9 31.2 4.9 23.6 13.3 18.5 10.5 
2000 64.0 30.5 5.6 26.2 14.8 16.3 9.2 
2001 59.2 34.4 6.3 38.6 26.5 32.0 22.0 
Average 66.7 29.7 3.6 27.2 13.5 16.0 7.8 
Source: C. B. L; Economic Bulletin; Monetary and Statistical Book 1966-2000, and IFS different issues 
D. D= Demand Deposit; TD=Time Deposit; S. D= Savings Deposit; M. S=Money Supply TO=Total 
Deposits 
Owner's equity has not been a very significant source of the liabilities for Libyan 
commercial banks. The ratio of owner's equity to the total liabilities in commercial 
banks has shown a continuous decline frone 6.2 per cent in 1970 to 4.3 per cent in 1980, 
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before rising to 7.3 in 2000 and dropping again to 6.9 per cent in 2001, as shown in 
table 4.2. These fluctuations could be understood as a significant growth of banking 
reserves, which increased from LD 4.2 million in 1970 to nearly LD 598 million in 
2001. 
Furthermore, over the same period, the commercial banks' capital has increased from 
LD 38.6 million to LD 206 million, which is consistent with the capital adequacy ratio 
imposed by the Basle Committee in 1988. 
From the foregoing it can be concluded that the development of the commercial banking 
sector in Libya has been significantly influenced by political events, social and 
economic plans, and the amendment introduced to the banking laws. For example the 
increase in the prices of crude oil prices have tended to increase the national wealth, 
with the subsequent growth of the volume of the banking industry in the country. 
4.2.2 Growth of Network Branches 
The main purpose of banking is the mobilisation of credits from all sources in the 
country. However, to reach that end, banks need to extend their activities by expanding 
their branch networks. Both table 4.3 and figure 4.3 attest to the fact that the increase in 
both time and savings deposits may be attributed to the expansion of the branch 
networks during the last three decades. 
However, the banking activities in Libya have not been confined only to the main cities 
in the country, but have extended to rural areas as well. This is expected to promote the 
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idea of the banking business amongst the people, and will definitely boost savings in 
various productive sectors. 
'I : ihlc -4.4: Commercial Ranl« anal their Branches 
Year Number Number Growth Average Branch Population Number of Person 
of flanks of Branches of Branches per Bank in Million per Branches 
1975 5 94 77.3 18.8 2.43 25,851 
1980 5 116 23.0 23.2 2.76 23,793 
1986 5 169 46.0 33.8 3.52 20,828 
1992 5 230 36.5 46.0 4.51 19,609 
1995 5 245 6.5 49.0 4.76 19,429 
2000 5 282 15.1 56.4 5.29 18,759 
Source: Central Bank of Libya; Annual Report (different issues); Population IFS; Year Book, 2001 
Following the promulgation of amendments in the banking laws in 1971, the objective 
of the banking sector in Libya has been to effectively participate in the economic 
development plans. The new government in Libya has realised that no meaningful 
development can he achieved without the development of rural areas. As in other 
developing countries, Libya has encouraged state-owned banks to open branches in rural 
areas, even when these branches are not economically feasible, in order to promote rural 
development. However, in such cases, state-owned banks will become tools for the 
generation of political support and employment. 
It can be seen in table 4.4 that there has been a remarkable growth in the number of bank 
branches. However, despite this growth, the quality of service has remained modest. In 
1970 there were 53 branches owned by 10 banks most of which were foreign banks. By 
1975, however, the number of commercial banks declined to 5 banks after the 
Libyanisation of foreign banks following the enforcement of Act 63 of 1971. Yet, in 
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1980 the number of branches had increased to 116. Also there were 5 state-owned 
commercial banks with 282 branches in 2000. The growth rate of network branches has 
been positive, with the highest rate of 77.3 per cent recorded in 1975. 
As shown on table 4.4, the growth rate of branches of commercial banks was 77.3 per 
cent in 1975 and 46 per cent in 1986, declining to 6.5 % in 1995 and rising again to 15.1 
per cent in 2000. This sharp decline in 1995 might be attributed to many factors. One of 
these factors is the fact that the decision to expand these branches was not based on 
proper feasibility studies, which seriously affected the financial status of the parent 
banks. For instance, branches reported as unsuccessful exceeded 30 per cent on average 
of total branches (see table 4.5A). 
Yet further branches were established in response to the state's general plans aiming at 
putting an end to immigration from rural to urban areas. Finally, in 1993 the government 
issued the new banking Act no I of 1993, which allowed the establishment of private 
banks. The new banks, known as domestic banks, aimed at transferring the rural 
communities from behind to advancement; and to make them compete with commercial 
banks. Nonetheless the number of domestic banks has currently risen up to 47 branches 
across the country. 
Table 4.5A: Number of Commercial Bank Branches and their Financial Positions 
Banks No: of Branches 
% Of Loss Branches/Total 
Annual Report Branches 
The National 39 33% 1989 
Jamahiriya 41 15'%, 1992 
Sahara 24 25% 1990 
l mma 31 87% 1991 
NN'ahda 42 38% 1991 
Source: lmt'nisY, (1993). 
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Table 4.4 also shows that the number of persons per branch has fallen from 37,358 in 
1970, to 18,759 persons in 2000. The main problem was that in the previous banking 
system banks were mainly concentrated in the major cities where business was easier 
and more lucrative rather than participating in the development of the rural areas. The 
Libyan government has made sonne attempts to sort out this situation by extending the 
branch network of commercial bank to every part of the country. Table 4.5B shows that 
the concentration of the branches of commercial banks appears to be in favour of urban 
centres. This is due to the fact that major urban areas have the resources that are likely to 
facilitate banks in performing smoothly and making profits, so that banks follow 
business instead of leading business. 
Table 4.5B: Distribution of Commercial Banks Branches based Municipalities 1995 
Banks 
Tripoli 13 19 14 15 10 71 
Benghazi 4 5 2 14 8 33 
Sabha 8 3 5 I 4 21 
Zawiya 4 6 6 6 5 27 
Gulf Sirte 6 7 7 11 3 34 
Al-jabal AI-Agter 12 7 1 9 3 32 
Al-jabal AI-Garrbi 5 7 6 8 I 24 
Total 52 54 41 64 34 245 
Source: CBL. 1995 ýý ý ý 
4.2.3 Comparative Analysis 
In order to examine the development of the banking system in Libya, it is useful to 
conduct a comparative analysis of different banking systems using both micro- and 
macroeconomic indicators. For this purpose the experiences in Malaysia and Saudi 
Arabia are useful, as both countries show similar economic characteristics to Libya. 
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As table 4.6 shows, the per capita income was highest in Saudi Arabia with U$ 7621, 
followed by Libya and Malaysia with US 5091 and U$ 3869 respectively. The lowest 
average annual growth of the GDP over the period 1980-2000 was shown by Libya, 
which recorded 3.1 per cent. This figure corresponds to 8.9 per cent in Malaysia and 
10.9 per cent in Saudi Arabia. 
Table 4.6: Economic Indicators 
Indicators Libya Malaysia Saudi 
: Aýerage of Growth of GDP 1980-2000 3.1 8.9 10.9 
Fiscal Deficit as % of GDP 1980-2000 3.2 4.4 3.4 
Per Capita Income in (2000) S 5091 3869 7621 
Time and Savings Deposits as % of MS 1980-2000 20.1 68.9 26.5 
Demand Deposits as % of GDP 1980-2000 54,0 36.7 43.1 
Demand Deposits as % of Total Assets of Commercial Banks 1980- 44.1 36.7 12.1 
2000 
Total Deposits as °o of GDP 1980-2000 43.2 109 52.2 
Population in Million at 2000 5.29 23.27 20.85 
Source: International Financial Statistics (different issues), The Middle East Business, 2001 
However, all three countries have suffered from government budget deficits, and all 
exhibited similar rates of deficit. Time and savings deposits as a proportion of money 
supply (M2) was highest in Malaysia, with an average of 68.9 per cent, for the simple 
reason that Malaysia has a higher level of financial intermediation than the other two 
countries. This ratio corresponds to 20.1% and 26.5% in Libya and Saudi Arabia 
respectively. 
Table 4.6 shows that the average total assets of the commercial banking sector relative to 
the GDP stood at 43.2 in Libya for period the 1980-2000, whereas this ratio was 109 per 
cent for Malaysia and 52.2 per cent for Saudi Arabia. On the other hand, the ratio of 
demand deposits as a percentage of both the GDP and the total assets was highest in 
Libya (54° ý, and 44.1"o respectively) compared to Malaysia (36.7% and 12.1% 
respectively) and Saudi Arabia (29.2°'o and 43.1' <, respectively). 
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The proportion of demand deposits to the total assets on average recorded 44.1 per cent 
in Libya, indicating that Libyan commercial banks have been unable to attract and 
mobilise time and savings deposits. In addition, Libya has a lower percentage of total 
assets to the GDP; which may reflect the poor participation of commercial banks in 
GDP. The share of the Libyan financial sector on average between 1983 and 1995 was 
5.8 per cent (Abu-Zaakook, 2000). Given the results of this analysis, it becomes unclear 
as to why the Libyan commercial banking has not performed well in mobilising its 
resources compared to other similar developing economics. 
4.3 The Monetary Policy Function and its Instruments 
Instruments of Monetary Policy 
Monetary policy could be defined as the methods by which the monetary authorities (i. e. 
central bank and treasury) could seek to control changes in the money stock and the cost 
and availability of credit, in order to achieve various macro-economic objectives 
(Hanson, 1983). 
Monetary policy would usually tend to aim for specific goals, such as the stability of 
prices in general, economic growth, and stability in the balance of payments. I lowever, 
to fulfil these objectives, monetary policy may resort to either one of the following 
approaches: 
I) Quantity tools are aimed at controlling the money stock and levels of bank credit. 
These include open-market operations, changes of requirement reserves, and 
discount rates. 
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2) Quality tools influence the flow of credit directed to specific sectors, for 
instance real estate, the agricultural sector and so on. These tools are commonly 
used in the developing countries because of their limited money and capital 
markets. Quality tools have two instruments: the moral suasion and the 
determination or restriction of credit. 
Prior to discussing the monetary instruments of the CBL, it is necessary to point out that 
the Libyan economy has conspicuous monetary features. It is considered as narrow and 
under-developed. This inference has been drawn from many financial and monetary 
ratios during the period of study, as shown in tables 4.7,4.8 and 4.9. 
Currency in circulation is considered as the main property of the money supply (M1) as 
well as a medium of exchange. The proportion of currency in circulation to money 
supply rose from 23.7 in 1980 to 26 per cent in 1986 and to 41.2 and 31.0 per cent in 
1993 and 2001 respectively, as shown in table 4.7. This percentage is very high 
compared to other countries. For example in the Saudi Arabia, and Malaysia it has been 
13.8 and 10.3 per cent in 2002 respectively (SAMA, 2003; and BNM, Annual report 
2003). This difference reflects the deficiencies of the Libyan banking system. The fall in 
this ratio during the period 1980-85 could be attributed to decisions of the CBL 
regarding restrictions on cash withdrawals. 
Table 4.8 shows the relationship between GDP and Ml. It can be seen that the growth of 
GDP was associated with increases in money supply, but the annual percentage changes 
in money supply were higher than those of GDP. 
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Table 4.7: Money Supply and its Components 1970-2001 
1970 112.2 128.8 241.0 46.6 53.4 
1971 120.7 243.8 364.5 33.1 66.9 
1972 147.4 265.6 413.0 35.7 64.3 
1973 202.6 311.4 514.0 39.4 60.6 
1974 262.2 502.8 765.0 34.3 65.7 
1975 346.0 521.5 867.5 39.9 60.1 
1976 435.9 703.5 1139.4 38.3 61.7 
1977 585.0 858.8 1443.8 40.5 59.5 
1978 868.5 819.3 1687.8 51.5 48.5 
1979 1055.7 1193.7 2249.4 46.9 53.1 
1980 685.7 2213.2 2898.9 23.7 76.3 
1981 791.2 2721.0 3512.2 22.5 77.5 
1982 889.9 2342.4 3232.3 27.5 72.5 
1983 838.2 2046.2 2884.4 29.1 70.9 
1984 767.6 1943.8 2711.4 28.3 71.7 
1985 985.1 2507.2 3492.3 28.2 71.8 
1986 1023.8 2017.7 3041.5 33.7 66.3 
1987 1068.2 2370.4 3438.6 31.1 68.9 
1988 899.6 2112.0 3011.6 29.9 70.1 
1989 1131.7 2550.3 3682.0 30.7 69.3 
1990 1461.1 3184.3 4645.4 31.5 68.5 
1991 1620.9 2821.8 4442.7 36.5 63.5 
1992 1982.2 3186.0 5168.2 38.4 61.6 
1993 2216.9 3168.0 5384.9 41.2 58.8 
1994 1989.8 4067.6 6057.4 32.8 67.2 
1995 2035.4 4337.0 6372.4 31.9 68.1 
1996 2419.8 4298.2 6718.0 36.0 64.0 
1997 2534.2 4487.4 7021.6 36.1 63.9 
1998 2698.6 4489.1 7187.7 37.5 62.5 
1999 2634.8 5256.3 7891.1 33.4 66.6 
2000 2699.2 5070.0 7769.2 34.7 65.3 
2001 2559.6 5708.3 8267.9 31.0 69.0 
Source: CBL, (2001) 
CC: Currency in Circulation, DD: Demand Deposits, M1: Money Supply (narrowly) 
As tables 4.7 and 4.8 show, the money supply in Libya has shown relatively low ratios 
of growth since 1970. During the last three decades ending in 2001, the money supply 
has risen from LD 241 million to LD 8.3 billion, with an annual average growth rate of 
13 per cent. The ratio of money in circulation to the total money supply represented 
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nearly 35 per cent during the period under review. However, this confirms the idea that 
the Libyan banking sector has not performed well to improve banking habits. 
Table 4.8: M11oney Supply and GDP in Libya 1970-2001(in LDmn) 
1970 241.0 1426.0 16.9 31.8 2.2 
1971 364.5 51.2 1627.0 14.1 22.4 125.6 7.7 
1972 413.0 13.3 1798.0 10.5 23.0 137.5 7.6 
1973 514.0 24.5 2246.0 24.9 22.9 140.3 6.2 
1974 765.0 48.8 3883.0 72.9 19.7 158.6 4.1 
1975 867.5 13.4 3780.0 -2.7 22.9 169.2 4.5 
1976 1139.4 31.3 4907.0 29.8 23.2 192.5 3.9 
1977 1443.8 26.7 5763.0 17.4 25.1 234.0 4.1 
1978 1687.8 16.9 5688.0 -1.3 29.7 244.5 4.3 
1979 2249.4 33.3 7846.0 37.9 28.7 315.9 4.0 
1980 2898.9 28.9 10882.0 38.7 26.6 930.9 8.6 
1981 3512.2 21.2 9401.0 -13.6 37.4 632.8 6.7 
1982 3232.3 -8.0 9373.0 -0.3 34.5 719.8 7.7 
1983 2884.4 -10.8 8932.0 -4.7 32.3 624.0 7.0 
1984 2711.4 -6.0 8364.0 -6.4 32.4 661.4 7.9 
1985 3492.3 28.8 8227.0 -1.6 42.4 885.7 10.8 
1986 3041.5 -12.9 7132.0 -13.3 42.6 927.3 13.0 
1987 3438.6 13.1 6253.0 -12.3 55.0 1325.0 21.2 
1988 3011.6 -12.4 6791.0 8.6 44.3 870.4 12.8 
1989 3682.0 22.3 7537.0 11.0 48.9 1009.0 13.4 
1990 4645.4 26.2 8095.0 7.4 57.4 1115.0 13.8 
1991 4442.7 -4.4 8887.0 9.8 50.0 1297.2 14.6 
1992 5168.2 16.3 9269.0 4.3 55.8 1820.2 19.6 
1993 5384.9 4.2 9148.0 -1.3 58.9 1538.5 16.8 
1994 6057.4 12.5 9444.0 3.2 64.1 2238.5 23.7 
1995 6372.4 5.2 10232.0 8.3 62.3 2370.8 23.2 
1996 6718.0 5.4 11945.0 16.7 56.2 2653.1 22.2 
1997 7021.6 4.5 13284.0 11.2 52.9 2777.7 20.9 
1998 7187.7 2.4 12619.0 -5.0 57.0 2863.3 22.7 
1999 7891.1 9.8 14314.0 13.4 55.1 2476.3 17.3 
2000 7769.2 -1.5 14321.4 0.1 54.2 2435.7 17.0 
2001 8267.9 6.4 14795.5 3.3 55.9 2511.1 17.0 
Source: 1. FS Yearbook 2002; CBL: Economic Bulletin (different issue), M/=Money Supph' 
ýnnrruý, h definition). 
From the statistics in table 4.8, it can be noted that a consistent relationship between the 
financial figures and GDP in general has been established between 1970 and 2001. 
Morcovcr, table 4.8 shows a significant increase in the size of the total liquid assets from 
I. I) 31.8 million in 1970 to LD 2.5 billion in 2001, with an annual average growth rate 
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of 23.8 per cent. This growth may be imputed to the significant increase in salaries and 
incomes. 
Table 4.9: Total credit and Total deposits as percentage to GDP 1970 to 2001(in LDmn) 
1970 96 
.2 
1420.0 5.9 129.7 9.1 0.74 
1971 107.6 1627.0 6.0 211.5 13.0 0.51 
1972 148.0 1798.0 6.6 263.6 14.7 0.56 
1973 240.9 2246.0 6.2 367.1 16.3 0.66 
1974 448.6 3883.0 11.9 602.3 15.5 0.74 
1975 641.9 3780.0 13.1 610.5 16.3 1.05 
1976 739.5 4907.0 12.8 826.5 16.8 0.89 
1977 853.2 5763.0 15.0 1004.4 18.1 0.85 
1978 926.0 5688.0 11.8 1043.4 18.3 0.89 
1979 1040.4 7846.0 9.6 1423.2 18.1 0.73 
1980 1321.2 10882.0 14.1 2416.2 22.2 0.55 
1981 2167.7 9401.0 23.1 2841.3 30.2 0.76 
1982 2162.0 9373.0 24.2 2517.0 26.9 0.86 
1983 2208.1 8932.0 26.2 2581.6 28.9 0.86 
1984 2153.7 8364.0 26.4 2858.8 34.2 0.75 
1985 2033.0 8227.0 28.5 3247.7 39.5 0.63 
1986 2031.6 7132.0 32.5 3437.9 48.2 0.59 
1987 2157.5 6253.0 31.8 3567.4 57.1 0.60 
1988 2316.5 6791.0 30.8 3310.0 48.7 0.70 
1989 2441.9 7537.0 30.2 3374.7 44.8 0.72 
1990 3053.3 8095.0 34.4 3321.4 41.0 0.92 
1991 3152.3 8887.0 34.0 3565.9 40.1 0.88 
1992 3392.2 9269.0 37.1 4173.0 45.0 0.81 
1993 3710.2 9148.0 39.3 4301.8 47.0 0.86 
1994 3986.1 9444.0 39.0 5035.9 53.3 0.79 
1995 4281.5 10232.0 35.8 5503.1 53.8 0.78 
1996 3915.0 11945.0 29.5 5879.0 49.2 0.67 
1997 4165.9 13284.0 33.0 6039.6 45.5 0.69 
1998 4530.2 12619.0 31.6 6577.8 52.1 0.69 
1999 5203.6 14314.0 36.4 7117.8 49.7 0.73 
2000 5584.0 14321.4 39.0 7463.0 52.1 0.75 
2001 6057.6 14795.5 40.9 7984.0 54.0 0.76 
Source: 1. F. S Yearbook 2002; CBL: Economic Bulletin (different issue) 
Table 4.9 shows a significant growth of total credit from LD 96.2 million in 1970 to LD 
6 billion in 2001. As table 4.9 shows, the ratio of the total credit to GDP fluctuated 
between 6 per cent and 14 per cent during the period 1970-80. It then started to increase 
from 23.1 per cent in 1981 to 41 per cent in 2001. On the other hand, the lower 
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percentage of total credit to GDP may reflect a lack of banking sector accountability in 
the Libyan economy, and the lack of a money market. It could also be attributed to the 
liquidity preferences of the Libyan people. Column 6 in table 4.9 shows the percentage 
of total deposits to total credit, which ratio reflects the capabilities of the commercial 
banks in investing their resources. However, the results show fluctuations in this ratio 
the during period under study, recording an average of 75%. This may indicate that 
commercial banks in Libya have only invested 75 per cent of their resources, and the 
remaining 25 per cent has not been invested. This ratio is higher by 10% then the 
liquidity ratio imposed by the CBL. 
4.4 The Initial Reform Policy in the Banking Sector 
As mentioned earlier, in 1978 the private sector was abolished and all economic 
activities came under government control. By 1989, the Libyan government permitted 
the private ownership of small and medium industries such as farms, and hotels. Since 
that time the Libyan government has moved towards liberalising the different economic 
sectors by adopting a new policy enabling individuals to participate in the economic 
cycle, with special consideration being given to the banking sector in general and 
commercial banks in particular. 
4.4.1 The Need for Banking Reforms in Libya 
As discussed earlier, banks play a vital role in any economy by offering credit for the 
development process as well as bearing the responsibility to maintain the confidence of 
the public in the integrity and security of banks. Therefore, banks need to work 
efficiently. 
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In the case of Libya, the banking sector was owned and controlled by the government 
following the nationalisation programme in the early 1970s. The need for banking 
reforms in Libya became very important in this period. The main reasons behind this 
might have been associated with several factors. Libya commenced economic reform 
policies in the mid 1980s, reinstating the private sector and adopting a new policy 
enabling individuals to participate in the different economic activities. Thus the 
development and promotion of these activities require sustained efforts to be made by a 
strong and effective banking system. An effective and efficient bank, on the other hand, 
requires the continuous improvement and diversification of its services. However, the 
Libyan banking sector has suffered from government intervention in the last three 
decades. That intervention has led to many problems including the laxity of management 
and lack of internal control systems. These other problems may have made banking 
reforms programmes more urgent. Among the banking reforms needed the following 
should be considered as top priorities: 
1) New Banking Law 
Until 1993, Libyan commercial banks operated under the terms of Law no 4 of 1963 and 
its subsequent amendments that including Law no. 63 of 1971, Law no. 158 of 1972 and 
no. 38 of 1973. Yet, on March 21St 1993, the General Peoples' Congress in Libya 
promulgated a banking Law no. 1 of 1993. Consequently, provision 2 of that law has 
overridden both the Currency law of 1955 and law no. 4 of 1963, and its amendments. 
The banking law no. 1 of 1993 was divided into four sections and ninety-four articles 
altogether. The first section contained four chapters and dealt with the Central Bank of 
Libya, where Articles 1 to 12 relate to issues pertaining to the establishment and 
150 
" management of the Central Bank of Libya. Under the terms of the new act, one hundred 
million dinars were allocated as initial capital to the Central Bank of Libya, subject to 
periodical adjustments. Chapter two, on the other hand, outlined the objectives and 
functions of the Central Bank. Chapter three of part I mainly discussed the issuance of 
currency in the country, whereas Articles 24 and 25 considered issues related to the 
control of commercial banks. Chapter five, on the other hand, discussed issues having to 
do with the accounts of the Central Bank. 
In order to control and to supervise commercial banks, the Central Bank was given the 
authority to regulate banking credit as stipulated by Article 34 as follows: 
1) Methods used in assessing the various assets of banks; 
2) Fixing of the proportion and kind of liquid funds which must be maintained 
by banks; 
3) Determining the channels in which banks are prohibited to invest their 
funds; 
4) Fixing reserves to be made available against such assets may be subject to 
great fluctuations in value; 
5) Fixing bank charges collected from or paid to customers in any manner 
whatsoever; 
6) Determining maximum interest rates on all creditor and debtor accounts 
and arrear charges; 
7) Determining the margin allowed between the interest rate or rediscount 
rate fixed by the bank and the discount rates charged by banks or their 
customers if the credit documents are eligible for rediscount or as 
collateral a loan; 
8) Fixing the percentage of each type of credit in relation to the total of these 
operations and determining the maximum amounts and durations of credit 
operations, investment or letters of credit in respect of all or some of banks 
and with relation to all or some of these operation; 
9) Determining the minimum limit of cash margin for opening documentary 
credits and letters of guarantee in general or in respect of a specific kind 
thereof and 
10) Prescribing the statements to be published and the manner of such 
publication (Banking Law No 1 of 1993). 
151 
One important change in the law has been introduced in section two. That change 
relates to commercial banking, regarding supervision and other duties. Article 51, for 
example, defined the new duties of commercial banks as follows: 
Contribution in the financing of development plans, formation of companies 
participation therein and in economic projects shall be among the principal 
functions of the commercial banks in accordance with the rules laid down herein. 
However, Article 53 of this law stipulates that commercial banks shall form a Libyan 
Joint Stock Corporation raising their underwritten capital from five hundred thousand 
dinars as stipulated by Law 63 of 1971 to no less than three million dinars distributed in 
nominal shares not exceeding 10 dinars according to the new act. Furthermore, this 
article determines the subscriptions of individuals and legal entities, public or private. 
Yet, the second paragraph of the same article would illustrate that foreign banks could 
be allowed to open branches in the country stating that: 
"Non-national banks may be allowed to open branches, agencies or 
representative offices in G. S. P. L. A. J. in accordance with the terms 
and conditions laid down by the Board of Directors of the Central 
Bank of Libya approved by the General People's Committee ". 
The second and third chapters in section two outlined the general duties and provisions 
of commercial banks, whereas parts three and five discuss exchange control and punitive 
provisions respectively. 
The banking law no 1 of 1993 has provided the Central Bank of Libya with the 
necessary powers in order to render it capable of practicing its duties as a leading force 
of monetary authority. But in the meantime, under the terms of this law, the appointment 
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of the board of directors for commercial banks became the duty of the CBL, overruling 
the provisions of Article 54 of law no. 63 of 1971. The new law stipulates that: 
"The Central Bank of Libya shall have representatives in the boards of 
commercial banks. The number of such representatives shall not be less 
than the percentage owned by the Central Bank of Libya in the capital 
of these commercial banks, and provided that the Chairman and General 
Manager shall be included" (CBL, 1972a) 
After describing the main changes introduced by the new Banking Law no 1 of 1993, the 
following important question follows: Does the current banking law offer sufficient 
reform? 
The answer to this question will necessitate the determination of the criteria of the 
banking law by analysing certain aspects. For example, as a sign of goodwill, and in 
order to win the people's trust in the banking sector, the new law has for the first time 
removed the restrictions on depositors to dispose of their accounts, as stipulated by 
article 71. Furthermore customers' accounts and transactions shall be dealt with in 
absolute confidentiality, only to be disclosed for legal reasons. 
The new banking Act has allowed the establishment of a new generation of commercial 
banks, which will take the form of stock firms. The underwritten capital of these firms 
would be no less than ten million dinars (later amended by Law 9 of 1995 to 3 million 
dinars) to be distributed among 300 thousand nominal shares i. e. 10 dinars per share 
given that the maximum shares held by individuals should not exceed one per cent of the 
total shares or two per cent for a group. 
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Moreover, the new law has not given the Central Bank the complete independence. For 
instance, it cannot issue banknotes and coins and other denominations without 
authorisation from the Minister of the Treasury, as stipulated by Article 26. In addition, 
banks must obtain a permit before carrying out any banking business, and no mergers 
can take place without the approval of the authorities concerned, as stipulated by 
Articles 52 and 67. This situation may confirm the fact that the Central Bank of Libya is 
still not fully independent and is subject to government intervention. 
However, the new law has extended the maximum temporary advances to the public 
Treasury to cover budget deficits from 10 per cent to 17 per cent from the estimated total 
budget revenues, on condition that these sums are repaid in advance before making any 
new advances. This article led to an increase in the size of internal debt to LD 5.9 billion 
in 1991, which then became the main problem facing the Libyan economy. Moreover, 
according to Article 53 of law no. 1 of 1993, the Central Bank of Libya is entitled to 
offer favourable interest rates to projects selected by the General Peoples' Committee, 
and the commercial banks will be offered credit to undertake these projects. The Central 
Bank may rediscount such loans up on the request of commercial banks. In fact, this 
article may pose many problems for commercial banks including increases in the size of 
the total credit to development projects, exposing them to insolvency. To sum up the 
new Banking law constituted the first step towards banking reforms, and yet various 
modifications were needed in order to cope with the requirements of these reforms in the 
subsequent phases. 
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2) Domestic Banks 
Libya has experienced significant changes in several activities, including the 
reinstatement of the private sector at the end of 1989, and the subsequent new Banking 
Act No. 1 of 1993. The banking system has also witnessed the establishment of new 
banks under the name of domestic banks (Al-Massaraf Al-Ahliya), which have played 
an active role in development projects. As table 4.10 shows, the total liabilities of 
domestic banks including contra accounts increased dramatically to LD 1.1 billion by 
the end of 2001 compared to LD 220 million in 1997. 
Liquidity assets in domestic banks have rose significantly from LD 150 million in 1997 
to LD 460.4 million in 2001. The growth of this item may be attributed to increased 
deposits with banks during the period under review. The percentage of liquidity assets to 
total financial assets declined from 68 per cent in 1997 to 43 per cent in 2001. This fall 
could be imputed mainly to the growth of credit facilities of domestic banks that had 
extended their loans and advances rather than depositing in the Central Bank or other 
banks to a record LD 396.8 million in 2001. 
The credit facilities of domestic banks have witnessed relative increases, with annual 
average rates of growth of 47.3 per cent. On the other hand, the proportion of total credit 
to total assets has risen progressively from 12 per cent in 1997 to 37 per cent in 2001. 
Overdraft and advances represented 95 and 98 per cent in 2000 and 2001 respectively, 
which testifies to the ease and scale of their profits. 
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Table 4.10: Aggregate of Assets and Liabilities of Domestic Banks 1997-2001 
Assets 
Cash in Vault 5.7 9.5 13.2 16.5 26.8 
Deposits in C. B. L 61.4 40.1 82.4 113.1 83.6 
Deposits and investments 87.8 137.7 229.1 306.5 350.1 
Loans Advances 26.3 81.4 164.9 264.4 396.8 
Other assets 8.9 16.1 16.5 33.6 59.9 
Contra account 30.2 34.2 41.6 100.0 155.8 
Total 220.3 319.0 547.7 834.1 1073.0 
Liabilities: 
Capital and Reserves 33.6 47.0 55.6 60.0 29.9 
Deposits* 104.0 178.8 355.5 547.0 741.0 
Public sector - - 233.5 348.8 - 
Pri%ate sector - - 111.1 153.4 - 
Borrow ing from banks 30.3 7.1 34.0 54.2 54.9 
Other liabilities 22.2 51.9 61.0 72.9 91.4 
Contra accounts 30.2 34.2 41.6 100.0 155.8 
Total 220.3 319.0 547.7 834.1 1073.0 
Source: CBL, (200/h) 
* Including savings accounts and the insurance. 
By the end of 2000, capital and reserves had increased to a record of LD 60 million i. e. 
about 7.2 per cent of total financial assets and liabilities. This would indicate that the 
small amount of capital that was available for domestic banks had limited the efforts of 
these banks to contribute to rural development. Total deposits reached LD 741 million at 
the end of 2001, including demand deposits of LD 569.6 million, time deposits of LD 84 
million and savings deposits of LD 87.7 million. However, these increased from LD 104 
million to 355.5 million in 1997 and 1999 respectively. Yet, public sector was the main 
contributor to these deposits, providing nearly 90% of total deposits by the end of 2000. 
The experiment with domestic banks in Libya is relatively new, so that the figures 
shown on the balance sheets of these banks may not reflect their real potential. 
Nonetheless domestic banks seem to be following the same strategies in state-owned 
banks, as they are still dependent on the public sector as the main sources of bank 
deposits, representing 65 per cent of their total deposits in the year 2000. This might 
13.2 16.5 26.8 
82.4 113.1 83.6 
229.1 306.5 350.1 
164.9 264.4 396.8 
16.5 33.6 59.9 
41.6 100.0 155.8 
547.7 834.1 1073.0 
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indicate the failure of domestic banks to attract deposits from individuals. As table 4.10 
shows, the total assets of domestic banks in the year 2000 was LD 737 million, 
equivalent to only 6% of that of commercial banks. This may indicate that domestic 
banks are small and not particularly successful. In addition, this would mean that the 
small amount of capital they have attracted would restrict their planning capabilities. 
3) Additional Reform Stages 
In 1988, the government of Libya took a significant step towards liberalising its 
economy by allowing private activities in areas such as small and medium industries, 
retail trade and agriculture business. However, in 1992 the government initiated fuller 
privatisation by passing a law that would allow the sale of state assets to the private 
sector, paving the way for the latter to take part in the process of economic development. 
Nonetheless, a wide range of further reform measures will be necessary to stimulate the 
Libyan economy towards achieving its potential. 
Consequently, the first private commercial bank was established in November 1995 
under the name of the Bank of Commerce and Development. Furthermore, the new Act 
allowed foreign banks to open branches or representative offices subject to the Central 
Bank approval. This led to the establishment of some foreign banks in Libya such as the 
Arab Banking Corporation, the Maltese Bank and the Canal Bank of Egypt (Tertorov, 
2002b). It also resulted in the emergence of policies concerning the liberalisation of 
exchange in the country. However, since 1986, the exchange rate of the Libyan currency 
against foreign currencies has suffered from a series of devaluations, whereby 
substantial government intervention has forced foreign currency dealing onto the black 
157 
market. For instance, the black market rate of the Libyan currency (the Dinar) against 
the US Dollar stood at $1= LD 3.75 for many years until the end of the 1990s, whereas 
the official rate remained unchanged, i. e. around $1 = LD 0.41. Yet, to tackle this 
problem, the Libyan government issued instructions to the Central Bank to consider two 
different rates for the dinar. These are the ordinary commercial rate for individual 
customers, and the official rate for government agencies and foreign companies. 
However, the Central Bank has, so far, met with some success regarding its plans and 
the 2002 currency reforms eventually closing the gap between the two rates (Tertorov, 
2002 a) 
4.4.2 Assessing the Libyan Banking Reforms Experience 
To sum up, in consideration of the initial reform policy of the banking sector in Libya, it 
can be seen that in the early 1990s the Libyan government commenced the reform of the 
banking sector, which included the promulgation of new banking laws and other relevant 
economic and investment laws aiming at introducing a full package of reforms featuring 
the establishment of private and domestic banks as well as amending the national 
currency exchange rate against foreign currencies. 
However, in order to properly evaluate the banking reforms in Libya, the following 
points could be useful for better understanding and assessment. 
1) The pace of banking reforms is slow and unclear, and this might be attributed to 
government hesitation regarding the privatisation of banks. 
2) The lack of confidence in the banking sector may be imputed to the policy of 
restrictions in the 1980s. Usually, confirming the right of individuals to deposit 
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and withdraw their money freely and without any restrictions is one of the 
elements that can help greatly in building that confidence. 
3) Banking services in Libya are still lagging behind those of other countries to the 
being limited to basic services. 
The success of the banking reforms in Libya implies that banks should independently 
operate under a strong leadership, i. e. without being influenced by political decisions. A 
carefully sequenced, coherent, and comprehensive implementation project includes 
creating the necessary environment for market forces to work in an efficient manner, 
establishing financial markets, improving the mechanism and instruments for monetary 
management, as well as setting up certain rules and regulations for supervision. The 
right sequencing with respect to time is crucial for the success of banking reforms. 
Finally banking reforms cannot be achieved overnight because it takes some time to 
realise this objectives. Malaysia is a case in point where the process of implementing 
reforms in a gradual manner has played a vital role in the success of the reform policies. 
4.5 Government Control versus Liberalisation 
It is noteworthy that the Libyan commercial banks have been a significant tool in 
development plans. Under governmental directives the banking system has been 
intended to give preference in its lending operations to certain economic sectors chosen 
by the government. However, both the banking laws no. 63 of 1971 and no. 1 of 1993, 
and other relevant Acts, have maintained that commercial banking operations must 
continue under governmental control. Consequently, the regulated banking sector in 
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Libya has been largely excluded from developing a true market and commercially 
oriented practices. 
The government controlled commercial banking sector has led to the poor managerial 
autonomy of such banks. As mentioned earlier in the early 1970s, Libyan commercial 
banking needed government help in order to continue its progress. On the other hand, 
government control over the banking sector was initiated by the nationalisation process 
in 1970. Since then commercial banks has been operating as government agencies or, in 
other words, as departments of the Central Bank of Libya. The Government has used 
these banks as a means of channelling credit to specific economic sectors to meet the 
objectives of its economic plans. Thus, the main role of commercial banks has been to 
supply sufficient credit to certain economic sectors according to government choice, for 
example, to make funds available for government projects at very low interest (i. e. cheap 
funding). However, at this point, it is more appropriate to discuss the impact of 
government intervention on credit policy and subsequent non-performing loans, and its 
impact on the internal control systems of commercial banks in Libya. 
4.5.1 Credit Policy and Government Intervention 
Due to government control over the commercial banking system, the primary role of the 
banking sector has been to channel funds to the real sector, rendering efficiency and 
profitability as secondary objective. Nonetheless, banking credit has been identified as 
primarily credit allocations for specific sectors with special policy loans. The 
government of Libya, represented by the Central Bank, set up a specific loan policy in 
accordance with the prevailing banking laws (i. e. Banking Law no. 63 of 1971 or no. 1 
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of 1993) to ensure that banking credit would be in compliance with the government's 
economic plans. 
Loan policy could be defined as bank loans allocated for specific economic activities 
with favourable interest and the availability of funds to support the government' 
objectives. Under this situation banking loans have been designed to provide subsidy for 
selected economic sectors (Atiya and Elgumati, 1993). However, during the period 
between 1970 and 1992, government intervention in all commercial banking activities 
was largely unsuccessful, creating a significant stock of non-performing loans. 
Prior to discussing the problems created by these loans for commercial banking in 
Libya, the reasons for the non-performing loans and their impact on the banking 
activities are considered. Also possible suggest solutions that will help tackle these 
problems are suggested. Moreover, general issues related to banking loans are 
investigated. 
4.5.1.1 Development of Lending Activity and Loans Classification 
Loans are considered as one of the most important assets of commercial banks. The 
proportion of loans to the total assets of commercial banks has been around 40 to 70 per 
cent. The interest on these loans represents a major source of revenue for these banks. 
Bank loans can be classified in a variety of ways. One method is based on the type of 
loan contract, i. e. whether short-, medium- or long-term. The degree of security of a loan 
is another means of classification; in other words whether the loan is secured or 
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unsecured. Nonetheless, the common classification is based on the purpose of the loan. 
These include commercial, consumer, real estate or industrial purposes. 
Lending functions in commercial banks depend on several factors, including the 
character and quality of lending offices, the size of the bank, and the size of the loan 
portfolio (Reed et al., 1984) 
It is worth mentioning that a regular and consistent classification of Libyan commercial 
bank loans does not exist. This may be attributed to the structural changes that have been 
introduced to the Libyan economy in general and to the commercial banking sector in 
particular. However, the Central Bank of Libya still adopts loan classification according 
to the purpose of use of the loan. However, the period under review involves three 
phases regarding the distribution of bank loans. The first phase spanned the period 1970- 
1978 when the state introduced the socialist system, whereby from 1980 until 1984 no 
specific details exist as to the distribution of bank loans. In the second phase, however, 
commencing in 1984 until the present time, the loan policy of the CBL has been mainly 
classified according to the type of economic sectors, as shown in table 4.12. In contrast, 
commercial banks have classified their loans based on the credit instruments used, 
including overdrafts and advances, bills of discount and bills negotiated (see table 4.13). 
In order to clarify the development of banking credit with regard to commercial banks in 
Libya, measurement approaches involving loan classification and loan policies are both 
employed. As shown in tables 4.11,4.12, and 4.13 a significant and rapid growth in 
bank loans activity has taken place. This could be attributed to the significant growth in 
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banking deposits in particular and the growth of the Libyan economy in general during 
the period 1970-2000. 
As table 4.1 1 indicates, loan classification based on functional categorization relates to 
ten economic activities. Ilowever, four of these activities namely general trade, 
construction and mortgages on building, industry and vehicles and the transportation 
services absorbed nearly 71 per cent (LD 802.4 million) of the total loans provided by 
commercial banks by the end of 1979. 
Table 4.11: Banking Loan in Economic Activities During 1970 -1979 (LD million) 
General Trade 35.5 73.8 139.1 185.1 236.2 
Construction Mortgages on Buildings 22.1 70.1 281.5 279.9 356.4 
Vehicles and Transportation 8.1 9.7 27.0 24.7 34.2 
Oil 2.3 2.0 3.0 1.7 3.6 
Industry 12.0 25.9 83.0 123.4 175.5 
Private Professional 4 1 27.1 44.3 73.9 81.2 
And individual . 
Agriculture 1.9 3.2 15.5 32.2 57.7 
Hotels, Restaurants, and Clubs 3.4 3.2 3.1 3.1 11.1 
Public Utilities 2.6 2.3 10.5 8.0 7.8 
Other items 4.1 23.7 34.9 159.3 76.7 
1 Total 96.2 240.9 641.9 891.3 1040.6 
Source: Shanibiesh, (2000). 
It is noteworthy that the intention of commercial banks to offer credit for these activities 
relates to the fact that the associated economic sectors have moved fundamental 
financial liquidity which has help them to repay their loans compared with other sectors 
which depend on government support. 
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'fable 4.12: Banking Credit in Economic Sectors During 1984 -2000 (LD million) 
Petroleum 66.5 52.8 26.2 10.7 27.3 83.7 
Electricity 30.0 38.4 35.8 79.7 212.7 324.9 
Transportation and Communication 72.4 48.0 46.4 69.5 103.7 116.4 
Planning Economy - 304.0 429.7 361.0 666.5 783.4 
Industry 606.1 269.8 261.5 214.9 325.3 321.6 
Treasury 22.2 18.5 11.4 9.6 7.0 8.7 
Health * 33.0 63.8 40.6 89.0 41.7 42.9 
Agriculture 102.0 106.8 116.3 103.8 108.3 118.5 
Housing and Public Utilities** 733.2 692.7 759.3 741.4 768.0 404.6 
Pre. Sector (Previous) 383.4 395.9 409.4 389.2 513.9 373.3 
Housing loans*** u. a u. a u. a 1279.5 1326.0 1468.9 
Social loans 12.4 67.7 62.5 127.3 394.8 937.2 
Others**** 92.5 99.1 52.3 131.1 1114.1 1464.3 
Total 2153.7 2157.5 2251.4 3606.7 5609.3 6448.4 
Source: C. B. L; Economic Bulletin (different issues): * including Social Security since 1998; **= Public 
utilities; ***; **** included: Education, Creation and Vocational Training, Information and Culture, 
Tourism, and Justice Marine Wealth 
The second classification is based on economic sectors. This classification may 
emphasise the control of the government on all economic sectors, and the use of the 
banking sector as a means of channelling funds to finance specific pre-selected sectors. 
Housing loans came top of the list of economic sectors to which credit facilities were 
directed during the period 1984-2000, absorbing around LD 1469 million or 26 per cent 
of the total credit provided to by the end of 2000. Economic planning came second, 
having a share of LD 783.4 million or about 14 per cent of total credit. This figure may 
reflect the domination of the state over the trade sector, such as in prompting 
commercial banks to finance the National Marketing Company. Other sectors, such as 
electricity, industry, and public utilities, received only LD 1051.1 million or an 
equivalent of 19 per cent of total credit during 1984-2000. This is mainly ascribed to the 
tact that the government directly spends significant funds on those sectors. 
Transportation and communication, petroleum, and agriculture came at the bottom of the 
list. with a collective share of only LD 318.6 million during the period under review. 
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Fable 4.13: Growth of Banking Loan (LD in million) 
Overdraft and Bills discounted Other Loans Total 
Advances and Negotiated 
1970 S. 9 1.9 96.2 
1975 599.2 25.7 16.9 641.9 
1980 1298.0 14.8 17.3 1321.2 
1985 1942.6 5.8 84.4 2032.9 
1990 3004.8 31.7 16.8 3053.3 
1995 4162.8 72.9 45.8 4281.5 
2000 5571.3 11.9 0.8 5584.0 
Source: Central Bank of Libra; Economic Bulletin (different issues) from 1970 to 2000 
Table 4.13 shows that total hank loans increased from LD 96.2 million in 1970 to LD 
5.5 billion in 2000, with an average annual growth of 43.5 per cent. Total overdrafts and 
advances represented 89 per cent of total loans in 1970, rising to nearly 99 per cent in 
2000. This increase in overdrafts may be due to the socialist policies introduced during 
the period from 1978 until 1989. Before that time bank loans mainly concentrated on 
financing the trade sector through overdrafts or by documentary credit. Consequently, 
the ratios of bills both discounted and negotiated to total loans has been reduced to 
around I per cent during the last five years of the period under review. The reason for 
this could be government control on marketing channels and the commercial sector in 
the aftermath of the socialist policies and the subsequent abolition of the private sector 
in 1978 (Attia and ElGhumati, 1993). 
Loan policies may be defined as a group of principles and basics, set up by senior 
management as guidelines for different administration levels regarding the 
implementation of the programmes and processes of loan policy (ibid, 1993). These 
policies are described as having explicit lending policies to establish the direction and 
use of the funds from stockholders, depositors, and others, to control the composition 
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and size of the loan portfolio and to determine the general circumstances appropriate to 
making loans. Banks should have a written loan policy to provide guidance for lending 
offices and thereby establish a greater degree of uniformity in lending practice. A loan 
policy is usually affected by many factors, including bank capital, risk management, 
profitability, the fluctuation and type of deposits, and general economic conditions. 
These factors need to be considered seriously when loan policy is to be drawn up (Reed 
et al., 1984). 
4.5.1.2 The Main Features of Loan Policy of Commercial Banks in Libya 
The data associated with commercial banks in Libya published by the CBL outlines the 
main features of the loan policy of commercial banks as follows: 
1) In general, commercial banks are state-owned banks controlled by the Central 
Bank where this situation has placed commercial banks in a position of 
monopoly and resulting in poor performance. 
In Practice, the Central Bank of Libya has continued to intervene in the loan activities of 
commercial banks in several ways, including the determination of the size and types of 
loan, as well as deciding the kind of guarantees and collaterals. For instance, the Central 
Bank of Libya determined a ratio of real estate loans given by commercial banks to be 
between 5% and 7.5 % in 1989, amending this in 1990 from 7.5% to 15% of total 
deposits. Furthermore, Article 34 in Banking Law no. 1 of 1993 gives the Central Bank 
a sole right to control the banking credit by determining the percentage of each type of 
credit. 
2) In general commercial banks in Libya have no regular loan policy and follow the 
directives of the Central Bank in this respect. However, under these 
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circumstances the senior management of commercial banks have adopted 
conservative loan policies. The decision of the Central Bank to stop credit grants 
to the private sector from 1980 to 1990 thus added insult to injury. 
3) Credit to the private sector is used as a measure for judging performance as well 
as the quality of services provided by the bank. This judgment is usually made 
by comparing private sector credit to the total credit. A high ratio would usually 
indicate good performance and proper use of resources, whereas a low ratio 
would indicate poor performance and use the abuse of resources. 
Table 4.13A shows that the average loans to the private sector represented only 6% 
during the period 1990 to 2000. This ratio would reflect the fact that the banking sector 
was virtually incapable of providing credit to the private sector. Moreover, according to 
Livine (1997), this ratio was very low compared to the ratio for other developing 
countries (37%). Also, it is noteworthy that table 4.13. A, suggests that banking reforms 
have had little impact in increasing credit allocations. 
Table 4.13sß: Credit for Private Sector as Percentage of Total Credit 
fears 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
PC/TC 0.13 0.13 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.08 0.09 0.06 0.05 0.06 
Sources: Faýad, (2001) 
PC Private credit, TC = Total Credit 
Economic conditions have adversely affected commercial banking performance. After 
nationalisation in 1971, commercial banks came under direct state control (i. e. the 
General Peoples' Committee and the Central Bank). For instance, in June 1980 the 
General Peoples' Committee issued a decree offering specific loans to underperforming 
government fins. Ho\VCVCr, that decree proved to be unfortunate with regard to its 
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adverse effects on the financial status of banks and the non-performing loans it created 
for the banking sector. The domination of the state and its direct interference has greatly 
affected the commercial banking sector. Furthermore, the government liquidated most of 
these companies before making any arrangements to sort out credit with respect to 
commercial banks loans. This may confirm the idea that government intervention has 
seriously affected the banking sector. 
4.5.1.3 Non-performing Loans: Reasons, Results and Impact on Bank Credit 
As mentioned earlier in this chapter, significant changes have been introduced to 
banking loans. Also, the rate of growth of these loans has been unacceptable compared °= . 
to rates in other Arab countries. For instance, the percentage of credit to GDP in Libya 
rose from 13.1 per cent in 1975 to 24.2 per cent in 1982, while the same ratio in the 
average Arab country stood at 26 and 37 per cent in 1975 and 1982 respectively. 
Moreover, the proportion of credit to deposits in Libya increased from 60 per cent to 72 
per cent between 1987 and 1989 as shown in 4.9. The domination of the state over the 
banking sector has affected banking performance leading to many problems such as poor 
performance and the increases in the number of bad loans. 
4.5.1.3.1 Loan Problems and their Reasons 
Bad loans are considered as one of the most severe problems that Libyan commercial 
banking has been facing. In the case of Libya, non-performing loans in bank portfolios 
could not be identified easily because of inadequate accounting standards, the absence of 
auditing and the absence of guidelines from the Central Bank. The ratio of bad loans at 
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times reached 45% of total credit in some commercial banks (Bel- kaer, 1993). The 
main reasons for this may be attributed to both external and internal factors. 
The external factors include the nature of ownership of commercial banks coupled with 
the increasing levels of state intervention in banking activities. Another external factor is 
the nature of the economic system, which in 1978 underwent radical changes leading to 
the introduction of the socialist regime. Under this regime, however, the state had 
ultimate control over all economic activities. Also, under these circumstances, banks 
became less concerned about evaluating the credit conditions of their borrowers, and 
therefore no risk management techniques were applied. 
In fact government intervention in banking sector activities took place through the 
Central Bank and other governmental organisations. These organisations usually issued 
directives and instructions that influenced banking credit policies for the purpose of 
sponsoring some projects already deemed to be under-performing. However, loans given 
by Libyan commercial banks to stock companies and other governmental organisations 
were guaranteed by the Treasury, which then disavowed its commitments, leaving these 
banks to sort out the problems on their own. 
On the other hand, internal factors are mainly associated with the poor performance of 
internal control systems. These factors include inappropriate banking principles with 
regard to the granting and controlling of credit, lack of feasibility studies, insufficient 
collateral, breaches of the regulation and banking processes that organise banking credit, 
and inadequate procedures to monitor customer accounts. 
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4.5.1.3.2 Size of Non-performing Loans in Libyan Commercial Banks 
The initial appearance of significant non-performing loans in the Libyan commercial 
banking system began in the early 1980s. During 1992, the balance of non-performing 
loans in commercial banking witnessed a significant growth that exceeded LD 1.5 
billion, or about 50 per cent of total credit in some commercial banks (CBL, 1992). Due 
to the severe problems of 1995, the Central Bank for the first time issued a circular 
concerning the method of loan classification, determining loans as to type and standard. 
An amendment of loan classification was introduced in 1997, reclassifying them into 
two categories. The first category included standard facilities i. e. perfect loans, which 
imply a 1% minimum allowance ratio given that any allowance in excess of that ratio 
must win the approval of the bank's General Assembly. The second category included 
irregular facilities, which were classified into three types, i. e. substandard, doubtful, and 
bad loans, with minimum allowance ratios of 10,30, and 60 per cent respectively. 
However, in the meantime, in case the minimum ratio was not enough, commercial 
banks could exceed that ratio after consultation with the General Assembly (CBL, 
1997). 
4.5.1.3.3 The Negative Impacts of Non-performing Loans 
As a result of the significant growth of non-performing loans, Libyan commercial banks 
increased their loan allowance (for doubtful loans) by following the circulars no. 20 of 
1995 and no. 5 of 1997 containing guidelines from the Central Bank. 
Table 4.14 below shows the growth of doubtful allowances and their impact on banking 
performance. The phenomenon of the growth provision of doubtful loans emerged in the 
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mid 1980s. However, since clear loan classification by the ('BL did not exist prior to 
1995, this led commercial banks to increase their provision of non-performing loans 
depending on the circumstances of the bank, the size of the non-performing loans, and 
management policy. 
As previously mentioned the first circular from the Central Bank of Libya concerning 
the regulation of loan classification was issued in 1995 and amended in 1997. Table 4.14 
shows the growth of provision of non-performing loans and its impact on commercial 
bank performance. The credit facilities in commercial banking increased during the 
period under review, but it should be noted that the percentage of net income to assets 
and to total credit has decreased (by more than 50 per cent in some banks) from 1.3 per 
cent in 1975 to 0.5 per cent in 1998. 
Fable 4.14: I he (', i tli of Uliman&&s I cans: in 11) million 
Years Total Total of Net of Allowances `ii, of % of Net %of 
of Assets Income of Loans Allowances Income Income 
Credit 2 3 to Credit to Credit to Assets 
19Th 041.9 ') 2 3.0 12.0 b. 
1979 1040.4 2054.3 24.9 37.5 4'; 0 2.4",, 1.2'ýo 
1983 2208.1 3873.5 21.0 193.4 9% 0.9% 0.5"/0 
1987 2157.5 5246.5 36.9 435.8 20% 2% 0.7% 
1991 3152.3 6287.7 23.0 560.0 18% 0.7% 0.4% 
1995 3038.2 8931.1 36.5 642.2 21.1% 0.8% 0.4% 
1999 3746.7 10123.1 53.4 880.5 23.5% 1% 0.5% 
Source: Annual Reports of Commercial Banks from / 975-1999 
Furthermore, table 4.14 and figure 4.4 show the enormous growth of provision of non- 
performing loans in Libyan commercial banks since1975 until 1998. This rose frone LD 
6.5 million in 1975 to LD 193.4 million in 1983 and then jumped to LD 880.5 million in 
1998. 
171 
Moreover, the ratio of loan provision to the total credit increased from 1 per cent in 
1975 to 9 per cent in 1983. It stood at 20 per cent in 1987 and dropped to 18 per cent in 
1991 before rising to around 21.1 per cent and 23.5 per cent in 1995 and 1999 
respectively. It is noteworthy that the fall in the ratio of net income to total assets 
indicates a drop in the profitability of commercial banks, suggesting that it is one of the 
main impacts of the growth of non-performing loans on the performance of banks in 
Libya. 
I iowever, table 4.14 also shows that the provision of doubtful loans has increased and as 
a percentage of total credit if reached over 45 per cent, leading to a series of problems. 
The growth of non-performing loans has also affected bank profitability in two ways; 
firstly by deduction of the annual provision of loans; and secondly by the exclusion of 
added interest of loans to the total revenue and using the interest-in-suspense accounts. 













The example shown below helps to explain this impact on bank profitability. Bank A 
measured its provision of loans at LD 5 million (discount from loss and profit 
statement). The amount of interest-in-suspense of these loans was LD 13 million. In the 
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1 1, ', 1 979 1QIk 1987 1991 1995 1999 
same year the net profits made by bank A were LD 20 million. Assuming that the loans 
of bank A were performing loans, therefore their profit would have increased to LD 38 
million instead of LD 20 million. 
The problem is that non-performing loans might tend to increase if the state is unwilling 
or unable to intervene to resolve this issue. Furthermore, most of these loans were 
granted to governmental firms by government directives and/or Treasury guarantees. 
The other impact on banking performance is that it may affect banking liquidity, owing 
to the blocking of credit accounts. This might make it incumbent on banks to liquidate 
their investments. This situation could create instability within commercial banks and 
would tend to encourage them to adopt conservative policies, which would also affect 
bank profitability. In brief, this further confirms the assumption that the performance of 
commercial banks in Libya has become frustrated by the intensive control and 
intervention of the government, whereby the initial reforms stage was not sufficient. So 
this may accelerate a need for policy reform by liberating the banking sector and 
allowing it to benefit from other experience. 
4.5.2 Internal Control System in Libyan Commercial Banks 
As mentioned earlier, the importance of internal control systems has increased 
significantly across the world after the liberalisation of financial sectors. The main 
purpose of liberalisation has been to increase banking lending to private sectors, reduce 
risk taking, and reduce government intervention. 
173 
For the safety and soundness of banking operations, strong internal control systems 
have become an important tool of the banking industry. The Basle Committee (1998) 
highlighted that strong internal control systems can ensure that the objectives of banking 
institutions will be met and that they comply with law and policy, and to ensuring that 
procedures of internal control will lower the risk of uncertainty and the loss of bank 
assets. 
However, establishing a sound and appropriate internal control system in banking 
organisations is the responsibility of the regulatory and supervisory boards of directors, 
and the senior management of commercial banks. The function of the Central Bank in 
regulating and controlling the banking sector could provide an appropriate framework 
for internal control systems to secure the soundness of bank operations (GAO, 1999). 
The Board of Directors and senior management in commercial banks have the duty of 
establishing appropriate and sound internal control systems in their banks. 
Consequently the Board of Directors should make sure that top management have taken 
the necessary steps to introduce and maintain a strong internal control system. 
Nonetheless in order to achieve this, the Board of Directors needs to allow full 
managerial autonomy, without which its capabilities to lead the bank will be restricted. 
Therefore, the formation of the Board of Directors will play an important role in the 
assessment of banks regarding their aims. However, it is noteworthy that the non- 
executive members of the Board of Directors must be fewer than half of the total 
members, as a precautionary measure to prevent any attempts from the executive 
directors to dominate the board. 
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Senior management also has responsibility regarding the internal control systems. This 
responsibility is usually associated with the implementation of the directives of the 
Board of Directors. Moreover, the senior management has the duty of establishing, 
monitoring and strengthening the internal audit functions of the bank organisation. 
The Central Bank has a sole right to appoint the Board of Directors for commercial 
banks in Libya. Article 54 of the doomed banking Act no. 63 of 1971 gave the Central 
Bank the authority to appoint Boards of Directors, given the fact that both the chairman 
of the board and the general manager would be delegated as representatives of the 
Central Bank. Furthermore, the Central Bank would be represented in the General 
Assembly of commercial banking. However, this situation would undermine the 
independence of the management of commercial banks. In addition, members of the 
Board of Directors delegated by the Central Bank still keep their posts as employees of 
the latter. Hence, it can be safely maintained that the Central Bank of Libya has been 
fully involved in the management of commercial banks rather than simply regulating 
these banks (i. e. through outlining the general framework regarding issues such as 
internal control systems, credit policy, loan classification, etc). 
The domination of the Central Bank over commercial banks has created many problems, 
such as a lack of sound internal control systems which have adversely affected banking 
performance through fraud, waste of resources, mismanagement, and abuse (this is 
confirmed by the questionnaire results in chapter 6). The liability of the Board of 
Directors and senior management regarding internal control systems lies with 
establishing the internal audit functions. From reviewing the annual reports of 
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commercial banks in Libya, it is noticeable that the role of the internal audit function at 
the departmental, divisional and office levels is confined to reviewing financial 
operations only. 
The functions of internal control systems with respect to commercial banks in Libya can 
be summarised as follows: 
A) Both the processes of appointing the board of directors and bank ownership have 
been negatively influenced the effectiveness of the internal control systems, restricting 
their efficiency in the prevention and reduction of errors, rather than assisting these 
organisations in determining the various risks that will make them stop short of meeting 
their objectives. 
B) In the Libyan commercial banking system, the Board of Directors consists of five 
members, including the president of the Board who is also the general manager; the 
vice-president who is also the deputy-general manager; and three other non-executive 
members. The involvement of the chairman of the Board of Directors in the daily routine 
administrative activities by virtue of his position as general manger will greatly affect 
his performance in leading and masterminding banking policies. However, this has been 
confirmed by a study conducted by Pi and Timme (1993) who examined the impact of 
disjunction between ownership and control in US commercial banks. They found that 
banks where the positions of chairman of the board and chief executive officer (general 
manager) were held by the same person were generally less efficient. 
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C) The different styles and positions of authorities that are already responsible for audit 
functions (i. e. Inspection Department, Department of Audit, Internal Audit Office, 
Division of Internal Audit, and so on) reflect the weak role of the Central Bank in 
establishing and creating the frameworks of internal control in regulating and guiding 
commercial banks (for more details see chapter 6). 
D) The limitations of internal audit in the Libyan commercial banks in reviewing their 
financial operation are responsible for various problems in banks, such as the growth of 
non-performing loans. 
E) Senior management still fail to ensure adequate internal auditing in their banks, 
reflected by inadequate levels of staffing. An independent study found that 27 per cent 
of internal audit department staff in Libyan commercial banks are incompetent in 
running their department (the present study suggests that 50 per cent of internal auditors 
are incapable of carrying out their duties). 
In several countries a strong internal control system has been used as a firewall for banks 
against government intervention. In Libya, however, the lack or absence of internal 
control may prompt the government to intervene and influence the banking operations. 
Therefore it can be argued that the Libyan commercial banking system has been 
adversely affected by government intervention. This situation had led to unreliable credit 
policy, so that the banks would offer credit according to CBL directives, which has 
resulted in a high level of non-performing loans. Consequently, this has led to a decline 
of banking performance. In addition, during that period 1980s and 1990s the commercial 
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banking appeared to function as an official department of the CBL, hence also suffering 
from weak internal control systems. This conclusion may provide an initial answer to the 
second question of this study concerning the impact of initial reform policies on internal 
control systems in Libyan commercial banks. 
4.6 Summary 
The Libyan commercial banks have witnessed a significant transformation during the 
period under review. Despite the growth of the banking sector, its performance is still 
unacceptable compared to other developing countries. Until the year 2000, the 
commercial banking system in Libya consisted of five state-owned banks with 282 
branches and agencies mainly located in the main cities. 
After nationalisation and the Libyanisation of the banking sector, the Central Bank of 
Libya assumed control over all banking activities. It fully owned three commercial 
banks and at least 51 per cent of the shares of the remaining banks. The Central Bank 
had the power to control and regulate the banking industry in the country. In order to 
ensure its direct control it would issued directives and used moral persuasion as effective 
monetary instruments to influence the banking sector. 
However, by the end of 1988, the Libyan government took a step towards the 
liberalisation of the economy, paying special attention to the privatisation of commercial 
banks. Eventually a new banking law was issued, which allowed private banking leading 
to the establishment of 47 private banks including the Bank of Commerce and 
Development. Furthermore, the government introduced some reforms to the exchange 
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rate of the national currency against foreign currencies, so that by the end of 2002 only 
one rate would exist. 
However, the commercial banking sector has suffered from massive government 
intervention over the last three decades, leading to instability in banking performance, 
poor profitability and significant increases in non-performing loans (i. e. of over LD one 
billion at the end of 1995). Yet, during 1970-2001, the credit policy of commercial 
banks in Libya was directed towards granting loans towards pre-selected state projects; a 
situation that led to the increase in the size of non-performing loans. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES AND BANKING 
EFFICIENCY 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
To achieve the objectives of this study, appropriate methods were followed. This chapter 
examines the design and methodology of the study, justifying approach used. A brief 
definition of banking efficiency and its measurement is provided, and sources of data 
and analytical methods are discussed. 
5.2 Research Methodology 
Due to the nature of this study, both quantitative and qualitative approaches are used. 
The methodology that used in this study is mainly two main aspects: 
1) The theoretical perspective deals with several matters as follows: 
i) Material on banking institutions in general and the commercial 
banks in particular was collected from several sources, including 
publications from both the Central Bank of Libya as well as 
reports from the commercial banks. 
ii) The available literature on the subject was thoroughly 
reviewed. 
iii) The available public and private sources of statistical data 
were exploited including annual reports and monthly bulletins in 
order to analyse the theoretical aspects of commercial banking 
2) The empirical research consisted of the following: 
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i) A descriptive empirical analysis investigated the main issues using a critical, 
theoretical and statistical approach to: 
a. Examining the main features of the Libyan economy in general 
and of the financial and the banking sector in particular. 
b. Examining the growth of commercial banking by determining 
the relationship between financial and economic ratios, and also 
by comparing the Libyan banking system and systems in other 
developing countries. 
ii) The banking operations and investment activities of Libyan commercial banks 
were analysed, which also entailed the evaluation of their performance, leading to: 
a. A questionnaire design to evaluate the effectiveness of the 
internal control systems of the Libyan commercial banking sector; 
b. Establishing the DEA model in testing banking efficiency and 
the measurement of the features of quality in the Libyan banking 
sector in conjunction with financial ratios (CAMEL ratings). 
5.2.1 Questionnaire Design 
The questionnaire was designed to act as a supplement to the data already published and 
used in this study. As managerial behaviour and conduct are considered as qualitative 
variables, which are not offered, in published documents, the aim of the questionnaire 
was to discover the potential internal control systems and well be the incorporation of 
such information in order to establish a reliable measurement of efficiency. 
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The questionnaire consisted of five parts aiming to evaluate the potential of internal 
control systems in Libyan commercial banking. The questionnaire design process 
started at the middle of April 2003. To design an appropriate and effective 
questionnaire, a pilot study was conducted in both British and Libyan banks. 
A first draft of the questionnaire was reviewed by several experts and individuals 
experienced questionnaire design. A series of amendments was made following a series 
of meetings with these experts and the supervisor. 
A second draft of the questionnaire was distributed to a British bank (HSBC), as a pilot 
study. At the same time, a sample of the questionnaire was sent to two Libyan 
commercial banks (Umma Bank and Sahara Bank). The idea here was to determine the 
suitability of the questionnaire design and its content for use with the audit department 
of banks. 
The third stage was to amend the questionnaire after receiving feedback from both the 
Libyan and British banks, and discussion with the supervisor. Thereafter the final 
version of the questionnaires was prepared and sent to Libyan commercial banks. 
5.2.2 Banking Efficiency as a Basis for Establishing DEA Technique 
The changes in regulatory frameworks, advancements in technology and market 
enlargements have all imposed increasing pressure on the banking industry, making 
greater efficiency imperative within a deregulated industry (Meryem et al., 2001). 
Therefore the primary objective of measuring and evaluating the operating efficiency of 
banks is to improve performance. Furthermore, the increased efficiency of financial 
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institutions, and in particular of banking firms, could make a significant contribution 
towards the improvement of performance and quality of services as well as increasing 
the soundness of the financial sector. 
Moreover, the methods of evaluation of performance need to be linked to decision 
models in order to be able to associate the results obtained with decisions (Oral, 1986). 
This would require analytical techniques that would provide means of identifying the 
relative strengths and weaknesses of banks. The latter might be available from 
accounting and financial ratios (Oral and Yolalan, 1990). 
The use of financial ratios in measuring banking performance is becoming a common 
practice, and yet Yeh (1996) has noticed that the major shortcoming of this approach is 
its reliance on benchmark ratios. These benchmarks could be arbitrary, a fact that might 
be misleading and might cause confusion to analysts. Sherman and Gold (1985) note 
that ratios do not capture long-term performance, and aggregate many aspects of 
performance such as operations marketing, and financing. In this regard Yue (1992) 
makes two important points. The first is that any single ratio is inadequate in the context 
of multiple inputs and outputs related to different activities, resources, and 
environmental factors. Secondly, a single ratio cannot encapsulate all the relevant inputs 
and outputs into a single measure of efficiency (ibid, 1992). 
However, in recent years, there has been a trend towards measuring bank performance 
using one of the frontier analysis methods. In frontier analysis, the institutions that 
183 
perform better relative to a particular standard are separated from those that perform 
poorly by using a non-parametric parametric measurement (Sathye, 2001). 
In fact, DEA measures and financial ratios are complementary to one another, in the 
sense that each will provide a different evaluation and thus producing a more complete 
overall picture regarding institutional performance. The financial ratio attempts to 
measure financial performance, whereas the DEA measures are designed to evaluate 
operational performance (Oral et al., 1992). 
5.2.2.1 The Concept of Banking Efficiency 
In the past twenty years the banking industry had faced growing competition from other 
financial services. Moreover, the banking industry has undergone substantial 
deregulation and changes. The impact of competitive and regulatory changes on banks 
can be judged by gross measures of performance such as profitability and failure rate 
(Wheelock and Wilson, 1995). 
Yet, the whole idea of defining performance is to capture the ability of a firm to 
transform its resources to generate outcomes. The performance of a bank is generally 
conceptualised as the extent to which the bank is able to utilise its resources to generate 
business transactions. Therefore the efficiency of performance is measured by the ratio 
of outputs to inputs, where a bigger value of this ratio would indicate better performance 
(Mukherjee, et al., 2002). 
According to Wheelock and Wilson (1995): 
inefficiency implies that resources are wasted, that is that firms are producing 
less than the feasible level of output from the resources employed, or are using 
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relatively costly combinations of resources to produce a particular mix of 
products or services ". 
The need to measure the efficiency of the banking sector is important in many ways, 
including academic and policy making purposes either within the bank or elsewhere. 
Thus, the prime goal of the policy maker/manager is to create policies that improve the 
efficiency of commercial banks. 
The concept of efficiency offers different meanings amongst economists and banking 
managers. For economists, the economic efficiency of institutions consists of two 
components: price efficiency (allocative efficiency), and technical efficiency. 
Consequently, the former measures the institution's success in choosing an optimal set 
of inputs, whilst the latter measures success in producing the maximum output from a 
given input. Thus, the economic efficiency might be interpreted as success when the 
planned objectives were achieved (Farrell, 1957). To this end, efficiency in a financial 
institution should imply "improved profitability, larger amounts of funds intermediated, 
better prices and quality services for customers, and greater safety and soundness of 
savings" (Berger et al., 1993). 
Nonetheless, with regard to banking efficiency, several studies have been preoccupied 
with the estimation and evaluation of banking efficiency within the framework of their 
operating cost functions. Recent studies, which are considered to offer the most 
comprehensive definition of economic efficiency in banks, recognise that efficiency in 
banking is a combination of both technical and production efficiency (Richard and 
Villanueva, 1980). However, Richard and Villanueva (1980) define the component of 
banking efficiency as: 
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"technical efficiency relates to banks or groups of banks which provide different 
quantities of services from an identical set of measured endowments of productive 
inputs. Price or allocate efficiency recognises that different banks successes in varying 
degrees in maximizing profits i. e. in equating the value of the marginal product of each 
variable input to its price". 
The performance of organisation is often described in terms of their efficiency in using 
the available resources. Yet, efficiency in commercial banking is important for a variety 
of reasons. Firstly, efficiency measures are indicators of success, by which the 
performance of individual banks, and the industry as a whole, can be measured. Several 
studies have found that banks would be more successful in maintaining their business if 
they operated efficiently. The second reason to investigate the efficiency of commercial 
banking is the potential impact of government policies on efficiency by measuring the 
impact of regulatory changes on the efficiency of commercial banks (Wheelock and 
Wilson, 1995). Thirdly, a measure of relative efficiency provides a good indicator of the 
success of a bank in competitive markets. In addition, it also reflects the potentiality for 
the failure of banking institutions (Saha and Ravisankar, 2000; Berger et al., 1993). 
Berger et al (1993) found that, during the 1980s, high-cost banks experienced a high rate 
of failure compared to more efficient banks. Wheelock and Wilson (1995) found that, 
the less technically efficient a bank was, the greater its potential for failure. Finally, this 
technique will also help a bank in recognising its areas of inefficiency so as to devise 
suitable strategies to improve its relative position in the market. It can also provide a 
framework to regulators to assess the health of individual banks and to work out 
appropriate intervention to prevent systemic failures (Saha and Ravisankar, 2000). 
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Currently, financial ratios are often used to measure the overall financial soundness of a 
bank and the quality of its management (Yue, 1992). Most bank regulators use financial 
ratios to help them evaluate bank performances as part of the CAMEL system. However, 
even though financial ratios offer useful information, they are prone to certain drawback 
as mentioned earlier in this chapter. 
Due to the changing nature of the banking industry, which has made such evaluation 
even more difficult, there is a need for more flexible and alternative forms of financial 
analysis. Many proposals have used a variety of techniques and samples to measure 
banking efficiency. The most common techniques include: 
1) The stochastic cost frontier approach 
2) The thick frontier approach 
3) The distribution-free approach 
4) The Data Envelopment Analysis approach (Wheelock and Wilson, 1995). 
Further discussion concerning these approaches is given below. 
5.2.2.2 Data Envelopment Analysis Methodology 
Since Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) was first introduced by Charnes, Cooper, and 
Rhodes in 1978, it has been extensively applied to many areas including education, 
hospitals, markets, non-profit organisations, public sector services, universities, the 
military, and many other areas listed in the bibliography by Tavares, (2002). The extent 
and variety of these studies show that DEA has emerged as a vital and useful method for 
assessing the performance of decision-making units (DMUs), providing a relative rating 
of their performance efficiency. 
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Data Envelopment Analysis is a non-parametric methodology in which linear 
programming is used to measure the distance of individual banks from the efficient or 
best practice frontier (Wheelock, and Wilson, 1995). According to Berg et al., (1993) 
DEA is a linear programming technique for constructing a non-parametric, piecewise 
linear envelope for a set of observed outputs and inputs data. 
DEA computes a bank's efficiency in transforming inputs to outputs relative to its peers 
(Siems, 1992). In other words, DEA is a linear programming technique that produces 
best practices frontier composed of efficient decision making units (DMUs) (Stayhe, 
2000). 
DEA calculates the relative efficiency of each DMU relative to other DMUs by using 
the actual observed values for inputs and outputs of each DMU. The DMUs could be 
banks or branches of banks. The DEA measure compares each of the banks/ branches in 
the sample, to determine which of the DMUs in the sample are efficient and which are 
not. The efficiency of DMU is measured relative to all other DMUs, with the simple 
restriction that all DMUs fall on or below the efficiency frontier (Lawrence and Robert, 
1990). The most efficient units are rated with a score of one, while the less efficient 
institutions score between zero and one. However, DEA was designed specifically to 
measure relative efficiencies using multiple inputs and outputs with no prior information 
regarding which inputs and outputs are most important in determining an efficiency 
score. This analysis is concerned with understanding how each DMU is performing 
relative to others, the causes of inefficiency, and suggesting ways to raise efficiency and 
improve the performance of a DMU. In this respect, the focus of the methodology 
188 
should be on each individual DMU rather than on averages. The relative efficiency of a 
bank is defined as the ratio of its total weighted outputs to its total weighted inputs 
(Siems, 1992). 
Table 5.1: Summary of Selected of Previous Studies of commercial bank efficiency 
Author, Technique, 
Approach 
Inputs Outputs Sample 
Yue, 1992 Interest expenses Interest income, non- 60 of the 
DEA Non-interest expenses, interest income, largest 
Intermediation non-transaction deposits Total loans Missouri 
commercial 
banks 1984 
Yeh, 1996 Interest expenses Interest income, non- 6 commercial 
DEA Non-interest expenses, interest income, banks in 
Financial ratio* and total deposits Total loans Twain from 
intermediation 1981-1989 
Fixed assets, number of Loans, liquid assets, 9 banks in UK 




(Dependent variable) (Independent Variable) 19 Jordanian 
111akhamreh, 2000 ROA, Earnings per shares, Total assets, debt equity banks 1989- 
Regression stock prices, stock value ratio, GDP, No. Of shares, 1996 
Intermediation and percentage of foreign 
Financial ratio** ownership, capital labor 
ratio, retained earnings... 
Hardy and Emillia, Revenue, profit and cost Loan and advances, holding Pakistan 
2001 government securities and banking sector 
Correlation See the Article bills, cash balance with othe 1981-1997 
Cost function and banks, other investment 
financial ratio 
Drake & Hall, 2002 General administration Total loans, bills 149 Japanese 
DEA, expenses, fixed assets, discounted, liquid assets banks 1997 
Intermediation deposits and other invest in 
securities, other income 
Tsionas et al, 2003 Labor, physical capital, Loans, investments, and Greek 
DEA deposits liquid assets. commercial 
Intermediation banking sector 
1993-1998 
DEA has been previously applied to the national banking industries of different 
countries by Sherman and Gold (1985), Ferrier and Lovell (1990), Yue (1992), Berg et 
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al (1993), Wheelock and Wilson (1995), Yeh (1996), Hardy and di Patti (2001), Drake 
and Hall (2002), and Tsionas et al (2003) (see table (5.1). 
DEA represents a mathematical programming methodology that can be applied to assess 
the efficiency of a variety of institutions using a variety of data. Farrell used the 
efficiency concept for the first time in 1957. To clarify the concept of efficiency, it is 
assumed that a bank uses two input variables, I, and I' to produce a single product 0, 
give the relative input price according to the frontier F, where F maps (I, I') into F (I, I') 
= 0. This case is illustrated in figure 5.1. A bank which operates at point E is 
productively (or overall) efficient in choosing a cost minimising production process, 
given the relative input prices that are represented by the slope CC'. 









Overall efficiency can be decomposed into two components: technical efficiency and 
allocative efficiency. This study does not consider allocative efficiency, hence, 
concentrating on technical, pure technical, and scale efficiency. 
Technical efficiency is the ability of banks to use their resources efficiently and use the 
least amount of inputs matching to a given set of output levels. Alloactive efficiency 
results from employing inputs in the wrong (non-optimal) proportions and indicates the 
amount by which the actual cost deviates from the minimum cost (Tsionas et al., (2003). 
A DMU at P is alloactively inefficient in choosing an inappropriate input mix, while at 
B is both technically inefficient in the ratio DP/DB, and allocatively inefficient in the 
ratio DK/DP, because it requires an excessive amount of both inputs, I, compared with a 
a bank at P producing the same level of output, 0. 
However, a bank using more of both inputs than the combination represented by P, may 
experience increasing or decreasing returns to scale. However, in general, the technical 
efficiency ratio DP/DS may be further decomposed into scale efficiency, DP/DS and 
pure technical efficiency DS/DB with respect to point P, as shown in figure 5.1 
representing the case of constant returns to scale (Drake and Hall, 2002). 
DEA provides an alternative to extracting information from a set of observations. It is a 
procedure for relative efficiency measurement, which incorporates multiple inputs and 
outputs. It identifies the frontier by creating a piecewise linear surface which rests on top 
of observations. 
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As mentioned earlier, efficiency concept was first proposed by Farrell in (1957) as in 
the following relationship: 
Efficiency = weighted sum of outputs 
/ 
weighted sum of inputs 
which can be written as: 
Efficiency of unit J= 
U1Y1 j+ U2Y2 j +..... 1 
V1X1j+V2X2j+...... 
Where U1= weight given to output 1, Ylj = amount of input 1 from unit J, 
V l= weight given to input 1, X1j= amount of output 1 from unit J. 
Note that efficiency is usually in the range between 0 and 1. 
To avoid the problem concerning a common set of weights, an alternative model has 
been developed by Charnes, Cooper, and Rhodes (1978). They adopted different weights 
for both inputs and outputs. Consider in N units each is called a Decision Making Unit 
(DMU) that converts I inputs into J outputs, where I can be equal or smaller than J. 
To measure the efficiency of this converting process for the DMU, Charnes et al (1978) 
used the maximum of ratio of weight outputs to weight inputs for that unit. 
Max e0= UjOYýO 
/ EYE°X° (1) 
J=1 r=i 
Subject to: 
Lux EVi°X; S1 
J-1 i-I 
n=1,........... N 
V, °, Uý z0 i=1,........ I; j= 1,........ J 
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where Yj", X, are positions of known outputs and inputs of nth DMU and V° , UjO are 
the variable weights to be determined by solving problem (1). Then a value of ho is 
obtained, followed by efficiency of DM U° , and its weights. If h° =1 the DM 
U° is 
efficient, otherwise, it is inefficient. 
In order to avoid problem (1) Charnes et al, (1978) transformed the above non-linear 
programming problem into a linear one as follows: 
J 




EVl xO =1, 
I-I 
tu, 
YJn _± `Y0' 
i=1 
n =1,......... N 
U; 0 , Vi >_ ý, i=1,......... I 
Given that the number of constraint equations is larger than the number of variables in 
the primal linear programming problem, we may turn this problem into a dual problem 
(more details are given in appendix two). 
For the purpose of this study, DEA efficiency is defined as an intermediary between 
savers and borrowers. According to DEA efficiency, the scores derived in this study can 
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be divided into three categories i. e. high, medium, and low DEA for financial peer 
group analysis. 
5.2.2.3 The Main Approaches to DEA 
Over the past two decades, substantial research by financial economists in government 
and academia from all over the world has gone into evaluating the efficiency of financial 
institutions. Berger and Humphrey (1997) have conducted 130 studies applying frontier 
efficiency analysis to financial institutions in 21 countries, and 116 of these studies were 
published during the period 1992 - 97. 
At least four-frontier analysis methodologies used to compute financial institution 
efficiency, exist; and there is no agreement among researchers as to which of these 
methods is the best. The main difference between these approaches has been the way in 
which they handle random errors and their assumptions regarding the shape of the 
efficiency frontier (Barr et al., 1999). The three main parametric methodologies include 
the stochastic frontier approach (SFA), the thick frontier approach (TFA), and the 
distribution-free approach (DFA). In general, parametric approaches specify a functional 
form for the cost, profit, or production relationship among inputs, outputs, and 
environmental factors, and allow for random error (Barr et al., 1999). 
The main non-parametric approach is DEA. Originally developed by Charnes, Cooper, 
and Rhodes (1978), DEA computes the relative technical (or productive) efficiency of 
individual DMUs by using multiple inputs and multiple outputs. DEA has been proven 
to be a valuable tool for strategic policy-making and for solving operational problems, 
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particularly in the service and non-profit sectors. Its usefulness for benchmarking is 
adopted here to provide an analytical, quantitative benchmarking tool for measuring 
relative productive efficiency. Productive efficiency examines levels of inputs relative to 
levels of outputs. To become productively efficient, a firm must either maximise its 
outputs with respect to its input quantities, or minimise its inputs with respect to its 
outputs. 
This study utilises one of these approaches to measure banking efficiency as well as to 
examine the impact of government intervention on banking performance. 
5.2.2.4 Models of DEA 
Since the first study by Chames et at., (1978) DEA techniques have been applied 
broadly. The rapid development of DEA has brought with it a variety of models 
characterised by different features. Two of the basic DEA models are CCR (Charnes, 
Cooper, and Rhodes, 1978) which tends to evaluate overall efficiency, and BCC 
(Banker, Chames, and Cooper, 1984) which tends to determine pure technical efficiency 
at the given scale of operation and will identify the type of scale efficiency (either 
increasing, decreasing or constant) (Denizer et al., 2000). 
In the CCR model each input and output is weighted and the efficiency of a given DMU 
is assessed by the ratio of the aggregate weighted output to aggregate weighted input. 
The weights assigned must be between 0 and I. 
The CCR model is also known as the constant return to scale model, and it identifies 
inefficient units regardless of their scale or size. In this model, both technical and scale 
inefficiency are presented. The BCC model tends to distinguish technical inefficiencies 
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from scale inefficiencies by estimating the pure technical efficiency at the given scale 
of operation. The BCC model introduces another restriction, that of convexity, to 
envelopment requirements. This model requires that the reference point on the 
production function for DMUs will be a combination of the observed efficient DMUs. 
This is also known as variable return to scale, and this model gives the technical 
efficiency of DMUs under investigation without considering scale efficiency (Denizer et 
al., 2000). 
It is possible to create and estimate models that provide input-oriented or output-oriented 
results for both CCR (constant returns to scale) and BCC (variable returns to scale) 
envelopment. An output-oriented model tends to maximise the proportional increase in 
the output variable while remaining within the envelopment space, whereas an input- 
oriented model tends to maximise the proportional decrease in the input variables while 
remaining within the envelopment space (for further details, see appendix two). 
Farrell's measure of technical efficiency can be further decomposed into pure technical 
efficiency and scale efficiency if the assumption of constant return to scale is relaxed. 
Figure 5.2 provides a graphical illustration of the CRS and VRS frontiers. The CRS line 
represents the constant returns to scale frontier OL, while the VRS curve is the variable 
returns to scale frontier represented by the curve DFGHK. VRS tends to envelope the 
data more closely than CRS, and consequently will calculate technical efficiency scores 
as greater than or equal to CRS. 
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A bank operating at point B on figure 5.2 is technically inefficient. Technical efficiency 
(TE) is measured by the AC/AB ratio. By relaxing the constant returns to scale 
assumption, the inefficiency can be decomposed into pure technical inefficiency (PTE) 
and scale inefficiency (SE). 




The pure technical efficiency can be derived by the condition of variable retrun on scale. 
We can add: 
R 
Zar =1 r=I 
The CCR model provides valuable information about cost-benefit evaluation. We can 
calculate the pure technical efficiency score from the BCC model, and then the scale 
efficiency score can be derived from technical efficiency and pure technical efficiency 
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scores, given that the technical efficiency score is equal to multiplication of the pure 
technical efficiency and scale efficiency scores (Fare et al., 1985). 
The new measures are calculated as PTE = AF/AB and SE = AC/AF. Thus, technical 
efficiency TE can be defined as the product of pure technical efficiency (how close the 
bank is to the production frontier) and scale efficiency (how close the bank is to 
producing at optimal scale). 
Then we can determine scale efficiency by dividing the overall technical efficiency 
ratios under the constant return to scale assumption by the efficiency measures under the 
variable return to scale assumption. The value of scale efficiency is also restricted 
between zero and one (Ferner, 1994). 
BCRS 
SE, _: _ 
TE 
e, VRS PTE 
The scale efficiency measure provides information about the excessive use of inputs in 
association with operating non-optimal outputs. In other words, the source of scale 
inefficiency can be attributed to either operating under increasing returns to scale (IRS) 
or decreasing returns to scale (DRS). If SE =1 then the DMU is operating at a constant, 
which is socially and economically optimal. Increasing return to scale (IRS) exists if 
SE< 1 and decreasing return to scale (DRS) exist if SE>1. 
This study is concerned with the input-orientation under the CCR and BCC models in 
order to measure overall technical efficiency, pure technical efficiency, and scale 
efficiency with regard to the Libyan commercial banking sector. 
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5.2.2.5 Window Analysis 
DEA is initially used to analyse cross-sectional data, where a given DMU is compared 
with all other DMUs that are produced during the same period of time, hence 
neutralising the time factor. However, this can be rather misleading since a dynamic 
context may seemingly give rise to the excessive use of resources that are intended to 
produce beneficial results in future periods. As such, panel data prevail over cross- 
sectional data in that not only do they enable a DMU to be compared with other 
counterparts, but also they allow the movement of efficiency of a particular DMU to be 
tracked over a certain period of time. In so doing, panel data are more likely to reflect 
the real efficiency of a DMU (Cooper et al., 2000; and Cullinane, et al., 2004). Thus, to 
avoid these problems and to deal with a small sample of DMUs, the window analysis 
technique has been used for the purposes of this study. 
Window analysis is a DEA technique that assesses a DMU with cross-reference to 
DMUs performing in different time periods. It extends the context of evaluation and 
expands the size of the reference group. Window analysis commonly uses the sensitivity 
analysis technique in DEA, and therefore allows the assessment of the stability of 
relative efficiency scores over time. This technique was first introduced by Charnes et al. 
(1985) under the name `windows analysis' and it is used in order to provide 
discriminatory results even with a small set of DMUs. DEA window analysis works on 
the principle of moving averages, and is useful in determining the performance trends of 
a unit over time (Asmild et al., 2004). Window analysis will, in essence, treat each DMU 
as a different company so that the data on banks at different periods of time are 
incorporated into the model by treating them as if they were different banks. If a bank is 
199 
found to be DEA-efficient in one year despite the window in which it is placed, it is 
likely to be considered strongly efficient compared to its contemporaries (Webb, 2003). 
Only a handful of papers have utilized the windows approach to DEA (see Charnes et 
al., 1985; Day et al., 1994; Hartman and Storbeck, 1996; Asmild et al., 2003, and Webb, 
2003 with the last four of these studies utilizing this technique in banking). 
However, Webb (2003) emphasises the benefits of DEA windows that already 
highlighted by Hartman and Storbeck (1996), suggesting that the approach clearly lends 
itself to analysing trends over a specified time period. Hartman and Storbeck (1996), 
also pointed out that it could be used to examine the stability and other properties of the 
efficiency evaluations across, as well as within windows. According to them this can be 
done by providing a table of summary statistics, which would include the means, 
variances and ranges of the efficiency results in and between windows. Moreover, in 
their view, the DEA will be most meaningful when analysing closely homogenous firms 
operating in the same market environment. They also suggest that window analysis is 
likely to provide some evidence of the short-run evolution of efficiency for a firm over 
time. Finally, according to Charnes et al., (1985), DEA widow analysis will provide a 
test for the stability of efficiency ratings, as well as detecting the trends and seasonal 
effects in the efficiency performance of individual DMUs. 
This study will use window analysis in order to investigate trends in the efficiency of a 
small sample of five commercial banks in Libya. This following a study by Webb 
(2003), who used DEA window analysis in order to investigate the relative efficiency 
level of a large UK retail bank during the period from 1982 to 1995. 
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5.2.2.6 Some Applications of DEA in the Banking Industry 
As discussed earlier, the DEA is a linear programming technique initially used by 
Charnes, Cooper, and Rhodes (1978) to evaluate the efficiency of non-profit 
organisations. Sherman and Gold (1985) were the first to apply DEA to banking. They 
applied DEA to branches of US savings banks by using the production approach. They 
selected 17 transactions in 14 branches. The results of their study identified that six of 
the 14 branches were inefficient. Parkan (1987) applied DEA to compare the efficiencies 
of 35 branches of a major Canadian chartered bank in Calgary using 6 inputs and 6 
outputs. Since that time a number of studies have applied DEA to measure the efficiency 
of banking firms. 
Ferrier and Lovell (1990) utilized both econometric and linear programming techniques 
to measure the efficiency of 575 US banks in 1984. In order to do this they selected 
three inputs, including the total number of employees, accountancy costs, and 
expenditure on furniture, and equipment and expenditure on material. On the other hand, 
five outputs were selected including demand deposit accounts, time deposits accounts, 
the number of real estate loans, the number of instalment loans, and number of 
commercial loans. They reported relatively high technical inefficiency as well as modest 
allocative inefficiency. 
Yue (1992) examined the efficiency of 60 commercial banks in Missouri USA, by 
adopting intermediation approach. The study covered the period from 1984 to 1990, 
utilizing four inputs which were interest expenses, non-interest expenses, and transaction 
deposits, and non-transaction deposits. The three outputs included interest income, non- 
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interest income, and total loans. The findings of this study showed that pure technical 
inefficiency was the major source of the overall technical inefficiency. 
Berger et al (1993) offered the first definitive attempt to measure banking productivity 
across countries. Their study measured the banking efficiency of the three Nordic 
countries. The data of this study encompassed 779 banks (503 Finnish, 150 Norwegian, 
and 126 Swedish). The study employed two inputs (labour and capital) and three outputs 
(total deposits, total loans, and number of branches). They found that banks in Finland 
were the most efficient, followed by Norway and then Swedish banks, which were the 
least efficient of the individual countries. Comparing the best practice frontiers of the 
three countries, they found the highest share of the banking industry was in Sweden, and 
the lowest in Finland. The average Swedish bank was much more efficient than either 
the average the Finish or Norwegian banks. 
However, Zaim (1995) investigated the effects of the post-1980 financial liberalisation 
policies on the efficiency of Turkish commercial banks. The intermediation approach 
was adopted, and the four inputs selected were the total number of employees, total 
interest expenditure, depreciation expenditure, and material expenditure. The four 
outputs estimated were demand deposits, time deposits, short-term loans, and long-term 
loans were estimated. The sample in this study comprised 39 banks for 1981 and 56 
banks for 1990. The findings were based on a comparison of efficiency scores, and 
indicated that state banks appeared to be more efficient than their private counterparts. 
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Yeh (1996) applied DEA in conjunction with financial ratios to investigate the 
efficiency of six commercial banks in Taiwan over the period 1981-1989. The study 
adopted the intermediation approach using three inputs: interest expenses, non-interest 
expenses, and total deposits. The three outputs were interest income, non-interest 
income, and total loans. The results indicated that banks with high DEA scores have 
higher ratios of capital adequacy, asset quality and profitability and lower ratios in 
financial leverage and liquidity. The results of this study are used as guidelines have 
regarding the examination of efficiency of Libyan commercial banking. 
Yolalan (1996) employed financial ratios to analyse the performance of Turkish 
commercial banks over the period 1988-1995. This study used two ratios as inputs: non- 
performing loans / total assets, and non-interest expenses / total assets, and three outputs 
ratios: I) shareholders' equity + net income / total assets; non-income / total assets; 
liquid assets / total assets. The results of this study indicated that foreign banks and to a 
lesser extent private banks, were the most efficient; whereas the state-owned banks were 
the least efficient. 
In another study associated with Turkish commercial banks, Yildirim (1999) analysed 
the policy and efficiency performance of the Turkish banking sector between 1988 and 
1996, a period characterized by increasing macroeconomic instability. This study 
adopted the intermediation approach using four inputs and three outputs. The four inputs 
were demand deposits, time deposits, interest expenses, and non-interest expenses, while 
the three outputs were loans, interest income, and non-interest income. The results 
indicated that the sector did not achieve any sustained efficiency gains in the liberalised 
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era with continuing scale inefficiency. Moreover, efficient banks were more profitable 
and pure technical and scale inefficiencies were positively related to size. 
More recently, a study by Sathye (2001) measured the productive efficiency of the 
banking sector in India in 94 banks: 27 public sector, 33 private sector, and 34 foreign 
banks. The study used two models of DEA to measure the banking efficiency during 
1997-1998. The two inputs used by the first model were interest and non-interest 
expenses, whereas the outputs were net interest and non-interest income. The second 
model, on the other hand, utilised deposits and the number of staff members as inputs, 
and net loans and non-interest income as outputs. The study showed that the mean 
efficiency score of the Indian banks compared well with UK banks, while the banks of 
the public sector had a higher mean efficiency score as compared to the private and 
foreign banks of the first model. Under the second model, foreign banks were found to 
possess higher scores than private and public commercial banks in India. 
This present study has adopted the intermediation approach, since this is closely linked 
to the main objectives of the Libyan commercial banks as intermediaries. 
5.2.2.7 Advantages and Disadvantages of Using DEA Technique 
As mentioned earlier in this chapter, the common difference between parametric and 
non-parametric approaches is mainly in handling the error term. The main advantages of 
DEA can be summarised as follows: a) it deals with multiple inputs and outputs; b) it 
does not require any a priori assumptions; c) it uses data which has already been 
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published in balance sheets and income statements; and d) it has the ability to identify 
sources and amounts of inefficiency in each input and output for each entity. 
However, the principle disadvantage of DEA is that it assumes the data to be free of 
measurement errors. A second shortcoming is that it indicates relative efficiency of 
DMUs in regard to a given sample. However, it is more likely that a unit not included in 
the original sample might show a higher efficiency than the highest efficiency shown in 
that sample (Avkiran, 1999). 
In this study, overall technical, pure technical and scale efficiency of Libyan pre- and 
post-reform commercial banks in the 1990s are measured using DEA. The main reason 
for using this approach, rather than a parametric approach, was that it was originally 
developed to measure efficiency in the public non-profit rather than profit-seeking 
private sectors. Moreover, the prices of inputs and outputs related to those sectors may 
not be available or otherwise reliable. 
5.2.2.8 Selection of Inputs and Outputs 
The most important step in using DEA to examine the relative efficiency of any type of 
firm is the selection of appropriate inputs and outputs. This is a really complicated 
problem for banks because there is no agreement as to the appropriate banking inputs 
and outputs (Yue, 1992). Two kinds of application of DEA have been adopted by banks 
to justify their choice of inputs and outputs. The first is the intermediary approach that 
views banks as financial intermediaries whose primary business is to borrow funds from 
depositors and lend those funds to others for profit. In this approach loans represent 
205 
outputs, whereas the various costs such as interest expenses, labour, capital, and 
operating costs represent inputs. The second approach is the production approach, which 
considers banks as institutions that use capital and labour to produce loans and deposit 
account services. Consequently, accounts and transactions represent the outputs for these 
banks, whereas labour, capital and operating costs represent their inputs (Yue, 1992). 
Ferrier and Lovell (1990) pointed out that the production approach is preferable if one 
needs to measure cost efficiency alone. The Intermediation approach, however, is 
concerned with the overall cost of banking and is therefore preferred when measuring 
overall efficiency. 
It can be inferred that the main differences between the two approaches can be 
summarised as follows: 
1) The intermediation approach treats deposits as inputs, whereas the production 
approach teats them as outputs. 
2) The intermediation approach includes both operational and financial costs, 
whereas the production approach only includes operational costs. 
Generally speaking, due to the availability of the necessary data, most studies associated 
with banking efficiency apply the intermediation approach. 
5.2.3 Financial Ratios 
Banks have aggressively sought to improve their performance by improving cash 
management and marketing new services that attract additional funds (Sherman and 
Gold, 1985). Many economic agents are interested in measuring the performance of 
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banks. Investors, depositors, borrowers and regulators are all interested in measuring 
liquidity, deposit security, profitability and many other aspects of bank performance. 
Financial ratios represent an important tool for decision makers. By using financial 
ratios, financial managers as well as interested external parties such as investors and 
lenders are assumed to be able to evaluate a firm's financial success and its ability to 
meet its future financial obligations (Teppo et al., 1995). 
Financial ratios used here are measures both within and outside the banking industry, 
including the rate of return on assets (ROA), the rate on return equity (ROE), the ratio of 
bad debts to assets, the ratio of staff costs to assets plus liabilities, and the total costs per 
employee. 
In order to evaluate banking performance in Libya, the CAMEL rating system will be 
used. The CAMEL rating system is an internal supervisory tool for evaluating the 
soundness of financial institutions on a uniform basis and for identifying institutions that 
need a special supervisory attention or concern (FRB, 1996). The rating system can 
supply additional insight to the examiners into the effects on the productivity of a bank 
of increases in the number of problems facing banks. This knowledge can be used as a 
component in early warning systems (Brockett et al., 1997). 
The financial ratios selected for the purposes of this study are commonly used to analyse 
banking performance in many countries. The study will follow the approach used by 
Yeh (1996). He employed a CAMEL method, which used twelve financial ratios for 
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evaluating banking performance. This study, however, is based on evaluating five 
elements in relation to commercial banking in Libya, including capital adequacy, asset 
quality, management efficiency, earnings quality, and liquidity position. This rating 
system is designed to take into account and reflect all significant financial and 
operational factors used by examiners in assessing the credit banking sector's 
performance (Missouri Department, 1999). Due to the problems affecting commercial 
banks in Libya, another ratio can be added. The ratio of loan losses to total loans is used 
as a measure of non-performing loans. However, the 16 ratios selected will, therefore, 
financial indicators for judging both the financial status and the performance of the 
banking sector in Libya. A brief description of the five CAMEL rating elements requires 
an introduction to other groups of measures such as capital adequacy, asset utilisation, 
liquidity, profitability, and asset quality. 
Capital Adequacy The Basle Capital Accord defined the capital adequacy ratio as the 
ratio of total capital to the sum of credit risk and market risk. Credit and market risks are 
calculated based on risk weights of 0%, 10%, 20%, 50%, or 100%, attached to the 
various balance sheet assets. Along that scale, 0% weighting is attached to the least risky 
assets such as cash held in bank, while 100% weighting is attached to the riskiest assets 
for instance, claims on non-OECD foreign markets. The Basle Committee set a 
minimum capital adequacy ratio requirement of 8%, at least half of which must be in 
Tier 1 capital adequacy (consisting of equity and disclosed reserves). However, the 
following four ratios need to be used as capital adequacy indicators: 
1) Total deposits to total capital 
2) Total liabilities to total capital 
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3) Total capital to total loans 
4) Total capital to total assets 
Asset Quality This measure focuses on the quality of the loan portfolio and the 
provisions taken against bad debts in a way that would enable the analyst to identify the 
weaknesses and strengths regarding the bank performance. The ratio of non-performing 
loans to total loans is a good indicator of loan liquidity. Due to the nature of data, 
published by Libyan commercial banks about non-performing loans, loan loss provisions 
have been selected as an indicator of non-performing loans in the present study. Also, 
the following ratios have been selected as indicators of asset quality: 
1) Loan loss provision / Total loans 
2) Loan loss provision / Total assets 
Asset Utilisation These ratios tend to measure management ability to employ assets 
efficiently in generating revenues. Nonetheless, a higher ratio of asset utilisation may 
indicate that banks are facing high-risk taking (Yeh, 1996). In other words, these ratios 
may be good indicators in directing the management with regard to asset allocation 
processes and therefore improving the quality of bank services. The following ratios are 
selected to assess asset quality: 
1) Interest income - interest expenses / total assets 
2) Total loans / Total assets 
3) Total operating income / Total assets 
4) Total Liabilities / Total Assets 
5) Non-interest expenses / Total income 
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Earnings (profitability) Banks, like many other organisations, are driven mainly by 
the profit motive. Accordingly, profitability is an important indicator of the financial 
performance of these institutions. Therefore, profitability ratios are undoubtedly the 
most important financial ratios in financial statements. ROA and ROE are generally 
regarded as the most appropriate overall bank performance measures. As Ikhide (2000) 
points out, ROA is a positive sign of the health of a bank but it could also indicate some 
of level risk-taking. He adds that ROE is a very important ratio when analysing bank 
performance. It provides an indication of the bank's return on its capital base. A high 
ROE could be indicative of the fact that the bank's equity base could be too small 
limiting its ability for further borrowing. Most studies using net profit figure in a 
measure of profitability. As a result of low net profits in Libyan commercial banks net 
profit before tax was employed as a measure of earnings liability. The following 
financial ratios are selected as profitability indicators: 
1) Net profit before tax / Total capital (ROE) 
2) Net profit before tax / Total assets (ROA) 
3) Net profit before tax / Total operating income 
Liquidity In order to protect customer deposits against misconduct, the bank 
management should keep and maintain a certain level of liquidity, which would not 
affect the profitability of the bank. This study would suggest the following ratios to be 
used as liquidity indicators: 
1) Liquid assets / Total deposits 
2) Total loans / Total deposits 
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In regard to what has been said so far, this study aims to measure the overall technical, 
pure, and scale efficiencies using the intermediation approach and spanning the period 
1980-2000, examining balance sheets and income statements as well as other data 
related to commercial banks in Libya. The Libyan banking sector is treated as a channel 
for offering credit to pre-selected activities, and therefore, in order to measure banking 
efficiency, two scenarios will be considered. 
Scenario A: Bank inputs are: 1) interest expenses; 2) non-interest expenses, and 3) total 
deposits. These inputs represent the cost of labour, administration, equipment, and funds 
purchased for bank operations and the sources of loanable funds for investment. In this 
case the total loans represent the bank output. 
Scenario B: Bank outputs in this case are: 1) interest income, 2) non-interest income, 
and 3) total loans. These outputs represent the bank revenues and other major profit 
making activities. Banking inputs are the same as in scenario A, excluding the total 
deposits. 
This study will use the Data Envelopment Analysis technique (DEA) to measure 
banking efficiency in association with financial ratios following the CAMEL method as 
a guide in evaluating the performance of commercial banks in Libya as well as 
incorporating the findings of the questionnaire. 
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5.3 Summary 
There is no consensus on the best tools for measuring banking efficiency. However, it is 
becoming commonplace to use financial ratios as tools in evaluating bank performance. 
Although accounting and financial ratios provide important and useful information for 
benchmarking a bank's financial performance, they suffer from various limitations. This 
study employs frontier tools (DEA). Since developed by Charters, Cooper, and Roheds 
in 1978, DEA techniques have been employed broadly in different context including, 
schools, courts, water utilities, non-profit organisations. DEA is a non-parametric 
technique which calculates the relative efficiency of DMUs relative to other DMUs. The 
main advantage of this approach is that no preconceived structure is imposed on the data 
in the determining the efficiency of units. In this study, however, both techniques cross- 
sectional and window analysis are used in order to measure and evaluate banking 
performance using 16 financial ratios. 
212 
CHAPTER SIX 
EVALUATION OF THE PERFORMANCE OF 
LIBYAN COMMERCIAL BANKING: AN 
APPLICATION OF DEA 
6.1 Introduction 
The objective of this study is to measure and to explain the variation in the performance 
of commercial banks in Libya during the initial stages of the recent banking reforms. 
While many similar studies have evaluated the performance of the banking sector in 
developed countries, yet very few studies have been concerned with the developing 
countries. Particularly in Libya, there have been no studies regarding the evaluation of 
the performance of the banking system by measuring its efficiency. However, the 
country's banking system is still dominated by the public sector, despite the fact that 
with the advent of the new millennium success in the banking industry is routinely 
associated with efficiency issues. 
The main purpose of this chapter is to investigate the aspects of efficiency in the Libyan 
banking sector between 1980 and 2000. In order to do this, both cross-sectional and 
window analyse were performed on the five commercial banks operating in the country. 
The results of the analyses will be discussed following the determination of the inputs 
and outputs employed in this study. 
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6.2 Selection of Inputs and Outputs 
The selection of output and input variables is the first difficult task that must be 
addressed by any study on banking. Such selection will be influenced by the concepts 
and objectives of banking firms, as well as the purpose of the study and the availability 
of reliable information. The necessary data have been acquired from commercial banks 
over the period 1980-2000, making use of the approved balance sheets and income 
statements. 
In the process of modelling commercial bank operations it is crucial to understand the 
objectives of the banking system. This will allow the correct selection of variables to be 
used in the analysis of banking performance (Bhattacharyya et al., 1997). Commercial 
banks in Libya are treated as intermediaries with the objective of mobilising funds for 
directed lending and investment. Following the nationalisation of the banking system in 
1970, deposit mobilisation has become one of the major objectives of banking services 
in Libya, where all major banks have been persuaded to pursue this goal. Furthermore 
commercial banks have been compelled through government regulations to finance 
prioritised sectors. 
In the light of this situation two main models have been constructed. 
Using these models in a complementary manner, it has been shown that efficiency 
scores vary with changes in inputs and outputs. Model A includes three inputs: interest 
expenses (IEXS); non-interest expenses (NIEXS); and total deposits (TD). In this model 
a bank output equals its total loans (TL). However, banks are here viewed as 
organisations, which receive funds from savers, transform them into borrowers. Model 
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B, on the other hand, focuses on the capabilities of bank management in controlling 
costs and in generating revenues. In this model, four variables have been selected, i. e. 
two as inputs (IEXS and NIEXS), and two as outputs (interest income, IINCOM and 
non-interest income, NIINCOM). 
IEXS is the sum of financial expenses that include interest paid and commission paid to 
intermediaries. NIEXS includes employee salaries and benefits, administrative costs, 
taxes on income and depreciation and commission paid, banking support fund 
contribution and other non-operating costs. TD includes demand, time, and savings 
deposits. These have represented the sources of loanable funds to be invested in assets. 
In respect of deposits figures, there is no agreement between authors. Some authors 
consider deposits as outputs (Ferrier and Lovell 1990; Berg et al., 1993; and Zaim 1995. 
On the other hand some authors such as (Yue 1992; Miller and Noulas 1996; Yildirm 
2002) use deposits as inputs given that they are the sources of loanable of funds to be 
invested in assets. 
IINCOM results from summing financial income that includes interest, and commissions 
received through loans, and NIINCOM that includes income from service charges on 
deposits accounts, commission, and non-operating income and dividends, fees and other 
non-interest revenues. Together these represent the bank revenues. TL includes all 
monetary credit offered by the banking sector. This output represents a major business 
activity in the Libyan banking sector (52 per cent of total assets). 
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6.3 Strategy of Analysis 
The framework of the analysis in this study is divided into three parts. The first part 
deals with cross sectional analysis and comprises of four stages. The first stage is the 
measurement of the bank's performance. Performance is associated with the technical 
efficiency, in being able to transform multiple resources into multiple financial services, 
and technical efficiency is calculate by using data envelopment analysis under a constant 
returns to the scale (CRS) assumption. Also, pure technical efficiency is calculated 
under the assumption of variable returns to the scale (VRS). Then, we can measure scale 
efficiency by calculating the ratio CRS/VRS. Moreover, the efficiency of peer units and 
the target efficiencies of the banking sector are examined. Both scenarios will be applied 
to compare and contrast the efficiency scores in the light of changes in inputs and 
outputs. 
The second stage of the analysis employs DEA window analysis, aiming to investigate 
the level of efficiency of commercial banks in Libya (in order to cope with the small 
sample size of banks) as well as the impact of reform policies in commercial banking. 
Then the third stage is designed to examine the impact of non-performing loans on 
banking efficiency. Finally, stage four aims to determine the sources of banking 
inefficiency in the Libyan banking sector. The second part aims to measure banking 
performance by using DEA results in conjunction with financial ratios. Part three is 
conducted through an analysis of questionnaire responses, by describing the potential of 
internal audit functions, examining their components, and measuring the efficiency of 
audit functions by employing the DEA technique. 
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6.3.1 Measuring Efficiency Score 
DEA is a non-parametric technique aiming to assess the technical efficiency of decision- 
making units (DMUs). DEA allows efficiency to be measured without having to specify 
either the form of the production function or the weightings of different inputs and 
outputs used by a DMU. This gives DEA an advantage over parametric approaches. 
Moreover, the DEA model is usually applied to cross sectional data. This study focuses 
on identifying the level of technical, pure, and scale efficiency for each bank on an 
annual basis during the period from 1980 until 2000. In order to analyse Libyan 
commercial banking efficiency, the Warwick DEA software windows version 0.99 was 
used. This was developed by the Operational Research and System Group of Warwick 
University Business School. This software allows for variable weights of inputs and 
offers estimations of units in a constant returns to scale model and with variable returns 
to scale, which are useful tools in establishing the sources of scale efficiency. Besides 
this, it generates tables of efficiencies, of targets, and of peer unit groups. The constant 
returns to scale option in the package is based on Charnes, Cooper, and Roodhs, (1978) 
model (hereafter termed CCR). On the other hand the variable returns to scale option in 
this software is based on Banker, Charnes, and Cooper, (1984), (the BCC model). 
Efficiency in Libyan commercial banks appears to enjoy a steady rate of progress under 
both scenarios. Table 6.1 shows the results for a cross sectional DEA assessment over 
1980-2000 under both scenarios. The first column presents the period included in this 
study. The second column shows the overall technical efficiency scores as measured by 
CCR model; whereas the third column provides the efficiency scores under the BCC 
model. The fourth column shows the measures of scale efficiency that calculated by 
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dividing column 2 by column 3. Column five presents technical efficiency under 
scenario 2 while column six shows pure technical efficiency. Finally, column seven 
offers scale efficiency estimation under model 2. 
Under the assumption of constant returns to scale the overall average of technical 
efficiency in Libyan commercial banks in the period 1980 and 2000 is 0.854, ranging 
from 78.2 per cent in 1980 and declining sharply to 76.4 per cent in 1988. This drop may 
be attributed to instability in the Libyan macro-economy in the 1980s, as this period 
witnessed massive government intervention in all economic and financial affairs. This 
may reflect the Libyan commercial banking reducing their inputs to produce the same 
level of outputs, in order to remain efficient. Assuming input minimisation (the 
modelling option in this study), an overall TE of 85.4 % will indicate a reduction in 
inputs equivalent to 17.09 % [(1/0.854)-1], as shown in Table 6.1 and figures 6.1 and 6.2 
On the other hand under scenario 2, TE also exhibits a gradual decline between 1980 and 
1987, switching to a rise in the two subsequent years of 1989 and 1990, and then 
recording a steady rise until 2000. Banks in scenario 2 seem to be more efficient in 
controlling costs and striving towards more productivity in generating revenues. This 
result may be due to the impact of the initial reforms policy in the Libyan banking 
sector. 
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Table 6.1: Overall Performance of Libyan Commercial Banking Sector 
YEAR SCENARIO 1 SCENARIO 2 
TE PTE SE TE PTE SE 
1 (CCR) (2) BCC (3) (4) (CCR) (5) BCC 6 (7) 
1980 0.782 0.918 0.851 0.895 0.956 0.937 
1981 0.840 0.957 0.878 0.879 0.924 0.951 
1982 0.827 0.939 0.881 0.878 0.974 0.901 
1983 0.821 0.951 0.864 0.925 0.995 0.929 
1984 0.787 0.952 0.827 0.935 0.939 0.996 
1985 0.779 0.940 0.829 0.850 0.862 0.986 
1986 0.776 0.942 0.824 0.918 0.949 0.967 
1987 0.801 0.954 0.839 0.847 0.882 0.960 
1988 0.764 0.956 0.799 0.922 0.998 0.924 
1989 0.778 0.968 0.804 0.917 0.978 0.937 
1990 0.817 0.898 0.910 1.000 1.000 1.000 
1991 0.839 0.927 0.905 0.942 0.978 0.963 
1992 0.916 1.000 0.916 0.889 0.910 0.978 
1993 0.975 0.989 0.986 0.983 0.994 0.988 
1994 0.995 1.000 0.995 0.880 0.927 0.950 
1995 0.952 0.963 0.989 0.922 0.937 0.984 
1996 0.946 0.961 0.984 0.974 0.980 0.993 
1997 0.963 0.991 0.972 0.974 1.000 0.974 
1998 0.890 1.000 0.890 0.995 1.000 0.995 
1999 0.840 0.954 0.880 0.931 0.971 0.959 
2000 0.853 0.954 0.894 0.949 0.975 0.973 
AVERAGE 0.854 0.958 0.891 0.924 0.959 0.964 
Scenario 1= 3 inputs and I output 
Scenario 2=2 inputs and 2 outputs 
Figure 6.1: Average Technical, Pure and Scale Efficiency of Libyan Commercial Banking 
(1980-2000) Under scenario I 
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Figure 6.2: ANerage Technical, Pure and Scale Efficiency of Libyan Commercial Banking 
(1980-2000) under Scenario 2 
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Regarding pure technical efficiency (PTE, variable returns to scale assumption), table 
6.1 shows that the average estimates of PTE for all banks in the sample were 95.8 and 
95.9 per cent under scenarios I and 2 respectively. These figures indicate that Libyan 
banks could on average have produced the same amount of output with about 4.1 per 
cent less resources used. 
Scale efficiency is calculated by dividing the ratios of CCR by 1CC. The results are 
presented in table 6.1 and figures 6.1 and 6.2. The scale efficiency of Libyan 
commercial banks ranged from 79.9 per cent to 99.5 per cent under scenario 1 and from 
90.1 per cent to 100 per cent under scenario 2. This means that the Libyan banking 
sector suffered by as much as 20 per cent to less than 1 per cent efficiency loss in 
scenario I and from 10 per cent in scenario 2 due to scale problems. Moreover, the 
average scale efficiency of the Libyan banking sector, as shown in table 6.1, is between 
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89.1 and 96.4 per cent. This means that inefficiency due to deviations of the actual 
scale of operation from the most productive size amounts to about 21 per cent. 
From the results in table 6.1 and figures 6.1 and 6.2 it can be suggested that efficiency in 
the Libya banking sector during the period under investigation tends to represent 
misallocations of resources. For instance, the average overall efficiency score in 1988 is 
estimated at 0.764 per cent, meaning that banks on average could have produced the 
same level of output by actually using only 76.4 per cent of the inputs used. In other 
words, the average Libyan commercial banks still suffered by as much as 23.6 per cent 
technical inefficiency, due to input wastage. 
On the other hand, the efficiency ranking from scenario 2 appears to be significantly 
different from scenario 1. This may be explained by differences in the inputs/outputs 
structure of the scenarios. Scenario 2 is based on interest expenses, non-interest 
expenses, interest income, and non-interest income variables that may differ from the 
balance sheet variables. 
Table 6.2: Overall Performance in Libyan Commercial Banking 1980-2000 
Under Scenario 1 
BANK1 BANK2 BANKS BANK4 BANK5 
TE 0.992 0.684 0.703 0.968 0.925 
PTE 0.994 0.843 1.000 0.990 0.961 
SE 0.998 0.811 0.703 0.978 0.963 
Under Scenario 2 
BANKI BANK2 BANK3 BANK4 BANKS 
TE 0.756 0.992 0.984 0.992 0.895 
PTE 0.859 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.934 
SE 0.880 0.992 0.984 0.992 0.959 
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Table 6.2 provides summary results on the average efficiency scores of Libyan 
commercial banks under both scenarios. Under scenario 1, bank 2 is considered as 
having the lowest TE efficiency score relative with other banks, followed by banks 3 and 
5 respectively. In addition, Libyan banks under scenario 1 seem to be less efficient; with 
the exception of banks 1 and 4. These results indicate that commercial banks are using 
high levels of inputs to produce the required outputs. On the other hand, the efficiency 
ranking from scenario 2 appears to be significantly different from those of scenario 1. 
This may again be explained by differences in the inputs/outputs structure of the 
scenarios. From table 6.2 one can see that scenario 2 indicates a more modest 
improvement in efficiency scores than scenario 1, implying that Libyan commercial 
banks are more efficient in reducing their costs to generate revenues. To sum up, 
technical efficiency results may suggest that Libyan commercial banking can improve 
their performance and increase their outputs by 15 and 8 per cent under scenarios 1 and 
2 respectively. 
Further investigation of the use of DEA analysis can be made by analysing the full 
results for the bank with the lowest efficiency score in Libya bank 2 in 1988. The results 
for bank 2 are summarised in tables 6.3 and 6.4. From this perspective, bank 2 seems to 
be using a greater quantity of inputs than would be needed to produce the same level of 
outputs. 
The values in column two of table 6.3 show the actual inputs and outputs used for 1988. 
The third column presents the target values that bank 2 would have to achieve in order to 
be efficient. Column four shows the percentage by which bank 2 would have to improve 
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each of its inputs and outputs. As shown in table 6.3, bank 2 seems to be using a greater 
quantity of inputs than would be needed to produce the same level of output. 
Consequently, bank 2 would have to reduce all inputs in order to produce the same level 
of total loans as outputs. 
Table 63: Targets for Unit Bank 2 Efficiency 45.95% in 1988 
VARIABLE ACTUAL TARGET TO GAIN ACHIEVED 
-INEXPS 15.0 5.4 63.9% 36.1% 
-NONINEXPS 8.4 3.9 54.1% 45.9% 
-TODEPS 625.2 256.5 59.0% 41.0% 
+TOLOANS 348.3 3483 0.0% 100.0% 
In order to analyse the peer group of bank 2, which would give a better insight into the 
inefficiency of this bank, table 6.4 shows one reference bank for bank 2. Bank 1 plays a 
major role while other banks are relatively unimportant. This means that banks should 
increase their total loans by 118 per cent, reduce their interest expenses by 21 per cent 
and reduce total deposits by 11 per cent. 
Table 6.4: Peers for Unit Bank 2 Efficiency 45.95% In 1988 
BANK2 BANK! 
LAMBDA 0.518 
ACTUAL SCALE 1.127 
15.0 -INEXPS 11.8 
8.4 -NONINEXPS 8.4 
625.2 -TODEPS 558.2 
348.3 +TOLOANS 758.0 
From the above results it can be seen that overall interest expenses emerge as the 
dominant source of inefficiency across the sample. These results suggest that managers 
might use such DEA results to identify the presence of inefficiency and the specific 
areas where the inefficiencies may lie. The DEA results above also suggest alternative 
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paths to improving efficiency. For instance, bank 2 could rival bank 1 or it could aim 
for the composite input-output level suggested in table 6.4. 
6.3.2 Window Analysis 
The DEA results shown above may be subject to criticism on the grounds that the 
commercial banking sector in Libya is basically an oligopoly with only five banks 
controlling and dominating the market. To evaluate banking performance over the 
designated period (1980-2000), we need to deal with the problem of the small number of 
DMUs compared to the number of relevant inputs and outputs. To overcome this 
problem, DEA window analysis with a width of five years was used, whereby efficiency 
scores for 21 years covering the period 1980-2000 have been obtained. 
The same inputs and outputs employed in scenario 1 have been used to perform the 
window analysis (full results for each bank are presented in appendix two). However, 
throughout the designated period of 2lyears, banking reform policies were been 
introduced in the early 1990s even though the banking sector has been state-owned. For 
this reason, and in order to measure the impact of the banking reform policies on 
banking efficiency, it would be appropriate to consider three phases, i. e. 1980-1987, 
1987-1993, and 1993-2000, in the investigation of the trend of relative efficiency using 
window analysis. 
In this study, the number of commercial banks is only five (n=5, p= 21 years). To 
increase the observations to a reasonably large amount but not to over-extend the period 
beyond the realms of plausibility, a five year window (width) was chosen, i. e. w=5. 
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So, the first window includes the years 1980 through to 1984. Eventually this resulted 
in a total of 25 DMUs per window (im, = 25) and the analysis was conducted on these 25 
DMUs. The window was then shifted by one year and the analysis was performed on the 
next five year set, dropping the first year and adding a new year, so that the new window 
will include the years 1981,82,83,84, and 85. Then the next window drops the first two 
years and add another two, and so on until window 17 includes the years 1996-2000. 







w1 w2 w3 w4 w5 w6 w7 w8 w9 w10 w11 w12 w13 w14 w15 w16 w17 
From the average aggregate efficiency for each window as shown in figure 6.3, it can be 
seen that there has been a general growth in the average overall efficiency levels over 
the entire period under study. 
Window 3, covering the period 1982-1986, has showed the lowest efficiency level, 
which testities to the macroeconomic instability and the massive government 
intervention. However, window 15 shows that the average overall efficiency levels of 
the Libyan commercial banks have dropped by over 6% compared to window 14. Figure 
6.3 clearly suggests a trend in efficiency scores in Libyan commercial banks in general. 
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On the other hand, bank 2 in particular shows a decline of over 22 % from window 14 
as shown in appendix three. 
Table 6.5 exhibits the overall average efficiency scores for each bank in each window, 
clarifying the trends and indicating which banks contributed to the decline in efficiency 
levels after window 14. The banks can be categorised into two groups: i) those banks 
that maintained relatively high levels of efficiency throughout the period and only 
showing small decrease in average efficiency levels; and ii) those showing an average 
overall efficiency decline of greater than 15%. Two banks (banks 2, and 5) dominate this 
latter group. These two banks exhibited a gradual decline in average long run efficiency 
levels from window 13, in other words indicating a monotonic decrease in input 
efficiency from this window and an employment of greater levels of inputs (interest 
expenses, non-interest expenses, total deposits) per unit of output generated (total loans). 
Table 6.6 confirms the results presented in figure 6.3 and table 6.5 by reporting the 
means and variances across all windows and the greatest differences in efficiency scores 
recorded by a bank for single year, and as well as the difference between maximum and 
minimum scores from the overall evaluation of that bank. The variance of efficiency 
scores of a DMU across windows describes the stability of its performance. A larger 
value may reflect a wide performance fluctuation. The results show the relative stability 
of each bank's results and are a further indication of the efficiency and stability of bank 
1. The mean of for the entire sample of efficiency scores for bank 1 is 93.59% with a 
variance of 57.002, which is the lowest found for ay bank over the whole period. On the 
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other hand banks 2,3, and 5 show larger values of variance, which may reflect higher 
levels of fluctuation in their performance. 
To sum up, the evidence indicates that overall efficiency has grown over the period 
under study until window 13, and then a decline began in window 14, which covers the 
years 1993-1997. Furthermore, much of this lower performance can be attributed to 
banks 2,3, and S. The most consistent performance is for banks 1 and 4. More analysis 
concerning the efficiency levels of Libyan commercial banks is concluded. 
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In order to investigate the impact of the reforms policies on banking efficiency in Libyan 
commercial banks by using results obtained using DEA-window analysis, the same 
inputs and outputs were employed to which gave the results under scenario 1. Therefore, 
the entire period of study was divided into three phases pre, in, and post reforms policies. 
Table 6.7 gives a summary of efficiency scores for 1980-1987,1987-1993, and 1993- 
2000 (the period representing initial banking reforms policy) for the banks. The columns 
headed "means" are obtained by calculating the efficiency scores from the window 
analysis of individual banks under scenario 1 under the CCR model. At this point, the 
means and variances of efficiency scores pre- and post initial reforms policies for each 
Libyan commercial bank was calculated. By calculating the means and variances the 
study can identify if, on average, the efficiency scores changed prior to and after the 
initial reforms polices. Significant changes in the averages will result in drawing a clearer 
picture concerning the impact of the reforms policy on banking efficiency. 
The period 1980-1987 was characterised by high levels of government intervention, and 
by the instability of the Libyan macro economy. This may have led to the results 
showing that most of the banking sector was highly inefficient (i. e. a low average of 
efficiency scores, and high variarance of 64.098). In this period only one bank achieved 
high efficiency scores (bank 1). 
Table 6.7: Summary of Efficiency Scores for Entire Period 
Period 1980-1987 W1-W4 Period 1987-1993 W4-W10 Period 1993-2000 W10-W17 
Mean Variance Mean Variance Mean Variance 
BANK 1 96.29 2.496 93.57 5.293 91.99 6.804 
BANK 2 56.88 15.917 51.03 41.948 79.11 117.265 
BANK 3 41.58 5.347 49.35 54.887 79.86 103.525 
BANK4 89.58 7.587 98.18 9.793 99.58 0.090 
BANK 5 65.91 289.143 96.63 17.472 95.19 29.100 
vera e 70.048 64.098 77.752 25.8786 89.146 51.3568 
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The second period reveals a gradual return to privatisation and the mean value has 
increased slightly when compared to the period 1980-1987. In this period banks 4 and 5 
improved their efficiency scores, but on the other hand the efficiency scores of banks 
land 2 dropped by 3% and 6% respectively. 
The third period of 1993-2000 is regarded as the period of initial reforms in many 
sectors. The banking sector in particular witnessed the emergence of the first private 
bank in the country in 1995, followed by more than 40 domestic banks. This may be 
reflected in the increase in efficiency scores to 89.14 per cent. As individual institutions, 
only banks 2 and 3 still continued to achieve lower efficiency, which indicates that these 
banks may have had managerial problems. For example, both banks had the highest rates 
of non-performing loans of all the banks. These results may help to provide an answer to 
the main question of why the initial banking reforms did not have a high impact on 
banking efficiency during the period of study. 
6.3.3 The Impact of Non-performing Loans on Efficiency 
As mentioned earlier, the main objectives of Libyan commercial banking following the 
nationalisation programme in 1971 was mainly to offer credit for sectors chosen by 
government. However, this situation has led to the increases of loan losses (i. e. non- 
performing loans) in the balance sheets of Libyan commercial banks. This is reflected in 
the growing size and of numbers non-performing loans in the Libyan banking sector. For 
instance, the rate of allowance for loan losses exceeded 55 % in one of the Libyan banks 
as discussed in chapter 4. So, for this reason, the results for banking efficiency scores 
presented on table 6.1 are likely to be higher than the real scores, due to this exaggeration 
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caused the by ratio of non-performing loans. Here the analysis is extended to investigate 
the impact of non-performing loans on banking efficiency in this period and banking 
efficiency under scenario 1 is measured by using net loans instead of total loans (i. e. 3 
inputs and 1 output). Consequently, a comparison between both scenarios is considered 
in the remainder of this chapter. 
Table 6.8: Efficiency Scores of Libyan Commercial Banking under Scenario 1 
TOTAL LOANS NET LOANS 
Year TE PTE SE TE PTE SE 
1980 0.782 0.918 0.851 0.775 0.915 0.846 
1981 0.840 0.957 0.878 0.828 0.949 0.873 
1982 0.827 0.939 0.881 0.814 0.930 0.876 
1983 0.821 0.951 0.864 0.796 0.938 0.849 
1984 0.787 0.952 0.827 0.755 0.950 0.794 
1985 0.779 0.940 0.829 0.735 0.939 0.783 
1986 0.776 0.942 0.824 0.725 0.940 0.771 
1987 0.801 0.954 0.839 0.734 0.954 0.769 
1988 0.764 0.956 0.799 0.684 0.935 0.731 
1989 0.778 0.968 0.804 0.687 0.935 0.735 
1990 0.817 0.898 0.910 0.712 0.874 0.814 
1991 0.839 0.927 0.905 0.744 0.894 0.832 
1992 0.916 1.000 0.916 0.841 0.986 0.853 
1993 0.975 0.989 0.986 0.943 0.989 0.954 
1994 0.995 1.000 0.995 0.943 0.995 0.947 
1995 0.952 0.963 0.989 0.950 0.970 0.980 
1996 0.946 0.961 0.984 0.892 0.961 0.928 
1997 0.963 0.991 0.972 0.838 1.000 0.838 
1998 0.890 1.000 0.890 0.825 1.000 0.825 
1999 0.840 0.954 0.880 0.763 0.954 0.800 
2000 0.853 0.954 0.894 0.780 0.958 0.814 
Average 0.854 0.958 0.891 0.798 0.951 0.839 
Table 6.9: Impact of Non-performing Loans on Technical Efficiency 













TE 1: 3 input and 1 output Total Loans 
TE 2: 3 inputs and 1 output Net Loans 
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Table 6.8 presents the average technical efficiency (TE) scores under both models. From 
these results it can be seen that the efficiency of Libyan commercial banks declined from 
85.4 per cent to 79.8 per cent with an approximate 6% decline during the period under 
study. This decline can be ascribed to the growth of non-performing loans in the banking 
sector; so that consequently efficiency scores in Libyan commercial banking deteriorated 
during the 1980s. The relatively poor performance during the period from 1980 to 1992 
is then due to instability in the macro economy in general and inefficient bank 
management in particular. 
Turning to the figures for bank 1 first, it seems that efficiency was high under both 
models. Bank 2 had the lowest efficiency under both models, scoring 0.684 in model 1 
and 0.521 in model 2, as shown in table 6.9. In bank 3a similar picture emerges, with 
relatively low efficiency scores of 0.703 and 0.654 under models 12 respectively, as 
shown in table 6.9. These results reflect that banks 2 and 3 might have suffered from lack 
of efficient managerial decision-making concerning credit, leading to a high level of non- 
performing loans. 
The technical efficiency of bank 4 seems to be steady during the period of the study. It 
records on average 96 per cent, which is the second highest relative efficiency score 
found in the Libyan banking sector. In bank 5 the overall technical efficiency declined by 
7% under model 2 when using net loans as the unique output. This result may represent 
the low impact of non-performing loans on efficiency scores in this bank. 
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In the light of the above results, the management of Libyan commercial banks must be 
addressed. Growth in the size of non-performing loans in their balance sheets may have 
occurred for many reasons. Firstly, total loans in Libyan commercial banks are 
exaggerated by the ratio of non-performing loan that affect the financial positions of 
these banks. Secondly, in these circumstances efficiency scores cannot reflect their real 
performance accurately. Finally, commercial banks should clearance their balance sheets 
by cancelling bad loans in order to continue in their business. 
To sum up, a number of the commercial banks studied, and notably banks 2,3, and 5, 
may have been affected by high levels of non-performing loans over the period. 
Consequently the efficiency of most banks under study declined due to an increased ratio 
of non-performing loans. This may indicate problems in credit decisions in the banking 
sector, which may affect bank profitability in the long run. However, all banks could 
reasonably be expected to record productivity improvements over time. 
6.3.4 Sources of Inefficiency Scores of Libyan Commercial Banking 
One of the main advantages of DEA is its capability to provide information concerning 
sources of inefficiency in both outputs and inputs. This information is very important for 
managers in improving organisational performance. As Chen and Yeh (2000) point out: 
"since the technical efficiency score (TE) is the product of pure technical 
efficiency (PTE) and the scale efficiency (SE) scores, the relative size of 
these scores provide evidence as to the sources of inefficiencies ". 
In other words, pure technical inefficiency results from using more inputs than necessary 
(input waste), while scale inefficiency occurs if a bank does not operate at constant 
returns to scale. 
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As table 6.1 shows, the average SE of 0.891 is lower than the average PTE at 0.958, 
indicating that pure technical efficiency has less importance than scale efficiency as a 
source of inefficiency among all the banks. Thus it emerges that scale efficiency in 
Libyan commercial banking is a more important source of inefficiency. This may be 
attributed to under-utilisation of inputs or the incorrect selection of inputs rather than 
inappropriate returns to scale. This finding of the relative importance of scale 
inefficiency is similar to the conclusion reached by Yildirim (2002) for the Turkish 
banking sector and Katib and Matthews (1999) for Malaysian banks. 
Even if pure technical inefficiency is relatively less important, it cannot, however, be 
ignored since there still exists some degree of pure technical inefficiency. This 
information also determines the scale of operations as well as the assessment of whether 
a particular bank experiences decreasing, increasing or constant returns to scale. 
Table 6.10 Returns to Scale of Frontier Banks 
Increase Return to 
Scale IRS 
Constant Return to 
Scale (CRS) 
Decrease Return to 
Scale (DRS) 
Number of banks 70 28 7 
Percentages 67% 27% 6% 
As table 6.10 shows, only 7 banks (6%) exhibited decreasing returns to scale, meaning 
that 94% of all banks exhibit increases in constant returns to scale. Sixty-seven per cent 
of scale inefficient banks are operating with increasing returns to scale, while 27 % are 
operating with constant returns to scale. These results indicate that most of the banks 
were not operating at constant returns to scale. Our findings are similar to those of 
Fukuyama (1993) for Japanese banking, which indicated that 76% of all banks exhibit 
increasing returns to scale. 
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For bank managers, the next step is to estimate how much output could be increased if 
inefficient banks could protect the level of their inputs. This means that additional 
decreases in specific input could be achieved for a bank to operate as well as the most 
efficient banks, and increases in output could be reached at lowered levels of resource 
input. 
Figure 6.4 shows that, on average, Libyan commercial banks employed excessive 
amounts of resources for all inputs over the study period. From this figure it can be seen 
that until 1990 the percentage of over-usage of inputs increased steadily. 
Figure 6.4: Sources of Inefficiency 













This means that Libyan commercial banks were not fully efficient in the utilisation of' 
their resources. After the initial reforms policy the trend declined sharply, meaning that 
banking in Libya seems to have been less efficient in using its resources. From figure 
6.4, interest expenses are the main source of inefficiency in the Libyan banking sector. 
This may he attributed to the interest rates being set by government. To sum up, the 
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results suggest that inefficiency sources are both pure technical (operational and 
managerial) and scale (regulatory). 
6.4 Microeconomic Performance 
The evaluation of banking performance is generally based on financial statement analysis 
focusing on financial ratios dealing with asset quality, capital adequacy, earnings quality, 
liquidity, and management efficiency. In the first stage of this study a financial and 
statistical analysis of the performance of five Libyan commercial banks for the period 
1970-2001 was conducted. Based on the results from this first stage of the study, new 
samples of banks as well as a subset of financial ratios were proposed to obtain a sub- 
sample of the best possible comparable banks with the most representative banking 
performance financial ratios 
The financial statements used for the financial analysis of the performance of the Libyan 
commercial banking sector are the balance sheet and profit and loss statement. Sixteen 
financial ratios have been selected for monitoring the financial situation and performance 
of each of the banks included in this study. These ratios cover the fields of profitability, 
liquidity, management efficiency, capital adequacy, and asset quality, and are given in 
groupings based on the CAMEL rating. 
6.4.1 DEA in Conjunction with Financial Ratios- Model One 
As indicated previously, financial ratios are commonly calculated to evaluate the 
different characteristics of a bank's performance. However, this tool of analysis suffers 
from many limitations (for more details see Yeh, 1996). In order to evaluate banking 
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performance and to investigate differences in the financial performance of Libyan 
commercial banks with different efficiency scores, which have already been measured by 
DEA and exhibited in table 6.11, banks in the sample were classified into three groups; 
high, medium, and low, in accordance with their respective DEA efficiency scores. To 
achieve the objectives of this study, 16 common financial ratios were calculated in a 
similar way to Yeh's (1996) study measuring the efficiency of 6 Taiwanese banks using 
DEA technique in conjunction with 12 financial ratios. In general, the CAMEL rating is 
used to classify financial ratios into 5 groups in terms of: capital adequacy, asset utility, 
management efficiency (asset quality), earning (profitability), and liquidity position. 
Consequently, the ANOVA test was employed, because this is a statistical method, 
which has been found more appropriate in financial research to summarise and identify 
results such as those depicted in table 6.12 in conjunction with the results from the 
financial ratios. 
From table 6.11, under scenario 1 using three inputs and one output (Model One), it can 
be seen that there is a total of DEA efficiency scores (21 years *5 banks), covering the 
period under study. To discriminate among the financial conditions for Libyan 
commercial banks over years with different DEA scores, the 105 bank/year combinations 
were classified into three groups: a high DEA group between 1 to 0.99, a medium group 
between 0.98 to 0.85, and a low group of 0.84 or less. 
The second stage is to categorise the results through financial ratios by using DEA scores 
in three groups as clarified above. Then ANOVA method was to calculate the mean 
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values of the three groups, with significance judged at the 5% confidence level, as well 
as F-values and differences between groups calculated using the Scheffe test. 
6.4.2 Empirical Results from DEA in Conjunction with Financial Ratios 
The results in table 6.11 give a summary of DEA efficiency scores of Libyan commercial 
banks during the period 1980-2000 under constant returns to scale. Moreover, table 6.12 
shows the mean values of the financial ratios and the mean differences between groups. 
Table 6.11: Overall Efficiency Scores of Libyan Commercial Banks under Scenario 1 
(3 Inputs, 1 Output) 
Years BANK! BANK2 BANKS BANK4 BANKS 
1980 1.000 0.421 0.489 1.000 1.000 
1981 1.000 0.757 0.443 1.000 1.000 
1982 1.000 0.581 0.578 0.977 1.000 
1983 1.000 0.643 0.463 1.000 1.000 
1984 1.000 0.536 0.397 1.000 1.000 
1985 1.000 0.459 0.434 1.000 1.000 
1986 1.000 0.465 0.417 1.000 1.000 
1987 1.000 0.507 0.541 0.955 1.000 
1988 1.000 0.459 0.515 0.871 0.975 
1989 1.000 0.530 0.590 0.852 0.917 
1990 1.000 0.574 0.784 0.813 0.914 
1991 1.000 0.611 0.721 1.000 0.864 
1992 1.000 1.000 0.586 0.993 1.000 
1993 1.000 1.000 0.951 0.926 1.000 
1994 1.000 1.000 0.987 1.000 0.986 
1995 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.948 0.813 
1996 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.729 
1997 1.000 0.957 0.859 1.000 1.000 
1998 0.986 0.791 1.000 1.000 0.671 
1999 0.994 0.495 1.000 1.000 0.711 
2000 0.861 0.568 1.000 1.000 0.836 
AVERAGE 0.992 0.684 0.703 0.968 0.925 
As shown in table 6.12, group 1 refers to the ratio for measuring capital adequacy in 
banking organisations, including four financial ratios. Group 2 relates to the measuring 
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of loan portfolios in banking firms in order to identify the points of strengths or 
weaknesses of this portfolio, where two financial ratios were already chosen to test the 
asset quality of loans portfolios in Libyan commercial banks. Group three refers to the 
ratio of asset utilisation, which measures management efficiency in using assets to 
generate revenues. Group four refers to profitability as the most important indicator of 
the financial performance of institutions. In the Libyan case this ratio is less important, 
due to the nature of ownership in the banking sector by government, as well as the 
objectives of the banking sector in Libya as being focused on mobilising resources and to 
offer credit for pre-selected sectors. Finally the liquidity group relates to the ability of 
organizations to meet their obligations by maintaining a certain level of liquidity without 
affecting profitability. 
In order to examine the significance of these data, a post hoc test was conducted to obtain 
the Scheffe Difference so as to distinguish significant differences between the three 
groups. Consequently, the means of ratios among three DEA groups with respect to each 
other are calculated. Both ANOVA tests and Scheffe Differences are used as 
complementary tools. 
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(N=34) F-Value SIG SIG 
Scheffe 
Difference* 
EA Efficiency Scores 1-. 99 98-. 85 . 84-less Y/N 
roup 1: Capital Adequacy 
1) TC / TA 0.055 0.067 0.068 3.860 0.024 Y 1..... 3 
2) TC / TL 0.138 0.221 0.250 17.441 0.000 Y 1.... 3 
3) TLIAB / TC 2432 20.95 19.05 2.526 0.085 N 
4) TD / TC 15.67 14.57 12.14 2.660 0.075 N 
roup 2: Asset Quality 
5) NPL* */ TL 0.187 0.290 0.352 9.106 0.000 Y 1... 3 
6) NPL* */ TA 0.071 0.080 0.092 2.800 0.065 N 
roup 3: Asset Utilisations 
7) N11 / TA 0.013 0.014 0.018 3.343 0.039 Y 1... 3 
8) TL / TA 0.472 0.362 0.300 13.595 0.000 Y 1.... 3 
9) TOI / TA 0.022 0.023 0.034 10.619 0.000 Y 1.... 3,2... 3 
10)TLIAB / TA 0.945 0.934 0.938 3.802 0.026 Y 1... 3 
11) NIE / TI 0.266 0.244 0.187 6.532 0.002 Y 1... 3 
Group 4: Earrings Liability 
12) NPBT / TC 0.147 0.144 0.240 7.027 0.001 Y 1.... 3,2... 3 
13) NPBT / TA 0.004 0.004 0.008 3.726 0.027 Y 1. ... 3 
14) NP I TOI 0.146 0.245 0.282 13.840 0.000 Y 1.... 3 
Group 5: Liquidity 
15) TL / TD 0.772 0.544 0.450 16.674 0.000 Y 1.... 3 
16) LA / TD 0.430 0.415 0.399 . 791 0.456 N 
*Significant at the 0.05 level of confidence 
** Allowance loan loss 
Table 6.12 shows that there are significant differences between groups in most of the 
financial ratios at the significance level 0.05, with the exception of 2 ratios of. capital 
adequacy, one ratio in the asset quality, and one in the liquidity factor. From these results 
it appears that banks with higher scores of DEA efficiency also have higher scores in 
other ratios; two in capital adequacy, three in asset utilisation, and one in liquidity. In 
contrast they have lower ratios in asset quality, financial leverage, and all profitability 
factors. Further explanation of each factor is given below. 
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Capital Adequacy: From the results above, two measures of this factor were found to be 
not significantly different between groups. Ratio 1, total capital / total assets, presented a 
mean value of 5.5% in banks with high DEA scores, whereas it was 6.7% and 6.8% for 
medium and low groups respectively. Table 6.12 shows that for ratio 2, the high group 
has a value of 14 per cent, whereas for the low group it is 25 per cent. Ratio 3 measures 
total liabilities / total capital. The results show that the total liabilities of the banks were 
higher than their capital by 24 times in the high groups. This may indicate that Libyan 
commercial banks are dependent on their liabilities as sources of payment, rather than 
their capital. Ratio 4, total deposits / total capital, presents a higher mean value of 15.6 
per cent in the high group and 14.5 and 12.1 per cent in medium and low groups 
respectively. 
The lower results in capital adequacy reveal that banks in the high groups exhibit lower 
capitalisation ratios. This may be attributed to the ownership structure of these banks. For 
instance, 3 out of the five banks are fully owned by government and more than 50 per 
cent of the shares of the other two banks are controlled by the state. 
Asset Quality: one of the two financial ratios in measuring asset quality shows a 
significant difference between groups. As discussed earlier allowance for loan losses is 
employed in this study as an indicator to represent non-performing loans in Libyan 
commercial banking. Raito 5, non-performing loans / total loans shows that the 
proportion of non-performing loans in low groups was 35 per cent whereas in the high 
group as 19 per cent. This result indicates that non-performing loans may be the main 
problem in Libyan commercial banks. Similar findings were found for ratio 6, which 
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measures the proportion of non-performing loans as a percentage of total assets, which 
was 9.2 per cent in the low group, and 7.1 per cent in the high group. This result may 
support the argument that the banking sector in Libya suffers from the growth in non- 
performing loans due to a lack of credit policy and government intervention. This 
supports our findings concerning the main reason for the decline in banking efficiency, 
when net loans were used as the only output. 
Asset Utilisation (Management efficiency): Five measures of asset utilisation have 
shown significant differences between groups. Ratio 7, net interest income / total assets 
presents a mean value of 1.3 per cent in the high group, and 1.8 per cent in the low 
group. Total loans / total assets ratio measures the percentage of total loans to total 
assets, and the higher this measure the more important the loan portfolio is in the banking 
organisation, and the higher the efficiency of bank management in converting deposits to 
loans as the basis of the intermediation approach. Table 6.12 shows that the mean of ratio 
8 registered 47.2 per cent in the high group, and a record mean of only 30.0 per cent for 
the low group. Ratio 11, non-interest expenses / total income, measures the efficiency of 
banking management in reducing cost in order to increase revenues. From the results, it 
seems that mean of the high group at 26.2 per cent is higher than that of other groups. 
This may reflect the higher proportion of non-interest expenses in the cost structure of 
the Libyan banking sector. Moreover, it reveals that a non-interest expense is one of the 
sources of inefficiency, as already found previously. 
Earrings Liability: these ratios give insights into operating efficiency in banking 
organisations. All measures show high statistical significance at the 5 per cent level. 
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Ratio 12, net profit before tax / total capital (ROE), and ratio 13, net profit before tax / 
total assets (ROA), show lower percentages in the high groups in comparison with the 
low group. In general, this result may refer to lower profitability in Libyan commercial 
banks, which primarily focuses on the mobilisation of resources and offering credit to 
pre-selected sectors with favoured interest rates, which are already being determined by 
government. In addition, high level of non-interest expenses in the banking sector also 
affect banking profitability and efficiency. Ratio 14, net profit / total operating income, is 
the only measure among the earning factors showing a highly significant difference 
between the groups. On the other hand this ratio presents a lower mean of 14.6 per cent 
in the high group. This finding also confirms that the Libyan banking sector experienced 
low profitability during the period under study. 
Liquidity Position: Only ratio 15 shows statistical significance between groups. In both 
ratios it seems that the means of the high group were higher than those of the low group. 
Ratio 15, total loans / total deposits, measures the ability of bank management in using 
adequate policy in order to invest its resources. This shows that Libyan banks have 
higher liquidity ratios, reflecting some lack of management ability in using their 
resources. The results show that banks with high efficiency scores also show higher 
means than other groups. Ratio 16, liquid assets / total deposits measures, show that 
commercial banks in Libya have high percentages of liquid assets, confirming our 
argument that Libyan commercial banks have high liquidity ratios which recorded LD 
1323.9 million at the end of the year 2000. This figure exceeded the reserves 
requirements by 144% (CBL, 2001). This may be attributed to lack of investment 
opportunities in the Libyan market as well as managerial shortcomings. 
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From the above analysis, banks with high efficiency scores were found to be more 
effective at the managerial level. All groups (high, medium, and low) appear to have had 
a significant fraction of non-performing loans, reflecting the inadequate loan allowance 
for loan losses. This factor would seem to provide clear support for our analysis that 
Libyan commercial banking has experienced a lack of efficient loan policy due to the 
massive government intervention of the 1980s. Furthermore, the above analysis shows 
that low efficiency scores may be explained by instability in credit policy. The findings 
also confirm that the Libyan banking sector experienced low profitability during the 
period under study. 
6.5 Questionnaire Analysis 
6.5.1 Introduction 
The questionnaire study attempts to reveal information that could assist in understanding 
the ways in which the internal control systems operate in Libyan commercial banks. The 
main objective of this study is to evaluate the performance of the Libyan commercial 
banking sector. This evaluation is undertaken by measuring efficiency, examining the 
development of the Libyan banking sector, and by conducting a questionnaire survey to 
appraise the potential of internal control systems. This stage gathers information not 
offered in published documents. In order to achieve this purpose a questionnaire survey 
was conducted to understand how internal controls operated and what their role was in 
banking efficiency. 
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6.5.2 Objectives of the Questionnaire Study 
The aim of this questionnaire was to appraise the potential of the internal controls 
systems of Libyan commercial banks. The questionnaire was designed to examine the 
effective role of internal control systems as managerial tools that already exist to sustain 
bank management in meeting their objectives and goals. It was, however, also designed 
to discover senior management's role in establishing the framework for internal control 
systems in Libyan commercial banks. The questionnaire consisted of 48 questions, 
divided into the following five parts: general information, audit functions; the role of 
senior management in audit functions; the scope and limitations of internal audit 
functions; and the objectives and mechanisms of internal audit functions. 
The first part included questions concerning job title, qualification, specialisation, and 
experience in the banking and auditing fields. The second part covered a variety of issues 
such as control of internal audit functions, reporting, feedback, employee competence, 
training programmes, and adherence to and application of the international auditing 
standards. The third part deals with senior management and its relation to auditing 
functions, while the fourth part focuses on the scope of the audit function. Finally, the 
fifth section attempts to investigate the objectives and mechanisms of internal audit 
functions including a variety of questions designed to discover the quality and efficiency 
of audit functions. (For more details, see appendix four). 
The questionnaire sample consisted of 100 branches of the five Libyan commercial 
banks, representing 35 per cent of the total branches in 2000 (20 branches of each 
commercial bank). The distribution of the questionnaire was carried out with the purpose 
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of covering all levels of auditors in commercial banking; therefore, one headquarters and 
two main branches were selected for each of the five commercial banks. The remaining 
17 were taken from different branches across the country as shown in table 6.13. The 
responses to questionnaires were later collected from each bank by post or fax. The 
response rate for the questionnaires was very high and 67 completed questionnaires out 
of 100 were received from the commercial banks, as table 6.13 shows. The data was 
processed using SPSS software. 
The objectives of this questionnaire were the appraisal of the potential of internal control 
systems, and to determine their effect on efficiency and performance in Libyan 
commercial banks. The analysis of the questionnaire results was therefore divided into 
three stages. The first stage deals with a descriptive analysis of internal control functions. 
Stage two was focused on estimating the associations and correlations among important 
variables using statistical inferences, in order to the test four hypotheses regarding the 
strength of internal audit functions. Stage three attempted to measure the efficiency of 
audit functions using the DEA technique. 





Percentage return rate 
per bank 
Bankl 20 12 60 
Bank2 20 12 60 
Bank3 20 15 75 
Bank4 20 14 70 
Banks 20 14 70 
Total 100 67 67 
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6 . 5.3 Results 
6.5.3.1 Descriptive Analysis 
Descriptive statistics serve two purposes: Firstly to explore the data, and secondly to 
summarise and describe the observations. Here we started by investigating the reality of 
the internal audit functions in Libyan commercial banks by measuring frequencies and 
applying the chi-square test. Cross-tabulated data was tested with the chi-square test in 
order to examine the relationship between variables. The chi-square test allowed the 
determination of whether or not there was a statistically significant association among 
variables. As a result of the small sample size, the chi-square statistic was calculated for 
the entire sample (67 branches) while figures (6.5-6.16) are represented as the difference 
between banks in the sample. 
6.5.3.1.1 General Information 
As shown in table 6.1* (All tables with * of questionnaire data can be found in appendix 
five), 60 per cent of respondents were internal auditors, whereas 19 per cent were audit 
internal division chairmen. There were five audit department managers in the sample 
banks. The findings reveal that 10 per cent of the sample practised audit duties, although 
their job titles varied (i. e. credit division chairman, financial chairman). From figure 6.5, 
SP=0.884 higher than 0.05 indicating non-significance, meaning that we cannot reject the 
null hypothesis that job titles are equal in all banks. This may indicate a lack in internal 
audit functions, which could be to the detriment of audit functions achieving their duties. 
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Figure 6.5: Job Title of Audit Function in Libyan Commercial Banks 
QAudit Manager  Internal Audit Office director 
  Audit internal division chairman Q Internal auditor 
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Ehe questionnaire attempted to seek information on the qualifications of auditors in 
Libyan commercial banks. This may reflect the main role of educational level on internal 
audit performance. Figure 6.6 gives details of the respondents' highest qualifications (see 
table 6.2*). Surprisingly, the majority of respondents (49%) held higher diplomas. For 
instance, as individual bank the highest share were 73% and 64%o in Bank 3 and Bank 4 
respectively, while that of managers with masters degrees was 12% and 22% for other 
qualifications. The null hypotheses of equal groups of levels of higher education in the 
auditing function can be rejected since SP = 0.005 less than 0.05. This finding supports 
the idea that the internal auditors' qualifications are inappropriate in order to sustain 
them in carrying out their duties. 
248 
Figure 6.6: Higher Qualifications of Auditors in Libyan Commercial Banks 
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In terms of their experience in the auditing field, 34 per cent of the sample had less than 
3 years experience. Respondents with auditing experience between 6-9 years and over 9 
years represented 16% and 21°'o of the sample respectively. This may indicate a higher 
turnover of employees in auditing, which may affect their capabilities in conducting their 
duties as shown in table 6.3*. Figure 6.7 shows that the SP-value =0.086 (P>0.05) and 
consequently there is insufficient evidence to reject the null hypotheses that the mean of 
experience in the audit field was equal in all banks. 
Figure 6.7: Experience in Auditing Field 
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6.5.3.1.2 Audit Function 
The questionnaire design aimed to describe the characteristic of the audit function in 
Libyan commercial banks, relating to control functions, reports, training programmes, 
and employee competence, as well as their understanding and implementation of 
international auditing standards. 
Results show that the internal audit function in all banks manifested in departments as 
part of organisational structure, under general manager authority, and preparing monthly 
reports addressed to general managers in most banks of the sample. This situation may 
reduce the independence of audit functions. Responsibility for the audit function in most 
developed countries is held by the chairman of the board of directors or audit committee. 
This situation gives the audit function more independence and power than other 
management levels. 
Regarding feedback from reports, 37 per cent of respondents declared that they always 
received feedback from top management. Of the remaining 63 per cent, 27 per cent 
answered sometimes, and 33 per cent that it depended on need. This may reflect a lack of 
interest among top management concerning audit observation in its reports, as shown in 
table 6.4* and figure 6.8. The SP value of 0.045 gives sufficient evidence to reject the 
hypothesis that feedback reports from senior management in the 5 banks are equal. 
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Figure 6.8: Reports Feedback 









Employee competence is considered as one of the main strengths of internal control, 
helping banking organisations to meet their objectives. The responses concerning 
employee competence showed that 51 per cent of current auditing employees were 
thought inadequate to fulfil their duties, while 30 per cent were adequate but with 
shortages of skills. The remaining responses were that they were inadequate and must he 
developed 13`%, and 3%, were adequate to fulfil their duties, as shown in table 6.5* and 
figure 6.9. The non-significance of the SP value means that we cannot reject the null 
hypothesis that the competence of current auditing employees is uniform among the 
banks. 
Figure 6.9: Audit Employee Competence 
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Moreover, audit training programmes and auditor development is also insufficient in 
Libyan commercial banking. As table 6.6* shows, training programmes are irregular and 
inappropriate. The result from this question show that 54% of the sample declared that 
the training programmes were irregular and did not lead to improved employee 
competence. These findings also reveal that the qualities of current auditing employees 
are insufficient and that they need specific and more appropriately trainings to improve 
their competence, as shown in figure 6.9. 
Auditing like other professions, has witnessed significant development, particularly in 
the last two decades and since the last declaration from Basel Committee in 1999. 
Responses questions 2.12-2.14 showed that audit staff do not pursue, adhere to or 
implement auditing standards while during performing their duties. The results show that 
the great majority of 85 per cent did not follow international standards. A staggering 85 
per cent also did not comply with auditing standards in their practice, as shown in tables 
6.7*-6.9*. This may reflect a lack in both top management and in the Central Bank of 
Libya in establishing and imposing these developments and auditing standard in practice. 
Furthermore, it may also be attributed to the poor quality of the current auditors in 
understanding those standards. 
6.5.3.1.3 Senior Management and Audit Functions 
Establishing a sound and appropriate internal control system in banking organisations is 
the responsibility of the board of directors and senior management. Therefore, senior 
management should take the necessary steps to put in place and maintain a strong 
internal control system. The role of top management and its involvement in the audit 
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function has become very important in creating appropriate and sufficient frameworks 
for internal audit functions in banking firms. This is clear from the ever-increasing 
incidence of bank failure, the growth of competition among banking and non-banking 
organisations, as well as the increased attention given to banking efficiency in recent 
years. 
Effectiveness and clarity in the structure of organisations and additional organisational 
flow-charts are the main keys to internal audit function. Last but not least, creating a 
proper written accountancy system is a crucial principle in sustaining the audit function 
in carrying out its duties. In order to investigate these points, therefore, further questions 
were asked in the questionnaire 3.1-3.3. The findings show that all banks have clear 
organisational structures and written accountancy systems, but they did not have 
additional flow-charts. This may disrupt the performance of audit functions. So, senior 
management should avoid this weakness by preparing additional organisation flow- 
charts. 
With regard to the determination of a framework and general policies concerning internal 
audit function, figure 6.10 shows that 67 per cent of respondents said that senior 
management failed to determine the framework for audit functions in the Libyan banks. 
This may reflect the lack of attention of top management to these functions, since they 
are supposed to have full responsibility for setting up such policies. In terms of 
individual banks, the highest percentage of the respond was 83% in Bank 1, followed by 
Banks 2, and 5 with 75 per cent and 71.4 per cent respectively and Bank 4 with 64.3 per 
cent. 
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Figure 6.10: Senior Management and Determination of General Policy of Audit Function 
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Similarly it was found that senior management were not thought to prioritise the 
importance of internal audit functions. The average percentage of disagreement among 
respondents in the sample exceeded 62 per cent: highest being in Banks and Bank I with 
79`%, and 75 `%,, respectively, as shown in table 6.12* and figure 6.1 I. "There seems to be 
sufficient evidence here to support the null hypothesis of unilbrmity among banks in the 
determination of general policy concerning audit functions. 
Figure 6.11: Senior Management and Importance of Aºulit Function 
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In response to question 3.8 regarding the views of senior management on the role of 
audit functions in banking firms, 48% of sample believed that top management treated 
the audit functions as being as a matter merely of regulatory compliance. Figure 6.12 
shows the highest percentage being in Bank 4 with 64 per cent followed by Bankl, with 
58 per cent. 
Figure 6.12: Viewpoint of Senior Management about Role of Audit Function 
Q Positive factor only   Negative factor Q Regulatory compliance 
Chi-square I2.869 
tit' 0.379 
* ('hi-squ: u. r 
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With regard to the role of senior management in the evaluation of audit functions over 
the last 10 years, table 6.14* shows that respondents from tour banks did not believe that 
senior management had evaluated audit functions at all in the least 10 years. The 
percentages saying this were 71% in both Bank 5 and Bank 4, followed by Bank 2 (50 
%). This may reflect a lack of senior management concern about creating and 
maintaining strong internal audit functions in their organisations. 
6.5.3.1.4 Scope and Limitations of Audit Functions 
Part four of the questionnaire was targeted to investigating the scope and extent of 
internal audit control in Libyan commercial banks. The responses to question 4.1 show 
that all commercial banks have internal audit programmes. On the other hand, these 
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programmes mainly concentrate on documentary audit (for example 93 per cent of' audit 
programmes in Bank 5 focus on document audit). More details are given in figure 6.13 
and in table 6.15* in appendix five. 
Figure 6.13: Form of Audit Programmes 
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The results in figure 6.13 show that there is no significant statistical diftcrencc among 
banks, since SP = 0.447 (P< 0.05), so the reject null hypothesis that audit programmes 
are equal cannot be rejected. We can conclude that auditing programmes are regarded as 
less important as in developed countries. This may indicated are important limitation of 
audit functions in Libyan commercial banks. For instance, in developed countries, the 
role of audit functions have been extended to include all banking activities, using many 
programmes in order to allow banking firms to meet their objectives and to increase 
efficiency in banking organisations. 
The responses to question 4.3 regarding the sufficiency of auditing programmes in 
sustaining audit functions show that the majority of respondents believed that these 
programmes were unable to sustain the audit functions in achieving their duties, as 
shown in figure 6.14. Further details are shown in tables 6.16* and 6.22*, confirming 
that the audit functions were not thought to achieve their objectives properly. 
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Figure 6.15 shows that internal audits are thought to fail in achieving their objectives. 
The findings show that less than 27 per cent of the sample believed that internal audit 
always succeeds in achieving its duties. The highest proportion was only 3O% für Hank 5 
and 4, followed by 33% and 25% in Banks 3 and 2 respectively, as shown in figure 6.14 
and table 6.22*. In order to investigate the success of audit functions, the ('hi-square 
statistics was calculated to see if there was any association among the sample. The result 
shows a Chi-square value of 27.698 with an SP of 0.006, being les than 0.05, indicating 
rejection of the null hypothesis as shown in figure 6.15. It must be concluded that the 5 
banks have statistically different responses in terms of the achievement of internal audit 
functions. 
Figure 6.15: Achievement of Internal Audit in Libyan Commercial Banking 
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As mentioned earlier, all bank activities should be under internal auditing control to 
secure that all banking transactions are achieved adequately. For that reason, the scope of 
audit functions should be extended to cover a review of top management activities. To 
investigate this point, question 5.4 was asked. 87 per cent of respondents in Bank 3 did 
not believe that the audit function was able to review top management activities, 
followed by 79 per cent in Banks 4 and 5 (more details can be found in table 6.18* in 
appendix five). 
The results in table 6.19* confirm the argument that the reality of internal audit functions 
in Libyan commercial banking only utilises traditional tools and does not succeed ever in 
the matter of routine procedures, and that risk management is not measured. 
As G. A. O (1993) pointed out, the main responsibility of the central bank as the regulator 
and supervisor of banking organisation is to establish a sound and adequate internal 
control system by providing an appropriate framework for audit functions, in order to 
secure the soundness of banking operations. The results in table 6.21 * show that the 
Central Bank of Libya has not played its role properly in providing an appropriate 
framework for audit functions, and that has led to different frameworks for audit 
functions being established by bank managements, and hence much confusion about the 
frameworks and general policies concerning internal audit functions in commercial 
banks. 
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Figure 6.16: Reasons for Corruption and Embezzlement Cases 
Q Lack of internal control systems   Attitude of senior management Q Lack of bank regulation 
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Che results in tables 6.23*- 6.25* show the significant role of internal control functions 
in discovering cases of corruption and embezzlement. On the other hand, increases in 
such cases may reflect the lack of internal control procedures to avoid these cases rauher 
than to discover them. The results in table 6.25* confirm the lack of' internal control in 
Libyan commercial banks. Question 5.10 concerned the reasons for cases ol* corruption 
33 per cent of respondents referred to lack of' internal control, and 33 per cent of 
corruption cases were attributed to the attitudes of top management. "I he rein ainder ww ere 
explained by the lack of banking regulation, and intervention From external bodies. To 
test these results within the sample the Chi-square statistics was used in order to test null 
hypothesis (all reasons of corruption among groups are equal). The value of' SP 0.009 
(P<0.05) suggests that the null hypothesis can be rejected. This result confirms the 
present analysis that internal control systems in the Libyan commercial banking sector 
are inadequate and insufficient in carrying out its objectives as shown in figure 6.16. 
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6.5.3.2 Evaluation of Internal Control Components 
The second stage of the questionnaire analysis was based on investigating the adequacy 
of internal audit functions in Libyan commercial banks as an indicator of the strength of 
internal control systems. As mentioned earlier, any effective and adequate audit function 
is dependent on certain components, including the qualifications of internal auditors, 
auditing programmes, the role of senior management, and the scope and limitations of 
auditing procedures. Thus, these factors were examined in order to find the associations 
between them in each bank, reflecting the strength of internal audit functions. 
1) In order to investigate the qualifications of internal auditors in Libyan commercial 
banks, 4 associations were selected. In general it can be seen that the qualifications of 
internal auditors in the 5 banks were inadequate. For individual banks, banks 2,4, and 3 
offered higher quality attributes than bank 1, while bank 5 has poorer quality in the 
qualification of its internal auditors, as shown in table 6.14. 
Table 6.14: Auditor Qualifications 
Bankl Bank2 Bank3 Bank4 Bank5 
Association and correlation Chi- Square Chi-Square Chi-Square Chi-Square Chi-Square 
Education VS Employees 0.478 0.944 0.003* 0.291 0.107 
competence 
Employees competence VS 0.109 0.079 0.756 0.151 0 284 Training programmes . 
Employees competence VS 0.0* 0.0* 0.588 0.0* 0 759 Auditing programmes . 
Employees competence VS 
Adherence of international 
Auditing standard 0.632 0.029* 0.0* 0.0* 0.885 
Signhlicant at r< u. u5 commences level. 
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2) An auditing programme is an indicator of a strong auditing system and is as important 
factor allowing the audit functions to meet its objectives. This factor may include all 
processes, procedures, bylaws, organisation structures, and written auditing and 
accountancy systems. As table 6.15 shows, 6 associations were calculated, aiming to test 
the strength of internal audit functions. From the results below it can be seen that, except 
for bank 3, all banks exhibit low statistically significance. This may, once again, reflect 
the weakness of audit functions in Libyan commercial banks. 
Table 6.15: Strength of Audit Functions 
Bankl Bank2 Bank3 Bank4 BankS 
Association and Correlation Chi-square Chi-square Chi-square Chi-square Chi-square 
A style of audit function VS 0.753 0.0* 0.0* 0.727 0.0* 
Organisation Structure 
A style of audit function J'S 0.546 0.753 0.0* 0.420 0.923 
Additional organisation Charts 
A style of audit function VS 0.640 0.740 0.0* 0.001 0.588 
Written Accountancy System 
A style of audit function I'S 0.140 0.546 0.0* 0.662 0.923 Does covers all activities 
A style of audit function {'S 
Reviewing top management 0.428 0.217 0.0* 0.594 0.308 
activities 
A style of audit function T'S 0.621 0.740 0.0* 0.466 0.057 
Measuring Risk management 
3) Boards of directors and senior management have an important role in establishing and 
maintaining strong internal audit functions in banking organisations, by determining the 
framework of general policy, and evaluating and reviewing the processes of audit 
functions. This may be used as an indicator to reflect the attention top management give 
to audit functions. 
261 
Table 6.16 shows that those 5 relationships were calculated in terms of testing the 
attention of senior management given to internal audit functions. The results show that 
only bank 1 has high significance for all 5 relationships, while bank 5 shows not 
significance. This result may reflect a lack of interest among senior management in audit 
functions. 
Table 6.16: Attention From Senior Management 
Bankl Bank2 Bank3 Bank4 Banks 
Association and Correlation Chi-square Chi-square Chi-square Chi-square Chi-square 
Who control VS 0.0* 0.179 0.138 0.021 * 0.281 Feed back form these reports 
Who control VS 
Determination policies by top 0.0* 0.632 0.635 0.025* 0.229 
management 
Who control VS 0.0* 0.325 0.002 0.069 0.849 
importance of audit f unction 
Who control VS 
Point of view of top management 0.0* 0.073 0.238 0.082 0.737 
for audit role 
Who control VS 0.0* 0.223 0.115 0.195 0.095 
Evaluation of audit function 
4) Finally, the effectiveness of audit functions is tested by measuring their achievements. 
Eight associations were used in order to judge internal audit function and their 
achievement of their duties. From the results shown in table 6.17, it can be seen that bank 
3 has high significance while bank 1 shows poor performance in terms of audit functions 
and achievements. The remaining of banks are significantly lower in fulfil their duties. 
This may be attributed to a lack of internal audit function in Libyan commercial banking. 
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Table 6.17: Audit Function and Achievement Its Duties 
Bankl Bank2 Bank 3 Bank 4 Bank 5 
Association and Correlation Chi-Square Chi-Square Chi-Square Chi-Square Chi-Square 
Auditing achievement VS 0.104 0.424 0.005* 0.019* 0.406 
Scope of auditing 
Auditing achievement VS 0.478 0.084 0.566 0.133 0.713 
Measuring Risk management 
Auditing achievement VS 0.564 0.206 0.044* 0.026* 0.713 
Discovering corruption cases 
Auditing achievement VS 0.231 0.0* 0.0* 0.014* 0.0* 
Organisation structure 
Auditing achievement ['S 0.478 0.632 0.002* 0.139 0.668 
Written accountancy 
Auditing achievement VS 
Pursuit international 0.478 0.027* 0.0* 0.081 0.850 
development 
Auditing achievement VS 
Adherence Intern- Auditing 0.231 0.274 0.0* 0.488 0.025* 
standard 
Auditing achievement VS 0.542 0.014* 0.543 0.0* 0.118 
Training programmes 
To conclude, the results in tables 6.14 to 6.17 reveal that the current internal control 
systems in Libyan commercial banks are insufficient to sustain bank management in 
meeting its objectives. 
6.5.3.3 Measuring the Efficiency of Internal Audit Functions 
As mentioned previously, some managerial factors cannot be evaluated by using data 
offered in balance sheets and income statements. Therefore, the questionnaires were used 
in order to appraise internal controls systems. This analysis is divided into three stages. 
The first stage considers and describes the aims in order to highlight the reality of 
internal auditing functions used in Libyan commercial banks. The second stage examines 
the components of internal audit functions as complementary to the descriptive analysis. 
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To complete the analysis, the performance of internal audit functions is examined by 
using the DEA technique. The average DEA efficiency score as shown in table 6.1 was 
used as a comparison with the DEA efficiency score in audit functions. The aims of this 
stage are therefore as follows. Firstly, the DEA technique is used for measuring and 
evaluating the performance of audit functions in the Libyan banking sector. Secondly, it 
provides a basis for assessing the performance of audit functions in the commercial 
banking sector to aid in comparative and efficiency evaluations. Finally, it investigates 
how DEA results can be interpreted and used in the management context. 
Prior to carrying out this stage, it is necessary to define efficiency in terms of audit 
functions. Lampe and Sutton (1991) point out that 
"Internal audit productivity is dependent on systemic conversion of 
inputs measured in terms of resource efficiency to outputs measured 
in terms of goal effectiveness by the system of internal auditing 
under consideration ". 
They add that this "effectiveness" concept is based on focusing on the degree to which 
the goals and objectives of the audit process are clearly stated and accomplished. 
The function of an internal audit has developed as a substantial element of management 
in both the private and public sectors. Due to its importance and its crucial role in 
management processes, it is thus essential that action be taken to ensure that the 
performance of internal audit functions reaches high quality standards. Here we focus on 
the measurement of the effectiveness of internal audit function in Libyan commercial 
banks in helping to ensure the achievement of the banking sectors' goals and objectives. 
It is assumed that measuring the performance of internal audit functions represents an 
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examination of the role of the internal audit in encouraging bank management to meet its 
objectives. 
A search of the literature on internal auditing indicated that, with a few notable 
exceptions, little work had been done on the development of performance measures. Data 
envelopment analysis is a technique based on mathematical programming designed to 
address complex interactions and relationship between input and output variables when 
the relations between these variables are unknown or difficult to identify (Charens et al., 
1989). 
As mentioned earlier, one of the main and somewhat difficult issues in using DEA 
techniques is how to select input and output variables. This is even more difficult in this 
study with regard to the questionnaire design. To overcome this problem, the analysis 
below uses a statistical approach by using the means of input and output variables in 
order to measure the efficiency of audit functions. 
Three factors from the questionnaire results are used as inputs, and two factors as outputs 
by calculating the means of these factors in order to transform the responses from 
qualitative to quantitative data. In order to measure the efficiency of audit functions in 
Libyan commercial banks, we used three inputs: (i) experience in the auditing field 
(EA), (ii) higher qualifications of auditors in Libyan commercial banks (QA), and (iii) 
the current competence of audit employees (CAE). Two outputs were used: (i) auditing 
reports (AR), and (ii) discovering cases of corruption (NCC). 
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6.5.3.3.1 Empirical Results 
From table 6.18 it can be seen that banks were grouped in accordance with their 
efficiency scores under audit performance. Banks 3 and 4 were the most efficient banks 
in the sample, followed by bank 1 (90.0 %), while the less efficient were banks 5 and 2, 
recording efficiency scores of 80.4% and 81.4`%, respectively. 
Table 6.18: Efficiency Scores of Libyan Commercial Banks 
Bankl Bank 2 Bank 3 Bank 4 Bank 5 
Efficiency Performance* 99.2 68.40 70.30 96.80 92.5 
Efficiency of Audit Function 89.97 81.41 100.00 100.00 80.41 
*Efficiency score quoted from table 6.1 












These results indicate that internal audit functions in banks 5,1 and 2 are less efficient in 
comparison with banks 3 and 4 in achieving their objectives. This indicates a failure of 
internal audit in sustaining bank management to meet their objectives. On the other hand 
banks with highly efficient audits also have high scores in technical efficiency. This 
might support our assumption that internal audit functions play an important and crucial 
role in helping banking organisations to achieve their objectives. 
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6.6 Summary 
This chapter has been devoted to measuring and examining efficiency in Libyan 
commercial banks during the period 1980-2000. The analytical strategy was to divide the 
process into three stages. The first stage was based on measuring banking efficiency 
including overall technical efficiency, pure technical efficiency, and scale efficiency, by 
using both cross sectional and window analysis. The second stage to measured efficiency 
scores in conjunctions with financial ratios. The final stage was dedicated to a 
questionnaire study appraising the potential of internal control systems in Libyan 
commercial banks. This stage was itself divided into three areas: descriptive analysis, 
examination of the strengths of internal audit components, and finally the measurement 
of all efficiency of internal audit functions by using the DEA technique. 
In order to examine Libyan banking sector efficiency, two approaches were used: cross 
sectional and window analysis. Under the cross sectional approach, two scenarios were 
used. The first scenario three inputs were selected; interest expenses, non-interest 
expenses, and total deposits to produce one output total loans. The results suggest that 
the range of overall technical efficiency was between 76.4% and 99.5%. The results 
show that for the entire period the banking sector in Libya suffered from scale 
inefficiency. This means that most Libyan commercial banks did not operate at constant 
returns to scale and that technical inefficiency was the main contribution to scale 
inefficiency. The second scenario attempted to examine the capability of managers to 
reduce costs and generate profits. However, the results show that efficiency scores were 
higher under scenario 1. 
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On the other hand, in the window analysis, the efficiency levels of the Libyan 
commercial banks reveals that there has been a general trend in average overall 
efficiency levels over the period under study from 73.5 per cent in window 3 the highest 
level of 93.24 per cent in window 14, and then down to 85.78 per cent in window 17. 
In order to examine the impact of reforms policy on banking efficiency by using the 
window analysis approach, the period of study was divided into three sub-periods. The 
results indicate that the banking efficiency score was lowest at 70 per cent for the first 
sub-period, which is characterised as involving severe government intervention. 
Efficiency score increased by the third sub-period to a record of 89.15 per cent indicating 
a rather a small impact of reforms policy on banking efficiency. 
Considering the size of non-performing loans, scenario three was employed in order to 
investigate the impact of non-performing loans on banking efficiency. The results reveal 
that efficiency scores declined slightly due to non-performing loans, from 85.4 per cent 
to 79.8 per cent. 
To avoid the caveats of the DEA technique, DEA scores were combined with the results 
of 16 financial ratios. This stage of the analysis aimed to classify banks into three groups 
of high, medium, and low efficiency in accordance with their DEA efficiency scores. The 
findings suggest that banks with higher scores in DEA efficiency also have higher ratios 
in capital adequacy, assets utilisation, and liquidity. In contrast, they have lower ratios in 
asset quality and profitability. Moreover, all groups appear to have had a significant 
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fraction of non-performing loans, reflecting the inadequacy of credit policy in Libyan 
commercial banks due to the government intervention of the 1980s. 
Stage three was dedicated to a questionnaire survey examining managerial aspects. In 
terms of descriptive analysis, the findings suggest that internal audit function seems to be 
weak in all commercial banks. For instance, the results show that 49 per cent of auditors 
in the sample only held higher diplomas, reflecting low qualifications. Furthermore, 34 
per cent declared their experience had lasted for less than 3 years, and 51 per cent from 
current audit employees were said to be inadequate in following their duties. Moreover, 
the questionnaire analysis reveals a lack of attention from top management to internal 
audit functions. For example, 48 per cent of respondents believed that the viewpoint of 
senior management towards audit function only relates to regulatory compliance. The 
findings reflect a lack of audit function' capabilities in meeting their aims. For instance, 
internal audit functions do not cover all bank activities, and particularly top management 
activities. In addition, audits functions are still dependent on documentary audit rather 
than using comprehensive audits similar to those in developed countries. 
The second stage of the questionnaire analysis focused an examination the component of 
audit functions. Four groups were used, and the results reveal a lack of internal audit 
functions, supporting the hypothesis that audit function are unable to sustain bank 
management in meeting their objectives and in increasing productivity and efficiency in 
banking organisations. 
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Finally, in the third stage, audit efficiency was measured by using DEA technique. 
Results suggest that banks with higher DEA efficiency scores in banking performance 
also exhibit higher efficiency. 
To sum up, it can be seen that the findings in this chapter should be treated as particularly 
useful for the Central Bank of Libya (CBL) and bank managers. The CBL can benefit 
from these results by choosing appropriate approaches in the bank regulation and 
supervision in order to increase efficiency in the Libyan banking sector, as well as to 
recognise the weaknesses of commercial banks in particular, and in the banking sector in 
general. For managers, these results point to effective tools in order to identify the main 
problems that may affect banking performance and audit functions. Moreover, these 




CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDIATION 
1.7 Summary and Conclusions 
This study has examined the behaviour of the banking sector in Libya from 1970 to 
2001, a period characterised by government control over the banking activities. During 
this period commercial banks in Libya witnessed fundamental changes and challenges, 
including Libyanisation and the nationalisation programmes, leading to the abolition of 
the private sector in 1978. These events affected the behaviour and performance of the 
banking sector in various ways. Therefore, the objectives of this study mainly focus on 
evaluating the performance of the banking sector, in order to highlight the main problems 
associated with commercial banks in Libya. 
For an overview of the Libyan economy, chapter two reviewed the economic situation 
from 1951 until now, highlighting the main features of the Libyan economy and their 
influence on the banking sector. 
In the early twentieth century, the Libyan economy depended on agricultural resources 
including barley, wheat, and dates, in addition to production in some basic industries 
such as shipbuilding and handicrafts. At that time Libya was an Italian colony and it can 
be seen that the monetary system and banking sector were integrated into the Italian 
banking system. By 1945 the Libyan banking sector and monetary system had broken 
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down, and all Italian banks closed. Consequently, Barclays Bank became the only 
operating in the field of monetary and banking business. As a result of this situation, 
various currencies circulated in the country, such as the Egyptian pound, French franc, 
Italian lire, and Military Authority lire. 
This situation has been significantly changed since oil was discovered in commercial 
quantities. The country has moved from a deficit to a surplus economy. Consequently the 
GDP and per capita income increased. In addition, oil exportation has provided Libya 
with considerable foreign currency, which affected the Libyan banking sector leading to 
the availability of credit. 
Oil revenues have given the Libyan government enough funds to enable it to play a 
major role with regard to the development plans. This encouraged the Libyan 
government to establish an independent monetary authority, taking advantage of the new 
economic situation following the oil discovery. Initially, banking law No. 4 of 1963 was 
issued in order to establish a Libyan banking sector. Subsequently the government 
introduced a programme of Libyanisation aiming to encourage the contribution of the 
local people to the banking sector to become at least 51% for Libyan investors and 49% 
for foreign investors. This process was completed in 1969 when the new government 
introduced both the nationalisation and Libyanisation programmes, establishing the 
Central Bank of Libya and five commercial banks, and other specialist government- 
owned banks. The objectives and goals of these banks were determined by general 
government policies on the one hand, and by the requirements of the development plans 
on the other hand. These events have affected banking performance. For instance, banks 
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became channels to offer credit to the public sector at specified interest rates. However, 
in the late 1978 the economic system in Libya was transformed from a capitalist to a 
socialist system, which affected the banking sector in a sense that its resources mainly 
became part of the government funds, under the control of the public sector, forcing 
commercial banks to establish joint companies in order to participate in the process of 
economic growth without feasibility studies. 
In addition, banking credit policy was expanded to encompass various sectors of the 
national economy, in order to direct the ever-increasing potentialities of commercial 
banks in the best interests of the national economy. So, for the first time, the services of 
commercial banks were extended to cover real estate loans to lower and medium income 
groups under certain conditions. In general, loans, advances and overdrafts were the most 
important components of total credit with respect to commercial banks in Libya, as these 
are the highest income yielding assets necessary for the banks to meet their investment 
financing requirements and the current expenditure of the productive system. During that 
time, the primary role of the banking system was to channel funds to other sectors, given 
the fact that efficiency and profitability were not being among the top priorities. 
However, in response to the privatisation laws in the early 1990s, the Libyan government 
undertook steps to liberalise the financial system. The key step has been the 
promulgating of the new banking law No: 1 of 1993, which allowed private banks to be 
established. Hence, the first time since the nationalisation of the banking sector in the 
country, a private bank was opened in 1995, followed by 47 domestic Banks established 
between 1997 and 2001. 
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However, by the year 2000, there were 57 banks operating in the Libyan banking sector. 
Of these, of which 5 commercial banks were fully state-owned, and 47 domestic banks 
(Al-massarf Al-Ahley) opened between 1997 and 2000. Yet, at the top of the banking 
system was the Central Bank of Libya (CBL), which became responsible for the 
prudential supervision of banks and for performing other central banking functions. 
Commercial banks were the dominant institutions in the system, whereas specialist banks 
such as the Development Bank, Agriculture Bank, Investment and Real Estate Bank and 
Libyan Arab Foreign Bank were established for specific purposes. However, the first 
three of these banks were primarily engaged in extending medium and long-term loans 
using the government as their main source for funding. On the other hand, the Libyan 
Arab Foreign Bank was established to take charge of the Libyan investments abroad. 
This study has revealed that some specific factors have aided the development of the 
banking sector, while others have impeded that development. These factors include those 
related to the prevailing economic and political conditions. For instance, the rises in the 
prices of crude oil, and the amendments introduced to the banking law have been 
reflected, to some extent, in the way in which commercial banking has developed. 
Furthermore, the abolition of the private sector and the adoption of a socialist system 
have affected banking growth by limiting loans portfolios to pre-selected public sector 
projects leading to the deterioration of banking assets in the long run by increasing the 
level of non-performing loans, which reached LD 1.5 billion in 1999. 
As a matter of fact the banking sector always played an important role in any economy 
through intermediation between depositors and investors. However, the objectives of the 
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banking industry have undergone fundamental changes. So the banking function has 
become broader, product, and geographic markets have become much more integrated. 
Consequently, banks have moved to introduce new services, and therefore intensifying 
competition among banking firms and other non-banking institutions. As a result of 
expansion, growth, and competition banks have become more prone to the crises that 
eventually began in the early 1980s and continued into the 1990s in both the industrial 
and the developing countries alike. 
Chapter three of this study has discussed that the banking crises have become a recurring 
phenomenon since the early 1980s. The reasons behind these crises could be attributed to 
the lack of prudential regulatory and supervisory frameworks, including lack of internal 
control systems, mismanagement, over-borrowing, over-lending, the growth of non- 
performing loans, government interference, and an inefficient institutional framework. 
All of these malpractices have lead to a decline in performance as well as inefficiency of 
the banking sector. Banking crises hit government budgets in many countries in the 
1990s. For example, in Indonesia the government spent over half of its total GDP in 
order to restructure the banking sector. However, in this respect international efforts have 
been made by organisations such as the World Bank, Basle Committee, and the Group of 
10 aiming at reducing the banking crises and at increasing the banking efficiency through 
the promotion of specific policies. These policies include strengthening the frameworks 
of banking regulation and supervision, privatising state-owned banks, removing interest 
rate controls, loan classification, and introducing robust guidelines on liquidity 
management, accounting standards, and basic internal control systems. However, various 
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countries have since adopted such policies to liberalise their banking sectors in order to 
improve performance. 
From the literature review it emerged that loan quality is the most important factor in 
banking assets as an indicator for safety and soundness in banking organisation. 
Therefore, bank supervision may focus on loans in order to guide management in credit 
process by establishing the appropriate loan classifications. 
In recent years, however, the importance of internal control systems in banking 
organisations has been increasingly recognised, particularly following the massive 
failures and losses associated with banking activities. Strong internal control systems 
play a crucial role in banking firms in securing safe and sound operations. They represent 
one of the main tools, which sustain management in meeting the bank's objectives and in 
reducing the uncertainty in the business through highlighting the potential risks facing 
the banking industry. The experiences of Malaysia and Saudi Arabia have shown that 
significant reforms and restructuring of banking sectors are possible through gradual 
application. These policies can be extended to cover both macro and microeconomic 
issues. The literature review of banking reforms has focussed on the fact that the success 
of banking reforms could be dependent on several factors, including the correct 
identification of banking problems, the selection of appropriate and applicable policies, 
and the careful sequencing and timing. Yet, it has become obvious that every experiment 
could be unique and could not be simply copied by other countries without consideration 
to the prevailing conditions of the two countries. 
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Libya returned to privatisation in the late 1980s, and consequently improved its banking 
sector both in terms of the growth figures in balance sheets, and in the introduction of a 
new banking organisation. However, the banking performance remained modest most of 
the time in the 1990s. The objective of chapter four has been to investigate the 
development of the Libyan commercial banking sector over the last three decades by 
analysing the growth of its assets and liabilities. In general, the growth of the total 
commercial banking assets appeared to have suffered severe fluctuations between 1970 
and 2001. The ratio of the total assets to the GDP during that period had increased 
steadily recording 79.3 per cent at the end of 2001, and 53.6 per cent on average across 
the entire period. In general there have been some specific factors, which have affected 
the development of the banking system in Libya. For instance, the nationalisation 
programme launched in 1970 and the new banking laws introduced in the 1970s and 
1990s, and the rises in the price of oil which increased the total revenue of the 
government. These were reflected in government expenditure, and led to sharp increases 
in government deposits. All of these factors have, in some cases, sustained but in other 
instances slowed down the development of the Libyan banking system as a whole. The 
government still has control over the banking sector and the high level of government 
intervention affects the commercial banks, prompting them to increase their credit and/or 
purchasing Treasury Bills and Securities (government tools). 
The total credit rose consistently between 1970 and 2001 growing 62-fold during that 
period. Although overdrafts are often regarded as an unsecured line of credit with regard 
to the Libyan commercial banking, loans and overdrafts represented the highest share of 
total credit during the period 1970-2001, reading a maximum for the years 1999,2000, 
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2001. This phenomenon may be attributed to many factors such as the new role of the 
banking sector featuring the contribution of this sector to the state economic policies by 
participating in the development plans through financing the trade and real estate sectors 
and other appropriate economic sectors. Another factor could be that the lack of money 
and the capital market had restricted the commercial banking sector in dealing with 
specific types of credit, limiting banking activities to short-term investments both locally 
and internationally. Moreover, the dramatic political change, following the introduction 
of socialism in 1979, leading to the abolition of the private sector the restrictions on 
private ownership, was another factor. Consequently, these severe measures have forced 
the banking sector to allow credit concentrating on the public sector. Also, the CBL 
control of the Libyan commercial banks has rendered them, in effect, to become 
departments of the CBL, introducing monopoly to the banking system. 
To sum up, it can be seen that over the entire period 1970-2001, there has been a 
significant growth in the total credit. On the other hand, the quality of loan portfolios has 
suffered from increases in bad loans as a consequence of government intervention. This 
situation has lead to the deterioration of assets quality or even to the ultimate bank 
failures in the long term. 
Time deposits have also developed markedly during the period under review, particularly 
representing deposits by government officials, growning eighty-fold during the period 
under review. This increase can be ascribed to rises in government deposits. 
278 
This study shows that over the entire period of 1970-2001, there has been significant 
growth in the Libyan commercial banks. Moreover, the research has highlighted many 
weak points, which may relate to lack of performance, including the following: 
1) Compared to Malaysia and Saudi Arabia, Libya has a lower ratio of total assets to 
GDP; which might reflect the poor contribution of commercial banking to the GDP. 
Given this fact it has become unclear as to why the Libyan commercial banking has 
performed so weakly in mobilising resources, compared to other developing 
economies. 
2) Furthermore, the ratio of money in circulation to the total money supply has 
represented over one-third during the period under review. This confirms the idea 
that the Libyan banking sector has not performed well to improve banking 
habitation. And last but not least, the CBL has become involved in both direct 
control and moral persuasion through directives issued and decisions made 
concerning commercial banks, which follow specific policies during the period 
under review. This situation might have caused some weaknesses regarding the 
activities of commercial banks, such as poor performance and the lack of a sound 
credit policy. Nonetheless, the current numerous bad loans represent a main problem 
for the banking sector. 
However, recently the Libyan government has been willing to open up the country's 
doors for foreign investment in many sectors to adapt to the challenges imposed by 
globalisation. These policies aim at reforming the financial sector in general and at 
liberalizing the banking sector in particular. 
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In order to restructure and reform the financial sector and to liberalize the banking sector, 
the Libyan government, in 1989, permitted a return to private ownership through 
establishing small and medium-size companies such as farms, hotels etc. Since that time 
the Libyan government has moved to liberalise the different economic sectors by 
adopting policies that will enable individuals to contribute to the economic cycle, and 
introducing the necessary reform policies to improve the banking performance. 
Nonetheless the Libyan experiment has, so far, revealed that the banking reforms have 
been too slow and unclear in terms of the overarching framework, and the banking 
services are still under-developed. However, despite the reform policy, commercial 
banks in Libya are still controlled by the government, where both the regulators and the 
banks are subject to governmental guidance for purposes such as the channelling of funds 
to preferred uses as a means of supporting national economic development plans. This 
will pose serious problems to the banking sector such as the increased level of non- 
performing loans a situation that has led to the deterioration in performance and the 
instability of the banking system. Even when the initial banking reforms in Libya have 
started, however, banking development remains stunted, and the overall conclusion is 
that the reform policy has had little impact on banking performance. 
However, financial ratios are commonly used to evaluate banking performance. Such 
tools are dependent on benchmark ratios that in some cases could be random, and which 
may mislead the analyst. Moreover these ratios do not work effectively when using 
multiple inputs and outputs. Therefore, this study aims to capture long-term performance 
in various aspects by measuring the efficiency of the Libyan commercial banking sector 
over the period 1980-2001. In an attempt to assess the overall efficiency of Libyan 
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commercial banks, this study has investigated the concept of efficiency in the banking 
industry by reviewing the methodology of Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA). 
The DEA technique has become a common tool regarding the evaluation of performance. 
However, the main advantage of this technique is that no functional form is imposed on 
the data, and also there is no statistical noise, besides the mathematical programming 
associated with this technique will tend to measure the efficiency of DMUs by 
transforming inputs to outputs relative to its peers. 
Moreover, Data Envelopment Analysis is a non-parametric methodology in which linear 
programming is used to measure the distance of individual banks from the more efficient 
or best practice frontier. As a linear programming technique it produces a best practices 
frontier composed of efficient Decision Making Units (DMUs), as initially developed by 
Charens, Cooper, and Rhodes (1978) to evaluate the efficiency of public sector non- 
profit organisation. Sherman and Gold (1985) were the first to apply DEA to banking. 
From that time a number of studies have applied DEA to measure the efficiency of the 
banking industries in different countries. 
In order to eliminate potential errors resulting from the separate use of the tools, i. e. 
financial ratios and DEA technique, this study attempts to measure banking performance 
using the DEA in conjunction with financial ratios. 
The major contribution of this study is the methodology used to measure the performance 
of the Libyan banking sector and the impact of the initial reforms policy. This 
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contribution is associated with the use of the modified DEA methodology to understand 
issues of performance and efficiency through the application of input oriented CCR and 
BCC models to the banking sector spanning a period of twenty-one years by using the 
two approaches of cross sectional and window analysis. Moreover, DEA has been used 
either in conjunction with financial ratios or with questionnaire data in order to appraise 
the potential and efficiency of the internal control systems. 
The application of the DEA approach to the Libyan commercial banking sector shows 
that the average overall technical efficiency over the period of the study declined due to 
the impact of non-performing loans on banking efficiency. 
On the other hand in order to examine the impact of the reform policies on the banking 
efficiency by using window analysis, three phases could be identified. The first phase has 
been characterised by a low banking efficiency score, indicating the massive government 
intervention in the banking system. On the other hand, the high efficiency score 
associated with phase three is strongly indicative of the impact of the reform policies on 
the banking efficiency, and yet generally speaking, these reforms appear to have had very 
little effect on the overall banking performance in Libya. 
The findings of this study have revealed that most of the commercial banks in Libya do 
not operate at constant returns to scale and that technical inefficiency may be attributed 
to scale inefficiency. The findings show that very few banks exhibited decreasing returns 
to scale, and a large majority exhibited increasingly constant returns to scale. However, 
two-thirds of scale inefficient banks operate with increasing returns to scale, while one- 
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quarter operated with constant returns to scale. Therefore the majority of the 
banks were 
not operating at constant returns to scale, a fact that renders scale efficiency a major 
source of inefficiency in relation to the commercial 
banking system in Libya. This might 
be attributed to either the under-utilisation of inputs or the incorrect selection 
combinations of inputs rather than inappropriate returns to scale. So, the overall interest 
expenses emerge as the dominant source of inefficiency across the sample. These results 
suggest that managers might use DEA results to identify the presence of inefficiencies as 
well the specific areas associated with these inefficiencies. 
This study has revealed that, on average, Libyan commercial banks have employed 
excessive resources for all types of input during the study period. However, from the 
results it becomes clear that until 1990, the percentage of over-usage of inputs increased 
steadily. This confirms the fact that commercial banks in Libya have been incapable of 
using the available resources in an efficient way. The results also suggest that the sources 
of inefficiency were both pure technical (managerial) and scale inefficiency (regulatory) 
DEA scores coupled with financial ratios show that banks with high scores for DEA 
efficiency also have higher ratios for capital adequacy, liquidity, and/or utilisation. On 
the other hand, they have lower financial ratios in asset quality, financial leverage and 
profitability. In the light of the analysis, banks with high efficiency scores were found to 
be more effective at the managerial level. All banks in three groups (high, medium, and 
low efficiency scores) appear to have had a significant fraction of non-performing loans, 
reflected in an inadequate loan allowance for loan losses. This factor would seem to 
provide clear support of the idea that Libyan commercial banking has experienced a lack 
of efficient loan policy due to the massive government intervention during the 1980s. 
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Furthermore, the above analysis shows that low efficiency scores may be explained by 
instability in credit policy. The findings also confirm that the Libyan banking sector 
experienced low profitability throughout the period under study. Finally, as far as the 
efficiency of internal audit functions in Libyan commercial banks is concerned, banks 
with higher technical efficiency scores also have higher scores for internal audit 
efficiency. 
This study has made a significant contribution to the banking literature by measuring the 
impact of government interference with regard to banking activities in general and the 
banking efficiency in particular. The results of this study appear to have provided new 
insights into financial performance of banks not available to managers through financial 
statements and traditional financial ratios analysis. Moreover, DEA results give further 
information concerning the current efficiency level of the Libyan commercial banks and 
sources of inefficiency. Also, it provides information to mangers, policy planners and 
decision-makers of the banking sector in Libya including ways to improve the current 
efficiency level. Furthermore, managerial performance can be improved by identifying 
the best practices and worst practices associated with high and low efficiency, 
respectively. 
In summary, the findings of this research may prove useful for the Central Bank of Libya 
(CBL) as well as bank managers. The CBL can benefit from these results by choosing 
the appropriate approach of banking regulation and supervision, in order to increase 
efficiency in the Libyan banking sector, and to recognise weak points in commercial 
banks in particular and in the banking sector in general. For managers these results give 
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effective tools with which they can identify the main problems that may affect banking 
performance and audit functions. Moreover, the results would provide a clear perspective 
of the potential problems that would likely affect the banking efficiency in Libya 
suggesting ways of improving that efficiency. The Libyan bank manager should find the 
findings of this study of potential use in identifying the extent of efficiency status and 
evaluation of their success or failure. This study may benefit policy makers in Libya in 
their attempt to improve the overall efficiency of the banking sector in the country to 
assess the degree to which domestic banks requiring reforms. 
2.7 Recommendations 
Although the results are satisfactory when it comes to banking growth and efficiency in 
Libyan commercial banks, some issues are worth stressing. The following 
recommendations, if taken on board, would enable the Libyan banking sector to improve 
its operations. 
The most significant problems facing commercial banks in Libya in particular and the 
banking sector in general could be summarised as follows: 1) lack of performance, 2) the 
level of growth of non-performing loans, and 3) weakness in internal control systems, 
and 4) high liquidity. 
Lack of banking performance could be attributed to the massive government interference 
as well as lack of a strong prudential banking supervision and regulation, coupled with 
the attitudes of the senior management, and the quality of staff. 
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Regarding the growth of non-perfonning loans, the Libyan government needs to 
strengthen its loan classification system and provision requirements in order to clear the 
balance sheets of commercial banks of bad loans in the first place, besides the 
enforcement of its banking regulation. Hence it is incumbent on commercial banks in 
Libya to classify loans in ways, which will match international standards. However, the 
current loan classification standards, introduced in 1997, are based on the borrower's past 
or the current financial performance. Yet, every bank should establish its own loan 
classification standard that reflects the past, current, and expectations of future financial 
performance of its borrowers. Furthermore, banks should be required to reclassify their 
current loan portfolio in order to solve the problem of bad loans. 
However, the Libyan banking sector would require specific measures to improve its 
internal control systems. The auditing programmes currently used focus mainly on 
documentary auditing. The Central Bank of Libya should play a crucial role in 
establishing soundness and safety in the banking sector. Thus, commercial banks should 
have the duty to develop written systems of. prudent lending policies, appropriate loan 
documentation practices in their lending function, as well as adopt specific procedures 
for loan approval. Consequently, the Libyan commercial banking system should first 
establish an appropriate internal control system including adequate organisational 
measures, which would distinguish between the boards of directors, the management 
executives, and the internal auditors. In addition, adequate administration procedures 
need to be set up via job description, besides improving their lending policies to match 
international standards and, establishing the risk management standards. 
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The study shows that reform of the banking sector had no significant effect on the use of 
cheques as a means of payments. The financial system remains cash-based with large 
liquidity outside the banking system. The excess liquidity outside the banking is also due 
to the lack of universal cheque acceptance by both the public and the banking system. 
However, the solution to this problem would imply the introduction of innovative 
banking products and services, such as Sika card and other pre-payment devices, that 
might reduce the excessive liquidity outside the banking sector and enhance the 
mobilisation of savings within the banking system. 
Financial deepening would also be accomplished by the introduction of improved 
banking products such as Auto Teller Machine (ATM), credit cards, commercial paper, 
travellers' cheques, money orders, and other services that facilitate commercial 
transactions. Furthermore, the government should encourage the introduction of bank 
deposits insurance to ensure public confidence in the banking system 
As a result of the government control of the banking system, there has been an inherent 
lack of both regulation and an adequate supervisory framework. It is clear that an 
effective framework of bank regulatory and supervisory system consistent with the 
international standards is more likely to address banking problems in a proper manner. 
Moreover, reform and/or restructuring cannot achieve its objective without 
comprehensive and robust programmes addressing both macro and micro levels. 
In order to establish such system, Libya needs to implement reforms in the following 
areas: 
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a. Restructuring current commercial banks including, reconstitution and 
strengthening of affected banks' board of directors. 
b. Reformulating banking objectives. 
c. Strengthening internal control systems. 
d. Enhancing the efficiency of the banking sector through more privatisation 
of banks by selling at least 30% of the shares of these banks to the private 
sector. 
e. Commercial banks should improve their services by introducing new 
services and using new technologies to perform banking operations 
f. In order to increase competition within the banking sector the Libyan 
government should establish new financial organisations including 
Islamic banks, and allow for domestic and specialist banks to practise 
commercial operations 
g. Resolving the problem of non-performing loans by writing them off 
balance sheets of commercial banks, or by issuing Treasury Bills instead 
of these loans. 
h. Other changes should include the upgrading of the managerial capacity 
and efficiency of under-performing banks through intensive staff training, 
and the provision of sufficient capital and liquidity to enable the troubled 
banks to operate in a self-sustaining manner after restructuring. 
3.7 Limitations and Directions for Future Research 
This study has several limitations, which suggest directions for future work. 
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Firstly, the study only assesses the efficiency in one type of banks in Libya, i. e. 
commercial banks. It may be more useful to assess the effect of the initial reforms 
policies on banking efficiency by applying the same methodology to the entire banking 
sector, including domestic banks, development banks, and private banks. 
Secondly, this study has only measured efficiency by applying the DEA technique under 
the intermediation approach. One possibility for further research would be to conduct a 
comparative study which will incorporate both the production and the intermediation 
approaches. 
Thirdly, of this study has mainly employed a non-parametric methodology in order to 
evaluate banking performance. It may be possible to evaluate banking efficiency and the 
impact of reform policies on banking performance by applying different frontier 
approaches i. e. a parametric methodology, and to compare the results of the different 
methods. This might provide an empirical identification of the impact of both 
government interference and the reforms policy on the banking performance in general 
and on the banking efficiency in particular. 
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Appendix one: The Evolution of the monetary policy 
Al.! The evolution of the Central Bank of Libya and its role in promoting the 
Libyan currency 
In the absence of a local banking system since 1942, there has been no effective 
monetary policy applied in the Libyan economy. Earlier in the 1940s and the 1950s 
a number of different currencies had been in exchange in the country, such as the 
Egyptian pound in the East of country, the French Franc in the Fezzen region and the 
currency in circulation in Tripolitania was Military Administration Lire. 
According to Pelt (1970), based on the report of a study concluded in the early 
1950s, it was noted that the first priority of the Libyan economy was the 
establishment of a banking system and a stable currency. However, political 
independence appears to have overshadowed this economic objective. After 
independence in 1951, a currency commission was established according to the 
Libyan currency Law No. 4 of 1951. The main aims of the currency commission 
being to define the functions of the monetary affairs department, the currency system 
and the investment of the state's accumulated currency reserves (Bank of Libya, 
1967). 
The first Libyan currency was issued in 1952, to replace the other currencies. The 
Libyan Pound was divided into 100 piasters and consisted of ten milliems. The 
National Bank of Libya was founded in 1956 to replace the Libyan currency 
commission maintaining close relationships with the Bank of England (Waddams, 
1980). 
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The Libyan pound maintained its equivalence to the sterling until 1967, when it was 
devaluated for the first time, but continuing as a member of the sterling bloc until the 
end of 1971. In September 1971, the Libyan currency was changed from the Libyan 
pound to the Libyan Dinar (LD), divided into 1,000 Dirhams. The new currency 
came in 250 and 500 dirhams banknotes and 1,5,10,50,100 dirhams (Waddams, 
1980). The Banking law No. 4 of 1963 gave the National Bank of Libya the sole right 
of issuing the currency rendering it responsible for maintaining the monetary stability 
and the external value of the Libyan currency and for regulating currency and credit. 
In addition, the Banking law No. 4 of the year 1963 tended to change the pattern by 
introducing a currency cover to about 90 per cent investment in sterling and the rest 
in dollar deposits. The gold cover; gold coins or foreign currencies, securities 
including Treasury Bills, which were issued or guaranteed by the Libyan 
Government and Treasury Bills issued or guaranteed by foreign governments as 
described in Article 31 in the new Banking law. The total currency in circulation rose 
from about 5.1 million Libyan pounds when the National Bank of Libya was founded 
in June 1956, to 38.1 million Libyan pounds at the end of 1966, with an annual 
average increase of 3.3 million Libyan pounds. 
Nevertheless, the failure of the Libyan currency commission in the early 1950s in 
identifying the Libyan economy's demand for the sake of economic development had 
led to a series of problems in both the monetary system and financial sector. 
Furthermore, the total assets of the commercial banks rose from £L 4.05 million at 
the end of 1951 to £L 13.7 by the end of 1955, pushing the money supply to an 
unprecedented level of £L 9.9 million. 
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Therefore, the government would not be able to conduct its fiscal policy without 
creating proper monetary institutions, particularly an effective central bank. 
The main reason for establishing a central bank was discussed in Government policy 
memorandum in 1954 emphasising the following points: 
> To hold government funds 
> To manage the Libyan currency 
> To control the Utilisation of foreign exchange rate and to supervise the 
country's balance of payments 
> To act as a central clearing bank 
> To control the over monetary policy and real control over the banking 
system. 
> To investment the Libyan currency 
Subsequently, the National Bank of Libya was established in accordance with law 
No. 30 of 1955 commencing its official operations in Tripoli in April 1956, with the 
currency commission affiliated to the new bank. 
A1.1.1 The National Bank of Libya: its evolution and role in the Libyan banking 
system 
As has been previously stated, the National Bank of Libya was founded according to 
law No. 30 of 1955, incorporating 52 articles, regarding the regulation organisation 
of its operations. The main objectives of the National Bank of Libya, as declared 
under article 6 were: 
"to regulated the Issued of bank-notes and coins to keep reserves with a 
view to maintaining monetary stability in Libya and external value of the 
Libyan pound, to influence the credit situation to the Kingdom's advantage 
and to act as banker to the government and to the provincial administration. 
Under this law the National Bank of Libya would undertake ordinary commercial 
banking business and also the duties of the Libyan commission of currencies. Yet, to 
meet those objectives, the bank was divided into two parts: the Issue Department, 
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and Banking Department, with the Bank of England as a conventional model. The 
authorised capital of the National Bank of Libya was one million Libyan pounds. 
During the first decade following its establishment, the National Bank of Libya 
played an important role representing the government as a banker and as an adviser. 
Furthermore, the Bank of Libya has played an active role on all major government 
committees dealing with economic development, foreign trade, finance, and other 
domestic economic problems. 
However, in the wake of the privatisation of the commercial banks in Libya, and the 
promotion of banking in the country, the desire to introduce the Libyans to the 
commercial filed has become intensified. Therefore, the government has come up 
with the suggestion that the Bank of Libya should undertake some limited 
commercial transaction such as, current account, and acceptance of deposits. 
Moreover many steps have been taken to extend the role of the Bank of Libya to 
accommodate the activities of the commercial banks as well. 
In addition, the main objective for the National Bank of Libya, to supervise 
commercial banks and become the last lender resort without practicing that, led to its 
malfunctioning. 
Although the main purpose of National Bank of Libya in entering the field of 
commercial banking was to assist in establishing other banking institutions yet, as 
has been concluded by its Third Report, the bank still enjoys a monopoly of power in 
this sector. To solve this problem, the first Banking law was promulgated in 1958, 
which consisted of twenty-three articles. It was very clear and has made some 
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important steps towards regulating the commercial banks. Under the new banking 
law, the activities of the commercial banks were more regulated such as Licensing 
procedures, capital, reserves, liquidity, credit policy, supervision, and duties 
responsibility. On the other hand, the Minister of Finance is made to hold the highest 
authority, and the National Bank has assumed an advisory role. To correct this 
situation the new Banking law was published in 1963. The Banking law No. 4 of 
1963, was replaced the National Bank of Libya law No. 30 of 1955. This law 
included two three sections incorporating 84 articles all together. 
However, according to the new law the name of the National Bank of Libya was 
changed to the Bank of Libya, and the Bank is now delegated the full power and 
authority of a modem Central bank. Its responsibilities included controlling the 
commercial banking sector as well as maintaining the monetary policies and the 
financial stability. As concluded in Article No 35 of the new law the control and 
supervision of the commercial banking has become more regulated (Banking law No. 
4 of 1963). 
In order to accomplish its first purpose, the Bank was adopted a policy to persuade 
the branches of foreign banks which were dealing in the country to register as Libyan 
firms, and to allowing not less than 51% of their capital to be shared by the Libyan 
nationals. 
A1.1.2 The Central Bank of Libya: tools and rules on the economy 
The banking system represents the cornerstone for the development of any economy. 
In general it consists of a central bank, commercial banks and specialised banks. The 
central bank is usually at the forefront i. e. in the position of the leader of the banking 
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system, with regard to its functions as defined by the law. Moreover, its main 
objective is the implementation of the general economic policies of the state, by 
using its own tools and instruments, in order to influence the behaviour of the 
banking sector and to ensure the proper implementation of the monetary policies 
through the control of the money supply (El-Jehaimi et al 1992) 
The functions, precise duties and powers of the central bank vary from one country 
to another. In general central banks have common functions, which all must 
discharge, and functions are inherent in their objectives including, control and issue 
of notes and coin, control of the volume of credit created by banks, as an adviser to 
the government and banks and a lender last resort (Struthers and Spelight, 1986). 
Yet, prior to discussing the evaluation of the central bank in Libya, it is very 
important to define the main functions of this institution in general. The Bank of 
International Settlement (BIS) defines a central bank as: 
"the bank in any country to which has been entrusted the duty of 
regulating the volume of currency and credit in that country" 
Struther and Spelight (1986) quoted Sir Richard (1967) defining the central bank as: 
"the central bank is organ of government that undertakes the 
financial operation of the government and by it conduct of 
those operations ". 
Generally central banks are responsible for the implementations of monetary 
policies. Its main task is to manage and control the money supply in the country, 
which is considered as a vital role associated with the state economy (El-Jehaimi et 
al., 1992). As a government organisation, central bank has many important functions 
including the conduct and control of credit, determining monetary policies, and 
providing supervision on the banking activity. However, to accomplish these 
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objectives the central bank has the power and the authority under all circumstances to 
achieve the general economic objectives of the state, mainly to bring about economic 
stability through cooperation with the entire banking system (Struthers and Spelight, 
1986). 
A1.1.2.1 Development function of Central Bank of Libya 
The Central Bank of Libya (CBL), unlike many other central banks, was not 
established for the specific purpose of carrying out the normal banking functions. 
However, at the present day, these functions are regarded as the main business of a 
central bank. Nonetheless, the Central Bank of Libya has developed gradually by 
adjusting and adapting itself to the changing conditions and circumstances, even 
though few phases have been involved in the course of this development. 
As has been explained previously, the Bank of Libya commenced its operations 
following the publication of Act No 30 of 1955 concerning the establishment of the 
first Libyan bank under the name of "the Libyan National Bank" or (LNB) in short. 
Then Article 6 of the same Law outlined the general objectives of the new bank. 
These objectives included the regulation and issuing of the Libyan currency, the 
maintenance and the management of government reserves. However, in carrying out 
functions the LNB may change the discount rate, liquidity ratio and use the moral 
persuasion as tools for regulating monetary policies and controlling credit facilities. 
However, the LNB also dealt with branches of foreign banks in Libya. Since these 
branches remain under the control of their headquarters abroad, as a result the LNB 
was unable to implement its banking credit policies on the branches. Yet, to solve 
this problem, the new banking law was issued in 1958, which determined the capital 
requirement and liquidity ratio for commercial banks. Under the new Act, 
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commercial banks must maintain 20 per cent as reserves from the total liabilities in 
their cabinet. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, the Libyan economy witnessed 
dramatic changes following the oil discovery and the subsequent impacts on the 
economy in Libya. Under these circumstances, however, the banking Law of 1958 
failed to cope with the new conditions of monetary and economic transformation. 
Consequently a new banking Law no 4 of 1963 came to being replacing the name of 
LNB by the name "the Bank of Libya" as well as providing the new Bank with the 
tools and authority to support, manage and implement the monetary policies in Libya 
(CBL, 2001). 
Yet, the significant change might have been that of the liquid reserves ratio. 
Commercial banks should maintain reserves with the Bank of Libya without interest 
against their deposit liabilities. On the other hand, the Bank of Libya has authority- 
introduced charge on reserves from 10 % to 40 % on demand deposit and 5% to 20 
% on time and savings deposits. Thereby commercial banks become fully under the 
supervision of Bank of Libya (El-Jehaimi et al., 1992). 
The emergence of law No 4 of 1963 represented the first step towards monetary 
reforms, where the central bank assumed its leading position regarding the 
organisation of the banking system, particularly with respect of the control and 
supervision of other financial institutions. Hence, for the first time the bank of Libya 
became capable of practicing its duties especially those of managing and controlling 
credit (bide, 1992). Nonetheless by the year 1971 the Bank of Libya had become a 
full fledged central bank representing the sole monetary authority in the country, 
following the enforcement of the banking law no 63 of 1971. According to the terms 
of this Act, the Bank of Libya has been given the authority to assume all the 
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functions of the Central Bank of Libya, given that the former has been reorganised 
into two departments i. e. the banking department and the issue department (El- 
Jehaimi et al, 1992). 
The major function of a modem central bank is to help implement the government's 
monetary policy. However, besides this function the bank would undertake several 
other functions many of which were common to central banks. After the 
nationalisation and the replacement of the banking law by Act no 63 of 1971, the 
CBL in the course of its development has come to perform an increasingly diverse 
set of functions as well as to develop its relationships with the government and 
banking sector. The functions of the CBL could include activities such as the issuing 
of currency, representing the government, acting as the banker' bank and providing 
supervising to the banking sector. 
A1.1.1.2 The Central Bank of Libya and its monetary tools 
¢ 1970-1990 
Prior to nationalisation, the CBL was unable to practice its authorities as a central 
bank, owing to the weakness of the banking law of 1958, as well as the obstacles, 
that followed the promulgation of the banking law no 4 of 1963. However, since its 
establishment under the terms of law 4 of 1963, the CBL has been successful in 
using some of the tools such as the requirement of reserves, liquid ratio and the 
determination of interest rates. 
As has been mentioned earlier the Libyanisation and the nationalisation of the 
banking sector have lead to the transfer of all commercial banks into joint stock 
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companies wholly owned by the CBL. The following the promulgation of law 63 of 
1971, the CBL became a full central bank. 
Theoretically, all instruments of monetary policy are available in Libya (except for 
the open market operation) and they can be used to control and regulate the money 
supply and to influence the banking credit (Baryun, 1987). During the period 1970- 
90, the CBL was confined to the use of limited monetary tools. For instance in 1970 
it reduced the liquidity ratio from 25 per cent to 15 per cent in order to facilitate the 
banking credit and to restrict the accumulation of funds, resulting from an increase in 
the level of liquidity ratio in banking sector. In addition, the definition of liquid 
assets has been changed since May 1970 to include cash money whether in domestic 
or foreign currency and demand and time deposits in both CBL and commercial 
banks. However, the 1980 witnessed another important decision taken by the CBL, 
which involved the fixing of the maximum limit for credit interest rates offered by 
commercial banks. This decision was related to the amendment of interest rates 
(CBL, 1980). 
With the enforcement of law 63 of 1971, the largest banks in the country came under 
the full ownership of the CBL, whereas it held 51 % or more of the shares of the 
remaining two commercial banks. Consequently, the monetary policy has been 
working through moral suasion and by issuing directives regarding bank credits. 
Moreover, the facts that the directors of commercial banks are actually CBL 
appointees, and therefore considered as employees of the CBL, will greatly influence 
their status as decision makers. 
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¢ 1991-2001 
At the end of 1989, Libya witnessed many changes towards privatisation in many 
sectors where the government offered a limited degree of freedom to these sectors to 
practice private activities. Likewise to enable the banking sector cope with these 
changes in undertaking its responsibilities as a leading force of the economy in 
Libya, the government introduced the banking Act no 1 of 1993 concerning Banking, 
Currency, and Credit. The new Act mainly aimed at enforcing the monetary policies 
in the country (more details are given in chapter four). 
Consequently, the CBL issued a new order in 1994 introducing some changes to the 
maximum limits for credit and interest rates offered by commercial banks. However, 
under the new order, these rates as determined by the CBL were as follows: 
Deposits for less than one month (10 days 2.5 %; 10-30 days 3%) 
Fixed deposits: 
a) 1 month to less than 3 months 3.5 % 
b) 3 months to under 6 months 4% 
c) 6 months to less than a year 5% 
d) One to three years 5.5% 
(CBL, 2001). 
The main purpose of the above mentioned decision was to encourage commercial 
banks to look for better chances for investment rather than interests from deposits. In 
brief, the CBL is involved in the direct control and the moral persuasion by issuing 
directives and orders to commercial banks to follow up specific policies during the 
period over review. This situation might have produced some weaknesses in 
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commercial banks such as poor performance and lack of credit policy and the 
numerous bad loans that currently represent a main problem for the banking sector. 
A1.2 The Monetary Policy 
As we have already mentioned in the first section, the Libyan banking, and the 
monetary system had been an integral part of the Italian Banking and monetary 
systems. That system was broken down when the Allied forces defeated the Italians 
in 1942. Libya was still without monetary system until the establishment of the 
National Bank of Libya in 1956. The hope for the foundation of a modern monetary 
policy was delayed. The main reasons may be associated with the limited legal 
power, the highly undeveloped state of the money market and the absence of any 
coordination in activities at the various economic levels in the country. 
The influence of the government on the monetary policy was very limited in the 
early days of independence. That was mainly due to its acute economic condition and 
heavy dependence on foreign aids. Moreover, due to the absence of any banking laws 
in regulating the banking sector, and maintaining the monetary policy, the 
government was unable to use effectively its available tools for monetary policy. 
As noted in the previous subsection in this chapter, one of the main purposes for 
establishing the Bank of Libya was to enable the government to control the monetary 
policy in the country (Bank of Libya, 1967). All monetary policy tools are now 
available for use except for the limited open markets. The bank rate and reserve 
requirements were not used much during the whole period. 
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During the period from 1956 until 1963, however, there were only some very limited 
monetary tools available to the Bank of Libya. The main tools were the rate of 
discount, and certain controls over liquidity. Furthermore, the Bank had used its 
power of moral suasion in conducting its monetary policy. After the publication of 
its Third Report, the Central Bank of Libya began to collect various economic data in 
order to make a more regular and systematic analysis of the economic trends. The 
aim was to establish a sound monetary policy, aimed at providing advice to the 
government. In addition, the Bank was required to make a general review of its credit 
and monetary policy in relation to the question of resorting to the National Bank of 
Libya for borrowing funds. The answer to this question was that the local foreign 
banks were borrowing from their respective head offices to raise their liquid funds. 
Therefore, the National Bank of Libya would not be able to influence the credit 
activities in the country. 
The government has adopted a new monetary policy after the nationalization and 
reorganisation of the banking system in the 1970s. The moral suasion and credit 
controls selected as monetary policy especially after the promulgation of law No 63 
of 1971. As Baryun (1987) argued, the moral suasion and cooperation became easier 
because the members of the committee of the commercial banks were considered 
employees of the Central Bank. 
Furthermore, the 1970s and the 1980s witnessed several decrees and regulations both 
in monetary policy and in banking policy. For instance, the fixing of the maximum 
limit for credit interest rate offered by commercial banks for deposits may be 
regarded as an important decision. (CBL, 1980). 
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APPENDIX TWO DEA MODELS 
1- CCR 
The CCR model assigns weights to each input and output, and it assesses the 
efficiency of a given DMU by the ratio of aggregate weighted output to the aggregate 
weighted input. Although input-oriented and output-oriented models calculate the 
same envelop surfaces, inefficient DMUs will be located at different positions in 
each model. Also, the following statements are valid, but the opposites are not 
necessarily valid. 
1. If DMU is efficient in output-oriented CCR, then it will be efficient in 
input-oriented CCR 
2. If DMU is efficient in CCR, then it will be efficient in BCC 
Input-Oriented CCR 
One of the most important of the ratio structures of CCR is to reduce multi-input and 
multi-output down to single-input and single-output. The ratio of this single-input 
and single-output provides an efficiency measure. This function is an objective 
function of DMUo and it can be written as the following: 
max ho (u, v) = uryro v x,, 
U, V r! 
This has been restriction that, for all DMU, output-to-input ratio should be less than 
1. 
Mathematical linear programming problem regarding CCR-input Ratio can be 
written as the followings 







Er <_ 1, for j=0, l ... n vý xýj 
i 
Ur >_c, Forr=0,1,......., n 
iE vixio 
Vi 
c, For r=0,1,......., n 
v; x;. 
Here, u, represents the weight of an output r, v; represents the weight of an input i, 
yj represents the amount of output r of a decision making unit j, x;. represents I of a 
decision making unit j, c is a positive non-archemedian scalar. It should be noted 
that if (u', v') is optimal, (ßu, Qv ") is also optimal for 8> 0. 
Under the assumption that the sum of inputs is constant at I and the sum of outputs 




U, V rr ro 
Subject to vX =1 t io 
J: uy-vvxSo 






This equation actually represents the dual equation of input-oriented CCR. Since this 
equation is a linear programming problem, primal equation of input-oriented CCR 
can be found by converting the above into a duality problem of linear programming. 
Then we have the following. 
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max z=9-e S, -i Si B. x. S, ST 0rr 
Subject to: E Aj yj - S+ = yo 
i 
exo-z y, x; -s- =0 i 
y; Sr, S, >_0 
Rewriting the above equations in the forms that are consistent with ones used to 
describe BCC and additive models will give the following equations. It should be 
noted that, unlike BCC models, the convexity restriction of (I A, = I) and uo don't 
appear in the equations. 
Primal 
max z 0-s. Is+-e. Is- 
e. x. s; s; 0 
SA YA - S. = Yo 
Dual 
maxcvo. UT yo a, v 
S. t VT X1 =1 
0X0 -X1%-s- =o 
A, S+, s- >_ 0 
UTY-VTR' O 
- UT <_ -s. I 
_ VT 5-8.1 
Output-Oriented CCR 
By following the same logic as in Input-oriented CCR, we can find the following 
output ratio for CCR 
min 
VTXO 
M, V ur 
Yo 
T 








Again following the procedure as in input-oriented CCR, we have the following 
duality problem. Again it should be noted that the convexity restriction and uo do not 
appear in the equation. 
Primal 
mix zo =O+E. Is+ + E. Is- 
Dual 
max qo = uT x0 
u, v 
s. t Oy0-yA, +s+=0 
x, % + s-xo 
xA, + s- = xo 
A, s+, s- ?0 
2. BCC 
S. t VT YJ =1 
-ury+VTX ZO 
uT z 6.1 
VT zE. I 
BCC model distinguishes technical inefficiency from scale inefficiencies by 
estimating pure technical efficiency at the given scale of operation. There are two 
forms of BCC. Depending on whether the primary objective is to maximise the 
proportional increase in outputs or the proportional decrease in inputs, different 
projected points can be obtained. The latter is called "Input-oriented BCC" and the 
former is called "output-oriented BCC". 
Input-oriented BCC 
Input-oriented BCC tries to minimise the input given output. In other words, it tries 
to minimise the distance between DMU and efficient frontier through the 
responsiveness of input. Basic framework of input-oriented BCC is the following: 
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Primal 
minzo = 0-c. Is+ -c. Is- 
B, 2, s'", s' 
s. t Y, %-s9=Y0 
oxo-XA-s- =0 
I. A. =1 
t, s', s- Z0 
Dual 
max co, = uT Y0 + vo 
u. v 
S. t v Xo =1 
uTY-vTX+vo <_0 
-uT <-E. I 
- VT 5 -6. I 
uo free 
It should be noted that a scalar variable 0 appeared in primal equation. Here, 0 is a 
variable that minimises inputs. 9 is applied to every DMUs input variable in order to 
improve efficiency. Also non-archmedian constant e appeared in both primal and 
dual equation. Input-oriented BCC is designed to minimise the range of scalar 
variable 0, and then movement toward efficiency frontier will be made through slack 
variables (s' , s- ). In order to 
improve efficiency, 0 will be applied to all DMUs, 
and the minimisation of 0 will be allowed due to the existence of non-archmedian 
constants. In order for a DMU to be efficient, the following conditions should be 
satisfied. 
1.9'=I ands+=s-=O 
2. w(*, = z(*) =I 
Output-oriented BCC 
Output oriented BCC concentrate on maximising outputs. Much like the name 
suggests, the focus of output-oriented BCC is to maximise outputs given inputs. 
Basic framework of output-oriented BCC is the given in the following set of 
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equations. 0 in the primal equation is a scalar that maximises output and output- 
oriented is designed to maximise the range of . 
Primal 
maxzo =0+c. Is* +E. Is- 
s. t OY0-Yt +s+ =0 
XA, + s- = X0 
Dual 
max q0 =u'Xo+v0 
u, u, uo 
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kPPENDIX FOURE QUESTINNAIRE DESIGEN 
Division of Economic and Resource Management 
Newcastle Business School 
Northumbria University 
Please answer the following questions by ticking the appropriate box 
PART 1: General Information: 
1.1) What is }our job title? 
Audit Department Manager 
Internal Audit office Director 
j Audit Internal Division Chairman 
. Internal auditor 
i Other ................................. 
1.2) 





Q High Diploma 
i Other .............................. 
1.3) 
.1 cadcniic/Training Specialisation 
.. Accountancy 
Finance and banking 
j Business Administration 
__ Statistical 
J Economics 




1.4) Number of years of experience in the banking field 
o Less than 6 years 
o From 6 to 12 years 
o From 12 to 18 years 
o Over 18 years 
o Other .................................... 
1.5) Number ofyears of experience in the auditing field 
o Less than 3 years 
o From 3 to 6 years 
o From 6 to 9 years 
o Over 9 years 
o Other ................................... 
Part II: Audit Function 






2.2) Who controls the internal audit function? 
Q Board of Directors 
Q Chairman of the Board of Directors 
Q General Manager 
o The Control Committee 
Q Other .................. 









E3 Other ............. 
ZS) If yes, whom is the report submitted to? 
Q Board of directors 
o Chairman of board of directors 
o General Manager 
o Control Committee 
Q Other ................. 
2.6) Do you receive any feed back front these reports? 
o Always 
o Some times 
o Depends on the need 
o None 
Q Other (please specify) .................. 
2.7) Do you think that the current competence of internal audit employees are? 
Q Adequate to fulfil their function 
Q Inadequate 
Q Adequate but with short of skills 
o Inadequate and must be developed 
o If you have any additional comment concerning the internal audit employees 
please give your opinion? ..................... 
2.8) How are the employees of the internal audit appointed? 
Q By Senior Management 
Q By transfer from other departments 
Q Must have at least 5 years experience in banking field 
Q By recommendation from the internal audit' manager 
Q Other ........................................................ . 
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2.9) Are there any training programs for developing the performance of the 
internal audit' employees in your bank? 
o Yes (regular programs) 
Q Yes (but irregular programs) 
o None 
2.10) If yes (regular programs) by what method? 
Q Regular studies (e. g. completing higher education) 
o Specific training 
o Offsite training courses 
o On job training 
Q Other ....................... 
2.11) Are audit employees (Head office/ Branches) able to notify any instruction 
and directives fron: Central Bank of Libya? 
o Yes 
o No 
2.12) Is there any pursuit of the international development in your internal audit? 
Q Yes 
Q No 
2.13) Do internal audit employees adhere to the international auditing standard 
when carrying out their functions? 
Q Always 
Q Sometimes 
2.14) Are these standards implemented in your bank? 
Q Yes 
Q No 
Part III: Senior Management and Audit Function 





3.2) Does your bank have any additional organisational charts that determine the 
authority, responsibility and communication? 
o Yes 
o No 
3.3) Does your bank have a written accountancy system to ensure that employees 
carry out their duties? 
o Yes 
Q No 




3.5) If yes, would you provide a brief account of these policies? 
.................................................................................................................. 
................................................................................................................. 
3.6) Do you agree that the senior management assist the internal audit 
(department/division /office) to perform their duties? 
o Strongly agree 
o Agree 
Q Disagree 
o Strongly disagree 
o Undecided 
3.7) Do you agree that senior management understands the importance of the 
internal audit's roles? 
o Strongly agree 
Q Agree 
o Disagree 
Q Strongly disagree 
Q Undecided 
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3.8) In your opinion, what is the point of view of the senior management for the 
role of the internal audit. 
o Positive and very important in realising the bank' goals 
Q Positive only 
Q Negative 
o Regulatory compliance 
o Other please specify .............................. 
3.9) Has the senior management placed greater emphasis on the internal audit's 
role during the last 10 years? 
Q Yes 
Q No 
Part IV: Scope and Limitation of Audit Function 




4.2) Please tick which programs are applicable (May choose more than one)? 
Q Financial audit 
o Managerial audit 
o Documentary audit 
Q Technical audit 
Q Goals audit 
Q Performance audit 
















4.7) If yes, please specify which methods are used in risk assessment? 
4.8) If no, who conducts this function? 
Q Senior management 
o Credit Department 
o External Expertise Bureau 
Q Not important 
o Other ...................... 
Part V: Objectives and Mechanisms of Internal Audit Function 
5.1) What is your official relationship with internal auditors in your bank? 
Q Direct relationship 
Q Indirect relationship 
5.2) If there is a direct official relationship, do you set out to them your directives 
and instructions concerning the internal audit duties? 
E3 Yes 
u No 




5.4) What is the relationship between your audit department and the Central Bank 
of Libya? 
o Direct relationship 
o Indirect relationship 
5.5) If a direct relationship, does the Central Bank of Libya determine the 
framework of audit function in banking sector? 
o Yes 
Q No 









5.8) Has the internal audit department ever assisted to discover many cases of 
corruption and embezzlement in the last 10 years? 
v Yes 
o No 
S. 9) Ifyes, how marry cases? 
Q 1-5 
Q 6-10 
Q Over 10 
5.10) Do you think that reasons for corruption and embezzlement may attribute to: 
o Lack of internal control systems 
Q Attitude of senior management 
o Lack of banking regulation 
o Intervention from external bodies 
o Other .................................................................................... 
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5.11) flow many tines had the top management reviewed the procedures and scope 
of the internal audit controls function? 
o Regularly 
o Other please specify ........................ 
5.12) 117: at do you believe is the most important factor to strengthen the roles of 
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